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ABSTRACT  
Individuals have excellent intuitive understanding of the physical world around 
them, evident from an early age.  However, implicit understanding does not always 
transfer to explicit knowledge. The evaluation of source reliability is a crucial 
scientific reasoning skill that may assist in this transfer. Both adults and children 
have been shown to pay attention to source reliability, preferring higher reliability 
sources. However, assessments in children have generally used artificial 
manipulations of source reliability, and the degree to which younger children are 
showing epistemic awareness regarding potential source knowledge is unclear.  
The study aims were to investigate the development of epistemic awareness in 
relation to what sources might know; to compare the developmental trajectory of 
implicit and explicit understanding of a familiar causal system; to enable a more 
direct comparison between the adult and child literature on source reliability; and 
to assess any role played by gender and language.  
A more naturalistic task, a typical science class problem related to forces and 
motion, was employed. Six- to 17-year-olds were asked questions regarding their 
causal understanding, before and after receiving unexpected information from 
differentially reliable sources, and after carrying out an intervention, observing that 
the information was correct.  
As predicted, participants who received information from high reliability sources 
were more likely to make correct predictions and explanations regarding the causal 
system. Participants who understood the causal system were more convinced than 
those who did not, and higher reliability source information increased conviction. 
Also, males made more correct predictions than females, although this could be 
confounded by age and SES differences. However, there were no age or language-
related effects regarding source reliability, possibly due to demographic differences 
within the sample.  
Future research looking at the role of source reliability in scientific reasoning should 
shift the paradigm into real-life environments, and include demographic and 
individual-differences measures. 
  
 
3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Declaration ............................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Abstract.................................................................................................................................................... 2 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................. 3 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................ 7 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................... 8 
Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................................10 
1 General Introduction ................................................................................................................11 
1.1 Development of scientific knowledge ......................................................................11 
1.1.1 Causal understanding ............................................................................................11 
1.1.2 Executive functioning ............................................................................................20 
1.1.3 Scientific reasoning .................................................................................................23 
1.1.4 Language .....................................................................................................................41 
1.1.5 Science education ....................................................................................................48 
1.2 Source reliability...............................................................................................................50 
1.2.1 Definition ....................................................................................................................50 
1.2.2 Children’s understanding of source reliability .............................................51 
1.2.3 Adult’s understanding of source reliability ...................................................65 
1.3 Aims of thesis (Rationale) .............................................................................................66 
1.4 Experimental paradigm .................................................................................................69 
1.5 Hypotheses .........................................................................................................................71 
1.5.1 Implicit understanding of the causal system (Prediction) ......................71 
1.5.2 Explicit understanding of the causal system (Explanation) ...................73 
1.5.3 Gender ..........................................................................................................................74 
1.5.4 Understanding the causal system .....................................................................74 
1.6 The following chapters ...................................................................................................75 
 
4 
2 General Methodology ...............................................................................................................76 
2.1 School information ..........................................................................................................76 
2.1.1 Primary school recruitment ................................................................................76 
2.1.2 Secondary school recruitment ............................................................................80 
2.2 Participants .........................................................................................................................85 
2.3 Apparatus ............................................................................................................................86 
2.4 Design ...................................................................................................................................90 
2.5 Independent variables ....................................................................................................90 
2.5.1 Source reliability ......................................................................................................90 
2.5.2 Weight and causal variables ................................................................................92 
2.5.3 Time point ..................................................................................................................93 
2.5.4 Receptive vocabulary .............................................................................................93 
2.5.5 Age .................................................................................................................................94 
2.6 Dependent variables .......................................................................................................94 
2.6.1 Practice trial measures ..........................................................................................94 
2.6.2 Variable prediction measure ...............................................................................95 
2.6.3 Degree of conviction measure ............................................................................96 
2.6.4 Weight explanation measure ..............................................................................96 
2.7 Procedure ............................................................................................................................98 
2.8 Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 104 
3 Results ......................................................................................................................................... 107 
3.1 Practice Trials ................................................................................................................. 107 
3.2 Personal characteristics inter-relationships ...................................................... 109 
3.3 Participants’ initial beliefs regarding the effect of weight ............................ 109 
3.4 Assessment of source reliability manipulation ................................................. 110 
3.5 Weight prediction ......................................................................................................... 112 
3.5.1 Univariate analyses for weight prediction: ................................................ 112 
 
5 
3.5.2 Multivariate analyses of correct predictions regarding the effect of 
weight  ...................................................................................................................................... 117 
3.6 Weight explanation ....................................................................................................... 118 
3.6.1 Univariate analyses for weight explanation ............................................... 119 
3.6.2 Multivariate analyses of correct explanation regarding the effect of 
weight  ...................................................................................................................................... 124 
3.7 Causal variable prediction ......................................................................................... 124 
3.7.1 Causal variable analysis ..................................................................................... 127 
4 General Discussion ................................................................................................................. 131 
4.1 Implicit understanding of the causal system (weight prediction) ............. 131 
4.1.1 Age .............................................................................................................................. 132 
4.1.2 Language .................................................................................................................. 137 
4.1.3 Degree of conviction ............................................................................................ 139 
4.2 Explicit understanding of the causal system (weight explanation) ........... 140 
4.2.1 Age .............................................................................................................................. 142 
4.2.2 Language .................................................................................................................. 145 
4.2.3 Degree of conviction ............................................................................................ 146 
4.3 Gender ............................................................................................................................... 147 
4.4 Understanding the causal system ........................................................................... 148 
4.5 Practice trials .................................................................................................................. 149 
4.6 Limitations ....................................................................................................................... 151 
4.6.1 Sample ....................................................................................................................... 151 
4.6.2 Methodological issues ......................................................................................... 154 
4.7 Future Directions .......................................................................................................... 158 
4.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 162 
References ......................................................................................................................................... 164 
Appendix A Letters for Schools ........................................................................................... 179 
School recruitment email for School A & B ................................................................... 179 
 
6 
Information for head teacher attached to recruitment email. .............................. 180 
Appendix B Letters for Parents ........................................................................................... 181 
Information sheet for primary school parents ............................................................ 181 
Consent form for primary school parents ..................................................................... 183 
Information sheet for secondary school parents ....................................................... 184 
Consent form for secondary school parents................................................................. 186 
Appendix C Information for Students over 16 .............................................................. 187 
Consent form for secondary school children under 16 ............................................ 187 
Information sheet for students 16 years and over .................................................... 188 
Consent form for secondary school children over 16 ............................................... 190 
 
  
 
7 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2-1  Car on an incline game in the standard set up. ............................................................... 88 
Figure 2-2  Diagrammatic representation of the stick scale with examples of the visual 
reminder to what each end of the scale represented. ......................................................................... 89 
Figure 3-1  Mean rating of reliability for science/physics teacher and nursery child by age 
group. .................................................................................................................................................................... 111 
  
 
8 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2-1  Primary school A demographics and performance, compared with the national 
average. ................................................................................................................................................................... 77 
Table 2-2  Primary school B demographics and performance, compared with the national 
average. ................................................................................................................................................................... 79 
Table 2-3  Secondary school C demographics and performance, compared with the national 
average. ................................................................................................................................................................... 81 
Table 2-4  Secondary school D demographics and performance, compared with the national 
average. ................................................................................................................................................................... 83 
Table 2-5  Participant characteristics: mean and S.D. by age group; age range; number 
participating per age group; number of participating females; the proportion of the year 
group participating. ........................................................................................................................................... 85 
Table 2-6  Age group, BPVS1 score, gender, and school of the nine participants who were 
removed from the analysis. ............................................................................................................................ 86 
Table 2-7  Sample quotes coded for ranking 0-3+ in the explanation scoring system. ......... 98 
Table 2-8  Main procedure timeline for the studies. ............................................................................ 99 
Table 3-1  Number of participants (%), mean age (S.D.) and mean BPVS Score (S.D.) in 
relation to repeating trials, using extreme set up and doing a sequential fair test (N=160).
 ................................................................................................................................................................................. 107 
Table 3-2  Frequency of repeat trials (%) by age group and gender (N = 156). .................... 108 
Table 3-3  Frequency of participants (%) who used an extreme set up as one of their trials, 
or did a sequential fair test, by gender (N = 160). .............................................................................. 108 
Table 3-4  Mean age (S.D.) in years and BPVS Score (S.D.) by gender (N  = 160). ................ 109 
Table 3-5  Prediction of distance travelled based on car weight, by age group (N = 160), 
percentage of year group in parentheses. ............................................................................................. 110 
Table 3-6  Mean participant ratings for the science teacher (S.D.)/nursery child (S.D.) by age 
group. .................................................................................................................................................................... 111 
Table 3-7  Mean reliability rating (S.D.) and significant pairwise comparisons between age 
groups for the science/physics teacher and nursery child (N = 160). ....................................... 112 
Table 3-8  Univariate analyses of the relevance of source reliability and gender (categorical 
factors) at each time point for weight prediction (N = 160). ......................................................... 114 
Table 3-9  Univariate analyses of age, BPVS, and degree of conviction (continuous factors) 
at each time point for the weight prediction outcome. .................................................................... 115 
Table 3-10  Results of a logistic regression to predict a correct prediction regarding the 
effect of weight on distance travelled. .................................................................................................... 116 
 
9 
Table 3-11  Quality of explanations at each time point and for each source reliability 
condition, after hearing that weight does not affect distance travelled. .................................. 119 
Table 3-12  Univariate analyses of source reliability and gender (categorical factors) at each 
time point for making a correct weight explanation. ........................................................................ 121 
Table 3-13  Univariate analyses of age, BPVS, and degree of conviction (continuous factors) 
at each time point for making a correct  weight explanation. ....................................................... 122 
Table 3-14  Results of a logistic regression to predict a correct explanation regarding the 
effect of weight on distance travelled. .................................................................................................... 123 
Table 3-15  Number and percentage of participants making correct and incorrect 
predictions (no effect and wrong direction), and mean difference (S.D.) between high and 
low set up predictions at each time of testing. .................................................................................... 126 
Table 3-16  Age group, number and proportion of participants making incorrect predictions 
in the wrong direction. For each causal variable, there are three possible errors, one at each 
time point (number of errors/3). .............................................................................................................. 127 
Table 3-17  No. of correct/incorrect predictions before and after the intervention on weight, 
and reports the outcome of McNemar’s test, for each causal variable (N = 160). ................ 128 
Table 3-18  Number of correct/incorrect predictions comparing height and starting point, 
and starting point and friction, at each time point, and reports the outcome of McNemar’s 
test (N = 160). .................................................................................................................................................... 130 
  
 
10 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
Firstly, I would like to thank the head teachers who assented to doing my studies in 
their schools. The staff in the schools were also very helpful both with recruitment 
and with providing a place to test. The children were also very keen to participate 
and made testing a pleasure. 
I am grateful to my supervisor Mike Oaksford who was very supportive, and always 
knew what to say when the project seemed unmanageable. Thanks also to Andy 
Tolmie, my second supervisor, who never failed to answer an email, and was always 
an excellent source of information.  
The staff and students in the Psychological Sciences Dept., where I work, were also 
excellent, providing ongoing support and encouragement especially in these final 
months where I was trying to both write up and do my job. In particular, Claire 
Santorelli, who was amazing. She provided ongoing, much needed support, and even 
did some excellent proof reading. Harish Patel is also worthy of special mention, as 
he built my apparatus, which was very sturdy and reliable, and performed with 
distinction throughout testing.  
I would like to thank my children Harry and Loulou for their patience and 
understanding during this process; my father for his sterling effort on proof reading; 
my mother and sister Jessy for their support and help with formatting; and my other 
siblings, Tory, Jim and Sarah, for accepting my eccentricities during this time. 
 
  
 
11 
1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In the following sections, aspects relating to the development of scientific 
knowledge will be described. Firstly, causal understanding (section 1.1.1) will be 
discussed, where young children demonstrate implicit understanding of causal 
relations from a very young age. Secondly, the development of executive function 
(section 1.1.2) is briefly outlined as a factor that is likely to contribute towards 
scientific reasoning and understanding. Thirdly, scientific reasoning (section 1.1.3), 
and factors that are likely to influence scientific reasoning are discussed, including 
language (section 1.1.4), and science education (section 1.1.5). The impact of social 
economic status and gender are discussed throughout. Finally, the main focus of this 
thesis, research on source reliability understanding (section 1.2) is outlined, where 
source reliability plays a crucial role in learning about causal relations. The general 
introduction concludes with the aims of the thesis (section 1.3), an outline of the 
experimental paradigm (section 1.4), and the hypotheses (section 1.5).  
1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
1.1.1 CAUSAL UNDERSTANDING 
1.1.1.1 DEFINITION 
Moving from infancy to adulthood, an extraordinary understanding of the world is 
gained. The capability of representing the causal structure of the daily environment, 
and using that information to make accurate predictions regarding events in 
everyday lives emerges. In essence, an understanding of cause and effect is 
demonstrated, whereby even young children can predict and explain causal 
relations in many different contexts (Schulz & Gopnik, 2004).  
The first indication of this understanding of causal relations was observed through 
the work of Baillargeon, Spelke, Carey, Gopnik and their colleagues, who produced 
a large body of research which suggested that young infants show appropriate 
understanding regarding physical objects and motion (see Spelke, Breinlinger, 
Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992, for review). The existence of this ability at such a 
young age suggests that they have an implicit understanding of the mechanisms that 
underlie these causal understandings, that are operational from very early on.  It is 
likely this knowledge develops through interaction between innate core principles 
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and the environment (Spelke, 1994). Furthermore, these early intuitive 
understandings have led to the suggestion that people possess intuitive theories of 
different domains, such as physics, biology, and psychology (see Gerstenberg & 
Tenenbaum, 2017, for an extensive review of intuitive theories). 
In the following, implicit understanding is thought to exist when children or adults 
make appropriate predictions regarding causal outcomes. They are not required to 
be able to accurately ‘explain’ why they made any particular prediction. This is in 
contrast to explicit understanding, where children or adults would be deemed to 
have explicit understanding when they provide accurate explanations regarding an 
appropriate prediction.  
1.1.1.2 CAUSAL UNDERSTANDING IN YOUNG CHILDREN 
In an attempt to better understand the causal learning mechanisms that underpin 
causal understanding, and promote swift and effective understanding of causal 
relations in familiar environments, Gopnik and colleagues examined children’s 
understanding of unfamiliar causal systems. An unfamiliar system allows systematic 
manipulation of the evidence children receive regarding causal structure, and 
examination of the causal inferences children draw as a result (Schulz & Gopnik, 
2004). For example, the causal structure of these unfamiliar systems could be 
learned through observation, where the child observes contingency between events, 
and also through intervention, where the child intervenes on the system and 
observes different outcomes. Using simple causal systems which were easy to learn 
to operate allowed researchers to investigate causal understanding in children as 
young as two years of age.  
For example, Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, and Glymour (2001) developed a paradigm that 
made it possible to assess how children learned about novel causal relationships, 
without utilising possibly innate knowledge (such as addressing their 
understanding of the physical world), or involving explicit instruction (which is 
difficult for very young children to understand). They developed a ‘Blicket detector’ 
which lights up and plays music when a ‘Blicket’ (usually an object that is unfamiliar 
to the participant) is placed on it, but does not when other objects are placed on it. 
The Blicket detector allowed Gopnik et al. (2001) to assess what causal 
understanding young participants aged two, three and four years old could gain 
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from both observation and intervention. The majority of participants were from 
white, middle-class backgrounds. Participants showed causal understanding 
following observation of the contingency between objects (Blickets) that light the 
machine, and objects that do not. Gopnik et al. (2001) found that even very young 
participants would extend the term Blicket to newer objects that set off the machine, 
thereby suggesting that they believed that these newer objects played a causal role 
in activating the machine. That is, participants as young as two years of age appeared 
to make appropriate predictions regarding future causal events, following exposure 
to the actions of the Blicket detector. Furthermore, slightly older participants of 
three and four years old could use the information they had learned to intervene on 
the system and make the machine stop. Gopnik et al. (2001) concluded that 
participants appear to have generalised causal learning mechanisms that allow 
them to learn about new causal relationships, and modify causal systems as they 
learn new information.  
Participants can learn new information about a causal system both through 
observation and intervention. When they use intervention, they change the causal 
system and observe the outcome.  Schultz, Gopnik and Glymour (2007) found that 
four- to five-year-olds could use intervention on a novel causal system to determine 
causal relations, and use knowledge of causal structure to predict the outcome of an 
intervention. Furthermore, when left to intervene on the system on their own (or in 
a pair), participants were often able to learn the correct causal structure from 
evidence gathered during their own interventions. Schultz et al. (2007) also 
suggested that participants would be capable of learning real-world causal relations 
from their own interventions during play. Schulz, Goodman, Tenenbaum and Jenkins 
(2008), who collected data in a metropolitan museum, found that participants 
learned abstract rules regarding the cause and effect from sparse data, that was 
resistant to change in the face of anomalous evidence. If they attain these capacities, 
then in the case of playing, participants might well be able to form general causal 
rules regarding the environment in which they are interacting.  
When looking at four- to five-year-olds’ exploratory play, Cook, Goodman, and 
Schultz (2011) found that under certain ambiguous conditions, participants were 
more likely to perform an intervention to assess cause and effect, compared with 
more unambiguous conditions. Participants were also more likely attempt to assess 
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cause and effect when witnessing an outcome that was inconsistent with what they 
had previously observed, but not when it was consistent. When left to play freely 
with the causal system, they were more likely to engage in exploratory behaviour 
having witnessed an inconsistent outcome compared with a consistent one (Legare, 
2012). Schultz and Gopnik (2004) investigated whether participants’ ability to 
demonstrate causal knowledge in a variety of domains (such as biology, physics or 
psychology) was indicative of specific learning mechanisms, or a more general 
learning mechanism. Their sample included three- to five-year-olds, mostly from 
white middle class backgrounds. In the first three experiments, three- to four-year-
old participants were presented with tasks in two domains, biology and psychology, 
and asked to identify what was the cause of the effect in structurally similar tasks in 
each domain. They found that both age groups made causal predictions using 
probabilistic information in a similar way across a range of tasks and domains. The 
results were consistent across domains. Furthermore, they found that four- to five-
year-olds were capable of overriding their domain specific knowledge in light of 
contradictory evidence. Overall, Schultz and Gopnik (2004) did not find any 
differences in task response across domain. They suggested that (in this case) the 
context was not as important for causal inference, compared with probabilistic 
information they received. Participants are also capable of using information they 
learned in one domain to guide predictions in a second domain, when faced with a 
novel task. Schultz, Bonawitz and Griffith (2007) found that from three years old, 
participants were more likely to identify a cause for an effect that was consistent 
with their beliefs regarding a specific domain (here, biological or psychological) as 
within the same domain. However, four- to five-year-olds extended this by being 
more likely to identify a cross-domain cause for an effect, when it fit with the 
evidence, and less likely when it did not.  
1.1.1.3 CAUSAL UNDERSTANDING IN OLDER CHILDREN AND ADULTS 
When considering developmental changes over time, in relation to causal learning, 
there is some evidence to suggest that younger participants are better at learning 
unexpected causal relations than older participants or adults. For example, Lucas, 
Bridgers, Griffiths, and Gopnik (2014), using the Blicket detector paradigm, found 
that four- to five-year-olds (from university affiliated preschools) paid more 
attention to the training data than did adults. The adults (undergraduate students) 
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appeared to be biased towards particular responses, where they persistently 
predicted only one Blicket was sufficient, even in the face of alternative evidence 
where two Blickets were required. This pattern of results was observable across 
different domains. Lucas et al. (2014) speculated that the adults’ prior beliefs and 
experience influenced their understanding of how such causal systems might work, 
such that when they were exposed to unexpected changes in the causal systems, 
their biases made them reluctant to revise their beliefs. Whilst it is the case that 
Lucas et al. (2014) found this pattern of responding in a number of experiments, it 
is not clear that adults would exhibit similar behaviour in more real-life tasks. Adult 
participants were selected from undergraduate students who received course credit 
in an introductory psychology class for participating in these experiments. It is 
possible that a proportion of these students were devoting minimal cognitive 
resources to the task, and did not pay attention to the training period of the 
experiment. There were no individual differences analyses, nor were the adults 
debriefed on what they thought were the goals of the experiment, both of which may 
have shed some light on patterns of responding. In a conceptually similar study 
(data collected in a museum and a local preschool), when participants were 
presented with tasks which could have personal or situationally based explanations, 
four-year-olds appropriately inferred cause from the provided data. However, six-
year-olds showed a bias towards personal based explanations, even when the data 
suggested a situationally based explanation (Seiver, Gopnik & Goodman, 2013). A 
similar argument to the above, that participants’ prior beliefs and experience 
affected responding, was made to explain the age-related differences. This pattern 
has been found a number of times with younger participants, where the younger 
learners were better than the older ones. A potential explanation offered by Gopnik, 
Griffiths, and Lucas (2015) took a probabilistic model-based approach and argued 
that, if the learner has no prior beliefs regarding potential hypotheses, then they will 
not need much evidence to overturn one for the other. However, if the learner has 
stronger prior beliefs regarding one hypothesis, then the strength of evidence 
required to overturn that hypothesis would be much more substantial. If that was 
the case, one would expect age-related changes in performance when faced with 
unexpected evidence that contravened prior beliefs. 
 
16 
In light of this Gopnik et al. (2017) examined changes in causal learning from early 
childhood to adulthood. They included middle childhood and adolescence, as 
developmental periods that are not typically explored in this literature. Replicating 
the experimental procedure used in Lucas et al. (2014), they found a similar pattern 
of performance, whereby as the age of participants increased, their performance 
decreased. Four-year-olds were the best at learning unexpected physical causal 
relationships. Six-, and nine- to 11-year-olds did less well than the four-year-olds, 
but performed similarly. The 12- to 14-year-olds and adults also performed 
similarly, but performed less well than the younger age groups. Although this does 
not answer the question regarding the degree of attention paid to the task by adults, 
it adds support to the idea that greater experience impacts on prior beliefs, by 
biasing attention towards particular responses. If this is the case, one would expect 
an increase in bias with age, which was seen. 
1.1.1.4 IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND GENDER 
There has been extensive research looking at causal learning and understanding in 
both younger children and adults. However, the majority of this research, 
particularly with children, has involved participants from English-speaking middle-
class environments, with little attention paid to individual differences, such as 
gender, or socio-economic status (SES). This is the case for the research cited thus 
far as well, where gender and SES were rarely mentioned beyond description of the 
participant sample. The gender balance was usually reported as similar, and SES 
described as middle-class, and/or representative of the area within which the study 
was conducted. Ethnicity was usually described as representative of the area as well.  
In recent years, there has been a push towards making psychological science more 
representative of the human population (see Rad, Martingano, & Ginges, 2018). 
Inspired by this, Wente et al. (2017) observed that, to their knowledge, all of the 
studies looking at the development of causal learning used similar participant 
samples from higher SES environments in North America and Europe. To counter 
this, they conducted a study which included a relatively low income cross-cultural 
sample of Peruvian children and adults, as well as a low income SES sample of 
children from North America. They utilised the Blicket detector paradigm, following 
a similar procedure to Lucas et al. (2014). Both Peruvian four-year-old children 
(from private schools in low SES areas, designed to provide affordable education to 
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Peru’s emerging middle class) and adults (Peruvian undergraduate college 
students) performed similarly to the higher SES North American equivalent; adults 
showed a bias towards particular responses, regardless of the evidence, which was 
not observed in the children. Children from lower SES environments (from a Head 
Start programme; Head Start promotes school readiness of children under five from 
low income families; U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Head 
Start, n.d.) largely responded similarly to children from higher SES environments, 
although the evidence was less clear for them. Wente et al. (2017) speculated that 
the lower SES children may have had some difficulties with inhibition and 
information processing that might have affected their responses. Furthermore, 
although these children come from low SES environments, their parents were 
interested enough in their education to participate in the Head Start programme, 
and it remains to be seen whether children with less parental support would 
perform equally well (Wente et al., 2017). 
There appears to be little research looking at gender differences in the causal 
learning literature; it was not mentioned in the studies discussed earlier beyond 
noting that the gender balance of participants was similar. Galsworthy, Dione, Dale 
and Plomin (2000) found that gender accounted for only 3% of variance in verbal 
ability, and 1% in non-verbal cognitive ability in two-year-olds. When assessing the 
genetic and environmental contributions, they found that gender appears to 
influence early language development, but not non-verbal cognitive development. 
As such, one might not expect to find a gender difference in causal learning, given 
that gender differences tend to be quite small, particularly when looking at non-
verbal cognitive ability.  In one rare study that included gender and focused on 
causal reasoning, Bullock (1984) looked at children’s understanding of causal 
mechanism when two objects moved in tandem. No gender difference in three- to 
five-year-old participants was found. However, even if gender differences in causal 
understanding and reasoning in younger children are minimal, that may not be the 
case for older children, especially once they have started school. It is possible that 
broader exposure to the environment around them, can influence prior beliefs, and 
that this may differentially affect genders in relation to their causal reasoning and 
understanding as suggested in Wente et al. (2017). This is because children 
participate in learning about science at school, where their explicit understanding 
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of causal relations is mediated by the classroom environment, where gender 
differences are frequently observed (and discussed in greater detail in section 1.1.3 
on scientific reasoning).  
1.1.1.5 ADULT CAUSAL UNDERSTANDING IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS 
The evidence suggesting that children show causal understanding from a young age 
led Gopnik, Glymour, Sobel, Schultz, Kushnir, and Danks (2004) to suggest a theory 
of causal learning that states that children use specialised cognitive systems that 
allow them to create a learned, abstract, and coherent causal map of the world. 
Furthermore, they suggested that this map can be best understood in terms of 
directed graphical causal models. This is in keeping with the probabilistic models 
used to describe adult causal learning and understanding that have existed from the 
late nineties (e.g. Cheng, 1997; Pearl, 2000; Tenenbaum & Griffith, 2001). Initially, 
the majority of research looking at causal learning in adults focused on how people 
learn causal relationships with simple cause and effect examples (e.g. Cheng, 1997; 
Griffith & Tenenbaum, 2005; Shanks, 1995).  However, the environments in which 
people operate involve multiple interacting variables, which dramatically increase 
the difficulty of inferring causal structure. This is because cause-and-effect 
relationships can only be inferred from observable cues such as contact, temporal 
order or covariation information (e.g. Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007; Lagnado & Sloman, 
2006; see also Fernbach, Linson-Gentry & Sloman, 2007). One cannot see a cause 
and effect; one can only see that the action of one entity appears to ‘affect’ the action 
of another entity. In more complex environments it is necessary to understand how 
these individual cause-and-effect relationships interact with each other. 
Seeking to address how adults learn the causal structure of more realistic, complex 
environments, Hagmayer and Waldmann (2000) asked German participants (no 
other participant information was given) to control a dynamic system by 
manipulating different variables to achieve a specific outcome. They were told 
nothing regarding how the system worked and were given a number of trials 
interacting with the system. They found that when the causal structure became 
more complicated, the adults showed little explicit understanding of the causal 
relationship between variables. However, they could make implicit, fairly accurate, 
predictions of singular events that took into account those very causal relationships. 
Furthermore, Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, and Blum (2003) found that 
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there were individual differences in the causal inference strategies participants 
used. Undergraduate participants from a university in the USA, and web 
participants, were asked to learn to play a game about the communication networks 
of ‘alien’ mind readers, that could take different causal structures. In the first case, 
focusing on observation only, alien communications could follow one of two causal 
patterns, which participants were asked to identify after they had observed several 
examples of the alien communications. They found that the results for the 
undergraduate students and web participant were ‘remarkably’ similar. Based on 
observation alone, where participants only observed examples of alien 
communications, they found that participants were able to distinguish between 
competing hypotheses to varying degrees. Some participants learned like optimal 
Bayesians, integrating across trials; others functioned as one trial Bayesians, 
without integrating across trials; and some showed no causal learning at all. In the 
second case, participants were able to intervene to control one variable, the 
communication of a single alien, to examine its effect on the communication of other 
aliens, in order to determine the causal structure of the communication network. 
Participants became better at inferring causal structure, when they were able to 
intervene on the system, in comparison with observation alone.  Furthermore, when 
they indicated they were unsure about causal structure, they subsequently chose 
interventions that would reduce their uncertainty. Individual differences in causal 
learning were also found by Osman and Shanks (2005). They found that not only did 
participants (undergraduate students from a UK university) differ in the way they 
weighted base rate information in a causal learning task, but that this also 
corresponded with performance in a decision-making task, where they treat base-
rate information consistently across both tasks.  
In summary, research evidence suggests that children are capable of learning causal 
relations, and making accurate predictions, from a young age, based on observation 
and intervention. It is possible that, as they develop, their learning is impacted by 
prior beliefs regarding the system at hand, where older children and adults perform 
less well when faced with unexpected evidence that conflicts with prior beliefs. 
However, for many, this understanding frequently does not appear to be explicit 
(even by adulthood). Causal understanding does not appear to be affected by 
gender, although there is little research explicitly taking gender into account. This is 
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also the case for SES, which may impact on causal learning and understanding, but 
the question is unresolved.  
Other factors that may influence causal understanding are executive functioning, 
and language skills, which are discussed in the following sections (Executive 
Function – section 1.1.2; Language – section 1.1.4). 
1.1.2 EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 
1.1.2.1 DEFINITION 
Executive functions (EFs) are a set of basic cognitive processes that allow the control 
and regulation of behaviour. The three core EFs commonly identified in the 
literature are inhibition control, updating, and shifting (see Miyake et al., 2000). 
Inhibition control refers to one’s ability to inhibit a strong internal impulse, or 
external pull, to enable one to generate a required or appropriate response. This 
enables selective attention to specific stimuli, whilst disregarding or ignoring other 
stimuli (as both bottom-up and top-down processes; Diamond, 2013). Updating 
refers to the monitoring and updating of representations in working memory. This 
involves attention to and evaluation of incoming information as it relates to the 
relevant task, and then updating the information held in working memory according 
to that information (Miyake et al., 2000). This includes both verbal and visual spatial 
information (Diamond, 2013). Shifting refers to the ability to switch between 
alternative sets of mental operations, such as shifting between tasks, aspects of 
tasks, or perspectives (Miyake et al., 2000).  
Higher level EFs such as reasoning, and problem-solving are likely to be 
underpinned by these primary lower level EFs (Diamond, 2013). For example, when 
attempting to identify specific causal relations, one might need to shift between 
potential hypotheses relating to potential causal relations, update one’s belief in the 
face of new information, and inhibit prior beliefs in the face of new, contradictory, 
evidence.  
The importance of executive functioning can be seen in its ability to predict school 
success, and other outcomes throughout life. In school, poor self-regulation 
negatively impacts on school success, and interventions designed to promote 
executive functions have been observed to counteract this (Blair & Diamond, 2008), 
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where executive functioning skills can be said to subserve successful self-regulation 
(Hoffmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). Moffitt et al. (2011) followed nearly 
1000 children born in the same year in one New Zealand city for 32 years. They 
found that good self-regulation in childhood predicted many positive outcomes, 
including health, and personal finance.  
1.1.2.2 FACTORS RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 
Children’s ability to engage executive functions in goal-directed behaviour is 
predicted by age. For example, Freier, Cooper and Mareschal (2017) looked at 
cognitive control across three- to five-year-old participants from pre-schools local 
to the university in London, UK (information on SES was not included). They found 
age improvements, in that the older participants showed better cognitive control 
and were better able to produce an overarching goal. They did not find gender 
effects. Regarding older children, Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra and Pulkkinen (2003) 
looked at aspects of executive function in eight- to 13-year-old children from Finland 
(information on SES was not included) They found three inter-related factors 
similar to those of Miyake et al. (2000). Furthermore, they found age correlated with 
performance with most individual EF measures, as well as shifting and working 
memory (referred to as updating by Diamond, 2013). In a study that used a large 
representative national sample (from the USA) aged from five to 17 years, Best, 
Miller, and Naglieri (2011) found evidence to suggest that performance on the three 
core executive functions, inhibiting, updating, and shifting increases with age until 
at least 15 years. There was a big improvement around the ages of five to seven, and 
the increase slowed somewhat in adolescence.  
1.1.2.3 IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND GENDER 
Another factor that possibly effects executive functioning (EF) is social economic 
status (SES). SES predicts EF, whereby children from lower SES backgrounds are 
likely to show poorer performance in tasks of inhibitory control, working memory, 
and other EF related tasks (e.g. Hackman, Gallop, Evans & Farah, 2015; Ng-Knight & 
Schoon, 2017). This SES difference can be seen when children start preschool 
(Welsh, Nix, Blair, Bierman, & Nelson, 2010) and was observed up to 10 years of age 
by Hackman et al. (2015). Negative impacts in adolescence have also been observed. 
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For example, lower SES has been associated with less behavioural inhibition 
(Spielberg et al., 2015).  
The relevance of gender for executive functioning has also been investigated in 
younger children. Matthews, Ponitz, and Morrison (2009) used participants from a 
state wide longitudinal study investigating cognitive and social development during 
the transition from preschool to primary school in Wisconsin, USA. Just over 80% of 
participants were white, and 40% of participants’ parents had Masters degrees. 
They found gender differences in five-year-olds self-regulation in the classroom, 
where teachers’ ratings were more likely to favour girls over boys, although they 
found no gender differences in academic achievement in their study.  
Yamamoto and Matsumura (2017) also looked at gender differences in five-year-old 
children, and combined direct measurement assessments of executive function 
tasks coupled with teacher ratings of behavioural self-regulation. They did not find 
gender differences in direct measurement assessments, but did in teacher ratings of 
self-regulation, with girls rated as having better behavioural self-regulation than 
boys. They speculated that teacher ratings could be gender biased, which may have 
also affected teacher ratings in Matthews et al. (2009). 
Clark, Pritchard, and Woodward (2010) investigated gender in relation to EF as it 
relates to academic achievement, examining how well EF abilities predicted early 
mathematics achievement. They assessed children’s developing executive function 
abilities at four years old, and looked at the relationship between these abilities and 
maths achievement at six years old. They found no relationship between gender and 
executive function. Gender was also not related to early maths ability. 
Berthelsen, Hayes, White, and Williams (2017) found a similar pattern. They 
examined early self-regulatory behaviours at four to five years of age (as well as 
other child and family factors from early childhood), and how they were related to 
the development of executive function in adolescence (at 14 to 15 years), using a 
sample of approximately 5000 participants from Australia. They found higher 
attentional regulation at age four to five years for girls, as well as higher teacher 
ratings for approaches to learning at six to seven years of age. In contrast, they found 
that boys tended to score more highly on executive function tasks in adolescence. 
However, they speculated that this gender difference might be due in part to the 
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computer-based mode of assessment, where boys are likely to be more familiar with 
computer game playing. Differences in performance tend to be larger when 
computer-based, compared with when paper-based assessments are used (Jerrim, 
2016). Ahmed, Tang, Waters and Davis-Kean (2018) also looked at the relationship 
between executive function and academic achievement from early childhood to 
adolescence in a US sample of around 1200 participants. Whilst not being a primary 
focus of their study, they reported that gender did not function as a significant 
predictor of EF, assessed at age 15, contrary to findings of Berthelsen et al. (2017). 
However, the tasks used to measure EF differed in the two studies, so it is not clear 
that the results are directly comparable. Although there is general agreement that 
EFs play a role in cognition, there is less consensus regarding which tests should be 
used in the assessment of specific EFs. If gender only has a small role in differences 
in cognitive development (Galsworthy et al., 2000; Ardila, Rosselli, Matute, & 
Inozemtseva, 2011), particularly when young, then one might expect task choice to 
affect the presence of gender differences, as speculated by Berthelsen et al. (2017). 
In conclusion, executive function abilities are required for effective reasoning 
regarding causal relations. They improve with age, and are impacted by SES. Gender 
differences in executive function are less evident when the children are of primary 
school age but there is an indication that they may be more pronounced in 
adolescence.   
1.1.3 SCIENTIFIC REASONING 
1.1.3.1 DEFINITION 
Evidence of causal reasoning, particularly for very young children, usually stems 
from their ability to make correct predictions regarding causal relationships. 
However, the ability to explicitly reason about causal relations come somewhat 
later. While very young children might have an implicit understanding of causal 
relationships in a particular causal system, they may not have an explicit 
understanding of how a particular causal system works. Scientific reasoning is a 
more explicit activity, more closely related to language. It encompasses the myriad 
reasoning skills required in the generation, testing and revising of hypotheses and 
theory in an attempt to gain scientific understanding. Scientific reasoning skills are 
frequently used to gain a greater causal understanding of the world around us. 
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The literature looking at the development of causal reasoning/understanding and 
scientific reasoning tends not to overlap much, even though they largely address 
similar phenomena. The literature on causal understanding (outlined above) seeks 
to understand how we gain such sophisticated knowledge regarding the world 
around us, from such sparse data, and frequently uses Bayesian approaches to 
address this question (Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffith, & Goodman, 2011). The field of 
scientific reasoning arose in part from the philosophy of science, which involved 
ongoing discussion regarding the “correct” scientific method. To this day, there is a 
large overlap between disciplines of philosophy of science and the psychology of 
(scientific) reasoning, where psychologists look to the philosophy of science to 
provide rational models with which to compare actual human reasoning. 
Furthermore, some of the more prominent models of normative scientific 
methodology take a Bayesian approach (Salmon, 1990; Talbott, 2008).  
1.1.3.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC AND EVERYDAY REASONING 
When considering how to define scientific reasoning, Klahr and Simon (1999) 
suggested that it is not qualitatively different from everyday reasoning, where 
scientific reasoning provides us with a systematic and cumulative construction of 
the world around us. Li and Klahr (2006) expanded on this concept and described 
scientific thinking by drawing on Einstein’s characterisation of the relationship 
between scientific thinking and everyday thinking, where scientific thinking draws 
on the cognitive processes that underpin general problem solving. They suggested 
that scientific problem solving differs from everyday problem solving only in the 
more precise definitions of concepts and conclusions, along with more systematic 
choice of experimental material and greater logical economy.  
Similarly, Kuhn (2010) also argued that scientific reasoning is akin to everyday 
reasoning, an activity most people engage in, rather than just professional scientists. 
Kuhn (2010) defined scientific reasoning as knowledge seeking, in that the person 
doing the scientific reasoning aims to enhance their knowledge, to gain scientific 
understanding of phenomena in the environment. The assumed parallel between 
scientific reasoning and everyday reasoning has led to much of the research on 
scientific reasoning looking at the ability of children and adults to reason 
normatively when faced with ‘scientific’ questions. Normative reasoning is 
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reasoning regarding the case at hand, according to the rules of scientific reasoning 
(see Stanovich, 2011, for an explication of those rules). 
It is desirable to have a definition of scientific reasoning that is embedded in 
everyday reasoning as it is more likely to reflect how scientists actually reason. One 
of the problems that bedevilled earlier models of scientific method, which sought to 
describe models of how science should be done, such as the falsificationist method, 
was that historical examples of successful scientific progress frequently do not map 
on to the outlined method (Salmon et al., 1992). For example, the failure of 
Newtonian mechanics to predict the orbit of Uranus was not considered 
disconfirmatory evidence, as earlier outlines of falsificationist method suggested it 
should have been. Instead, an auxiliary hypothesis was suggested to explain the 
orbit (Anderson & Hepburn, 2016; Salmon et al., 1992). Newtonian mechanics were 
not considered to be disconfirmed until a better theory came along, the theory of 
relativity, which could explain the phenomena under question, as well as the 
perihelion of Mercury, which Newtonian mechanics could not (Anderson & 
Hepburn, 2016). The failure of the falsificationist method to explain the history of 
science has led to it being rejected by contemporary philosophers of science 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007), where the conclusion is that normative models of the 
scientific method should be able to explain past scientific progress.  
This problem has also imbued the psychology of reasoning, which looked to 
philosophy to provide optimal, rational models of reasoning with which to compare 
everyday reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). Although there was a belief that 
human reasoning was inherently rational, people have persistently provided 
illogical responses in some tasks, such as the Wason selection task (see Oaksford & 
Chater, 2007 for a review). In the Wason selection task, participants are presented 
with four cards, with a number on one side and a letter on the other. Participants 
are then asked which card(s) they would turn over to establish whether a given rule 
was true or false. According to the falsificationist method, participants should seek 
to disconfirm the rule, but very few participants applied the nominal ‘normative’ 
strategy, suggesting that people’s hypothesis search strategies were inherently 
illogical. Ultimately, new models of the scientific method came to the fore, most 
notably taking a probabilistic approach, which made much more sense of people’s 
strategies in the Wason selection task, as well as other tasks where people’s 
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responses failed to conform to the normative response (see Oaksford & Chater, 
2007, and Stanovich, 2011) for extensive discussions of this issue).  
Along with the argument that any definition of scientific reasoning should map on to 
everyday reasoning, there is also evidence to suggest that people do treat every day 
and scientific arguments in a similar way. Corner and Hahn (2009) asked 
undergraduate participants to evaluate the strength of science and non-science 
arguments. They found that the evaluation of both appeared to be determined by 
the same factors, such as diagnosticity of evidence – strength of evidence and 
reliability of the source of evidence – where stronger evidence and more reliable 
sources led to higher ratings regarding the strength of the argument for both science 
and non-science arguments. The main difference between the two was that ratings 
for science arguments were sometimes more polarised. Science arguments were 
rated as very strong with high reliability sources and strong evidence, and very 
weak for the converse, low reliability sources and weak evidence. The difference 
was not as extreme for non-science arguments. Corner and Hahn (2009) suggested 
that this may be due to the way in which science is currently taught as a collection 
of objectively drawn facts, based on evidence. As such, a scientific argument from an 
unreliable source, and lacking evidence, might seem particularly unconvincing, 
compared with a non-science argument which does not suffer from the burden of 
such expectations. 
In conclusion, an influential strand of current thought in the philosophy of science 
holds that models of the scientific method should be able to describe events within 
the history of science - actual scientific practice – which supports the idea that a 
definition of scientific reasoning should draw from everyday reasoning (Kuhn, 
2010; Li & Klahr, 2006). If a definition of scientific reasoning does not track how 
people actually reason, then it is likely not to explain many aspects of the scientific 
process (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). Definitions such as this seek to place scientific 
thinking within the grasp of the majority, as opposed to the elevated few. It also 
suggests that scientific reasoning is in principle teachable, in that it is an extension 
of reasoning that is used every day. 
 
 
 
27 
1.1.3.3 FACTORS RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING 
Regarding the development of scientific reasoning, there has been a parallel drawn 
between children’s reasoning, where they seek to gain understanding of the world 
around them, and scientific reasoning. As presented in section 1.1.1 on causal 
reasoning, children appear to have some knowledge regarding our physical 
environment from a very young age (e.g. Carey & Spelke, 1996; Gopnik, Meltzoff, & 
Bryant, 1997; Gopnik et al., 2001; Spelke, 1994). The existence of these early 
intuitive understandings has led to the suggestion that people possess intuitive 
theories of different domains, such as physics, biology, and psychology (see 
Gerstenberg & Tenenbaum 2017 for an extensive review of intuitive theories) and 
some have claimed that these intuitive theories are similar to scientific theories. 
That is, both contain a system of interrelated concepts, governed by causal laws that 
dictate the relationships between the concepts. They suggested that, if this is the 
case, then cognitive development is like theory change in science (Carey, 1985; 
Gopnik et al., 1997; Schulz, 2012), although others have argued the contrary (Fuller, 
2011). However, Kuhn (2010) proposed that, although children construct implicit 
theories regarding their environment which are updated in light of new evidence 
(e.g. Gopnik et al., 2001), this process cannot be described as scientific reasoning as 
the process occurs outside conscious awareness. As scientific reasoning develops, 
using conscious thoughts and language, the process of theory revision becomes 
more explicit, whereby theory and evidence are considered in relation to one 
another. To be a competent scientific reasoner, one would need to have the set of 
skills required to allow the generation, testing and revision of theories in light of 
evidence. One should also be able to reflect on the process of acquiring and revising 
knowledge (Kuhn, 2005). 
Several reviews have summarised the comparison between children’s reasoning 
and scientific reasoning (Carey 1985; Gopnik et al., 1997; Schulz, 2012). Klahr and 
Simon (1999) pointed out that the evidence is problematic as children exhibit flaws 
in their (scientific) reasoning, such as failing to design controlled experiments, 
failing to revise belief in the face of new evidence, failing to discriminate between 
theory and evidence, and so on (see Silar & Klahr, 2012, for a review of general 
misconceptions in scientific reasoning). For example, Klahr, Fay and Dunbar (1993) 
compared nine-year-olds, 11-year-olds, undergraduates (science or engineering 
 
28 
majors), and community college students (non-science majors; the latter two groups 
comprise participants with and without scientific training). The child participants 
came primarily from academic and professional families, i.e. middle-class 
environments. Participants were taught how to use a programmable robot. They 
were then given a new operation, given a potential hypothesis, and asked to discover 
what the actual rules were. Potential hypotheses were always incorrect but either 
plausible or implausible. They found that adult participants were much better than 
children at choosing experiments that decreased the number of potential 
hypotheses. Adult and child participants also differed in response to the plausibility 
of the initial hypothesis. When the hypothesis was plausible, both adults and 
children sought to elucidate features of the hypothesis. However, when the 
hypothesis was implausible, adult participants tended to propose alternative 
hypotheses, and conduct experiments that discriminated between them. They were 
much better than the children at discovering implausible rules. Children tended to 
focus on plausible rules, and struggled to detect implausible but correct hypotheses 
from the data. Nine-year-olds showed poorer performance than 11-year-olds. 
Overall, adults were better than children at evaluating hypotheses and designing 
experiments.  
The development of cognitive skills is related to the development of scientific 
reasoning. Although young children can use perceptual evidence to guide their 
understanding of causal relations (see section 1.1.1 on causal understanding), it is 
thought that children need to understand that belief and knowledge can be based on 
perceptual evidence. It is claimed that this develops along with the development of 
theory of mind, in that one needs be able to recognise a protagonist can hold false 
beliefs in relation to the external world (Kuhn, Cheney and Weinstock, 2000; Morris, 
Croker, Masnick, & Zimmerman, 2012). By age five, children are likely to show basic 
scientific reasoning prowess such as utilising evidence to determine whether or not 
a hypothesis is knowable. Fay and Klahr (1996) asked five-year-old participants 
from middle-class homes in the USA to choose which set of objects could produce a 
particular outcome, where the problem was determinable sometimes, and 
indeterminable at other times. They found that most of the children could solve the 
determinable problems, and some of them could solve the indeterminable problems 
(in that they identified the problem as indeterminable). There were notable 
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individual differences in responses, and only a small proportion of participants 
made optimal responses in the more difficult conditions.   
Koerber, Sodian, Thoermer and Nett (2005) examined four-, five-, and six-year-old 
German middle-class participants’ ability to assess their understanding of the 
hypothesis evidence relationship, by examining what they understood about the 
impact of new evidence on beliefs. The children were asked about a character’s 
beliefs following evidence that contradicted the character’s prior beliefs, or faked 
evidence. All age groups showed high accuracy when required to revise the belief of 
the character, although around 25% of four-year-olds were excluded due to failing 
the control questions designed to assess their ability to complete the task 
appropriately. The authors suggested that four-year-olds’ performance may be 
limited by memory and attention problems. These problems may also explain why 
four-year-olds did not do so well in the faked evidence task. They would have to hold 
concurrent representations of the evidence, where memory and attention might 
impact. Furthermore, in a second experiment, Koerber et al. (2005) also showed that 
five-year-old participants’ ability to evaluate evidence was affected by the prior 
beliefs, although even here their ability to assess the hypothesis evidence 
relationship was still above chance. This finding is in keeping with similar findings 
in the causal understanding literature, where prior beliefs impact on understanding 
(see section 1.1.1 on causal understanding). This pattern of response is also seen 
with adults (Chin & Brewer, 1998), who gave different types of responses to data 
that conflicted with non-scientist adults’ prior beliefs. Koerber et al. (2005) 
suggested that their, and other similar findings (e.g. Sodian, Zaitchik, & Carey, 1991; 
Ruffman,  Perner,  Olson,  and  Doherty, 1993), indicated that even participants as 
young as four years old demonstrate basic scientific reasoning skills.  
Mayer, Sodian, Koerber, and Schwippert (2013) looked at the impact of EF on 
scientific reasoning (specifically at inhibition control and problem solving) using 
paper and pencil tests with 10-years-olds from Germany, with a sample balanced by 
gender. No relationship was found between scientific reasoning and inhibition. They 
did find a relationship with problem solving (plus IQ, reading comprehension, and 
spatial abilities). It is possible the lack of relationship with inhibition is due to the 
nature of the test. Mayer et al. (2013) used a variant of the Stroop colour-words task 
to measure inhibitory control.  Participants did not need to set aside prior beliefs 
 
30 
about causal relations in this test, so it is not clear that the task used represents the 
kind of inhibitory control one might need when doing a scientific reasoning task. 
When they controlled for all cognitive abilities included in the study, scientific 
reasoning performance was best predicted by problem solving and reading 
comprehension.  
However, children frequently confuse theory and evidence even in simple cases. For 
example, when four- and six-year-olds, and adults, were asked to explain why a 
certain event occurred, participants frequently responded with their theory 
regarding why the event occurred, rather than reporting the evidence (Kuhn & 
Pearsall, 2000). Participants (no more information was provided) were shown a 
sequence of pictures indicating an event with a particular outcome, such as two 
runners competing in a race. Participants were asked to indicate the outcome and 
justify the knowledge. Four-year-olds were more likely to provide a theory as to why 
the outcome came about, rather than report the evidence that pertained to the 
outcome. In this example, when indicating who they thought had won, they would 
refer to the fast shoes, worn by the winner (theory regarding the outcome), as 
opposed to the trophy the winner was holding (evidence of the outcome). Six-year-
olds showed a much better understanding and adults always provided an evidence 
based response in these relatively simple tasks. There was a small improvement at 
each age group when they were given a prompt towards an evidence based response 
(adults were at ceiling; reported in Kuhn and Pearsall, 2000). Notably, the difference 
between the findings of Fay and Klahr (1995), and Koerber et al. (2005) and those 
of Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) is that the latter required explanatory responses. That 
is, the participants were required to explicitly understand and be able to explain the 
hypothesis evidence relationship that led to their response. Koerber et al. (2005), 
on the other hand, asked participants to select between different potential 
responses, a far simpler task linguistically, that did not require extensive explicit 
understanding to participate. It could be argued that these findings mirror the 
findings of causal understanding in young participants - that participants show good 
basic understanding of hypothesis evidence relationships, but at younger ages, 
understanding is not fully explicit. Taking the definition of scientific reasoning 
outlined above - the reasoning skills required in the generation, testing and revising 
of hypotheses and theory in an attempt to understand the world around us - then 
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these children (Fay & Klahr, 1996;  Koerber et al., 2005) showed the underpinnings 
of scientific reasoning. Until such time as the process occurs inside conscious 
awareness, and children can provide explicit explanations for their responses, they 
cannot be considered to be competent scientific reasoners.  
1.1.3.4 CONTROL OF VARIABLE STRATEGIES 
One crucial skill in scientific reasoning is the ability to design experiments that 
adequately assess the question at hand. In particular, to design unconfounded 
experiments, and draw appropriate inferences from the outcomes.  This is 
frequently referred to as a control of variables strategy (Chen & Klahr, 1999). The 
control of variables strategy is a method of creating experiments in which a single 
contrast is made between experimental conditions (this also known as a ‘fair test’). 
It also includes the ability to make appropriate inferences based on the outcomes of 
these unconfounded experiments.  
Chen and Klahr (1999) looked at how children from seven to 10 years old, from two 
private elementary schools in the US, acquired and understood the procedural and 
logical aspects of using the control of variables strategy to do experiments. 
Participants interacted with three tasks in the physical domain (springs, inclines, 
sinking) that had multiple variables that could affect the outcome, with a specific 
question that needed to be addressed. For example, the incline angle, height of 
starting gate on the incline, surface on the incline, and type of ball could vary, and 
participants were asked what factors determined how far the ball will roll down a 
ramp. Some participants were given control of variables strategy training. Probe 
questions were also asked: firstly why they chose the test they did; and secondly 
whether or not they could tell that the variable they were testing made a difference, 
and why. Participants who had (explicit) training plus probe questions (implicit 
training), were compared with participants who had no training plus probe 
questions, and a control group who had no training and no probe questions. 
Following training on one task, they were assessed on that task, and then were 
introduced to two more tasks, to see whether any transfer effects could be observed. 
It was found that a small percentage (15%) already knew the strategy and used it 
from the start. Furthermore, with appropriate explicit training, participants were 
capable of learning control of variables strategy, with transfer within the same 
domain, similar domains, and 10-year-olds could transfer the strategy to other more 
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remote domains. Participants in the probe only group (implicit training), and the 
control group showed much less use of the control of variables strategy and no 
difference between them. However, although explicit training boosted performance, 
participants did continue to use ineffective strategies in some cases. Chen and Klahr 
(1999) concluded that, although children can learn aspects of the appropriate 
procedural and logical underpinnings of the control of variables strategy from a 
young age, grasp of these strategies improves with age. Furthermore, they suggested 
that direct instruction is an effective way to educate children with regards to control 
of variables strategy. 
Kuhn and colleagues used a microgenetic approach, whereby the participant 
engaged in similar tasks over multiple sessions such that changes in strategy could 
be observed (see Kuhn, 2010; Kuhn and Dean, 2005). For example, Kuhn and Dean 
(2005) asked 11- to 12-year-olds to participate in a control of variables task. They 
sought to consider efficient methods other than direct instruction to develop 
children’s inquiry skills through engagement and practice. However, this cohort was 
different from Chen and Klahr’s (1999) study as they were academically low 
performing children from an urban public school serving a lower income 
population. This cohort was chosen as they often showed limited progress in 
developing inquiry skills over time, compared with students from more 
advantageous backgrounds. The study was designed to prevent students from 
engaging in ineffective testing (such as manipulating multiple variables at once), 
which frequently occurred if students failed to formulate an appropriate question. 
Kuhn and Dean (2005) speculated that children were attempting to discover the 
effects of all variables at once, and intervened by suggesting to participants that they 
should find out about one thing at a time. All participants who received the 
suggestion indicated a focus on only one variable. Participants in the control 
condition focused on only one variable around 11% of the time, and 83% of the time 
they intended to find out about three or more variables in a single comparison. 
Furthermore, they found participants in the experimental group made many more 
appropriate causal inferences compared with the control group, in both the original 
and a new context, even with a cohort that frequently underperforms compared 
with peers from more advantageous backgrounds. Dean and Kuhn (2007) also found 
little difference in long-term performance of 10- to 11-year-olds from diverse SES 
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backgrounds in the USA, in a direct comparison between direct instruction and 
practice, and practice only. However, they found that children’s use of the control of 
variables strategy improved and became more embedded if direct instruction was 
accompanied by sustained practice involving problems requiring the strategy. 
Kuhn (2007a) argued that control of variable strategies do not encompass the whole 
of scientific reasoning. For example, not only does one want to identify the effects of 
a single variable among many, but also to reason appropriately about simultaneous 
effects of multiple variables (once the individual effects have been identified). Kuhn 
(2007a) sought to identify whether children’s poor performance at multiple 
variable prediction was related to poor control of variables strategies, or could be 
attributable to uncertainty regarding the structure of the causal system at hand, and 
vacillation over the nature of different possible effects. Participants were from an 
independent school affiliated with the University, and approximately nine- to 10-
year-olds. Kuhn (2007a) found that participants failed to utilise the information they 
gained regarding the effects of different variables, to make accurate predictions 
regarding multiple variable effects. A similar finding was also found with adults. 
Kuhn (2007b) investigated the everyday reasoning of the average adult (as opposed 
to undergraduate students) on familiar topics. It was also found that people with 
college degrees performed better than people without (Kuhn, 2007b), which may 
suggest that extensive training in skills related to scientific reasoning are required 
to perform well in more complex tasks, such as making multi-variable predictions. 
As with explanations for poor performance above, Kuhn (2007b) also argued that 
prior beliefs regarding the variables at hand may have impacted on performance.  
Further research looking at strategies used to identify underlying causal 
mechanisms suggested that the use of effective strategies improves with age, with 
adults much more likely to use an effective strategy (Chen & Klahr, 1999; Klahr et 
al., 1993). This is not to say that younger participants do not use effective strategies, 
just that they are more likely to use less adequate ones. However, the majority of 
participants of all ages are likely to improve with practice (Kuhn & Dean, 2005), 
suggesting that developing good scientific reasoning skills involves an introduction 
to the necessary skills plus practice of those skills. 
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Research with older children and adults suggests that the continued development 
of scientific reasoning becomes even more complex as the complexity of the 
questions at hand increase. In more complex cases, even adults confuse theory and 
evidence, frequently relying on explanation to support claims (Brem & Rips, 2000; 
Kuhn, 2001). This phenomenon is dependent on context, and disappears among 
abler university students (see Kuhn, 2001, for summary). Adults are also likely to 
have problems integrating theory and evidence, and there is a great range of 
scientific reasoning ability in both children and adults, although adults are almost 
always better than children (Klahr et al., 1993; Kuhn & Pease, 2006).  
1.1.3.5 EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING 
When thinking about how things are known more generally - epistemological 
understanding – Kuhn et al. (2000) sought to illustrate individual differences in 
epistemological understanding, as well as changes over time. They suggested that 
mature epistemological understanding is likely to reveal understanding of the 
coordination of the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing. They identified 
four categories of knowing: realist (assertions are copies of an external reality; 
knowledge is from an external source, and is certain); absolutist (assertions are facts 
that are correct or incorrect in their representation of reality; knowledge is from an 
external source, and is certain, but not directly accessible, possibly resulting in false 
beliefs); multiplist (assertions are opinions freely chosen by and accountable only to 
their owners; knowledge is generated by human minds, and is uncertain); and 
evaluativist (assertions are judgements that can be evaluated and compared 
according to criteria of argument and evidence; knowledge is generated by human 
minds, and is uncertain but susceptible to evaluation). Mature epistemological 
understanding would be demonstrated by understanding at the evaluativist level. 
People who engage in fully specified scientific reasoning regarding phenomena in 
the world could be said to be reasoning at the evaluative level, whereby scientists 
evaluate and compare assertions (hypotheses, theories) according to criteria of 
argument and evidence.  
Kuhn et al. (2000) compared 10-, 13-, and 17-year-old mostly middle-class, white 
students to undergraduate students from a high-ranking university, as well as three 
adult groups, one group chosen to be of comparable intellectual ability to the 
undergraduate group (working full-time, and doing a business MBA; predominantly 
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white), and the other of seemingly lesser ability (community college students, of 
primarily Hispanic ethnicity). The final group was an expert group of PhD 
candidates. Their goal was to consider the influence of age, intellectual ability and 
life experience on epistemological understanding. They developed a measure of 
epistemological understanding, asking a series of questions which enabled them to 
assess what epistemological understanding category the participants reached, in a 
number of different domains (judgements of personal taste, ascetic judgements, 
value judgements, judgements regarding truths about the social world, judgements 
regarding truths about the physical world). Participants were given a pair of 
contrasting statements from two interlocutors. They then had to indicate whether 
they thought one or both statements could be ‘right’. That was followed up with a 
second question they needed to evaluate, that if both statements could be ‘right’, 
could one statement be better or more right than the other. 
Kuhn et al. (2000) suggested that very young children begin as realists, becoming an 
absolutist during early science education years. Of particular relevance here were 
judgements regarding truths about physical world. They found around a third of 10-
year-olds showed a predominantly absolutist level. This decreased slightly, but did 
not disappear in all other groups except for the expert group. A similar but opposite 
pattern was observed, whereby around a fifth of 10-year-olds showed a 
predominantly evaluativist level, which increased with age, to around 40-45% for 
the undergraduate students and adult groups, aside from the expert group, all of 
whom reached this level.  
One issue with developmentally based claims is that they do not fully concur with 
the children’s early demonstration of basic scientific reasoning skills, which one 
could argue show the beginnings of an evaluativist level of epistemological 
understanding (Fay & Klahr, 1996; Koerber et al., 2005; see also causal 
understanding section 1.1.1.2). For example, Koerber et al. (2005) found that four- 
to six-year-olds were capable of revising beliefs in light of new evidence, when 
provided with a task that was linguistically simple, only requiring implicit 
understanding. Kuhn et al. (2000) used a more complex assessment, which required 
relatively sophisticated linguistic understanding. It is possible that some differences 
in performance across age could reflect developmental changes in language ability 
and understanding (see section 1.1.4 on language), as opposed to a transition 
 
36 
through the described levels of epistemological understanding, particularly as they 
relate to the evaluativist level.  
1.1.3.6 EXPLANATION 
One skill that is necessary for developing good scientific reasoning is the ability to 
generate appropriate arguments following predictions. Kuhn (2005) suggests that 
the central goals of science education should be to teach children both enquiry skills, 
and argument skills. Enquiry skills emphasise the processes of enquiry - asking 
questions, the generation and interpretation of data, and drawing conclusions. In 
primary schools in the UK the focus of science education is largely on the 
development of enquiry skills (5-11 years; Department for Education, 2015). In 
secondary school (11-16 years; Department for Education, 2015), there is an 
expanded focus on enquiry skills, and more emphasis on argumentation skills. These 
include being able to provide and modify explanations; taking into account the 
relationship between the data, predictions and hypotheses; and being able to draw 
appropriate conclusions based on evaluation of evidence and argument. Providing 
explanations is crucial to the practice of science, where argumentation takes a 
central role. The findings of science, when presented for the evaluation of others, 
are largely provided in the form of written explanatory arguments, explaining the 
relationship between theory and evidence.  
Explanation also plays a central role in our everyday reasoning. They are generated 
to help us make sense of the world, and they assist us in the exchange of beliefs, and 
making decisions. Lombrozo (2006) claimed that explanation also assists us in our 
causal understanding, whereby explanation constrains causal inference by reducing 
the range of potential mechanisms to those consistent with prior beliefs regarding 
the causal mechanisms. Certainly, children engage in explanation when utilising 
causal reasoning to make sense of real life events, and do so frequently, even at age 
two to three years. Hickling and Wellman (2001) examined the content of 
explanations that four two-and-a-half to five-year-olds (75% white, 75% middle 
class) gave or asked for in everyday conversation. They found that the explanation 
is focused on the entity targeted, and the explanatory mode of causal reasoning, plus 
the relations between these elements. They concluded that these children had 
appropriately constrained, yet flexible causal reasoning. Legare and Lombrozo 
(2014) also found that explanation appeared to promote causal learning and 
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generalisation. Their participants came from preschools in a metropolitan area in 
south-west USA. They were gender balanced and primarily Euro-American and 
middle-class. Participants were shown how to use an unfamiliar causal system, and 
then were either asked to observe the machine, or provide an explanation regarding 
how it works. The experimenter then removed a part of the causal system, and the 
child was then asked which part would make it work again, choosing from a 
selection of parts. Legare and Lombrozo (2014) found three- to five-year-olds 
showed better understanding of the causal system when they had been asked to 
provide an explanation. Furthermore, they also found age-related improvements, 
where the four- and five-year-olds were better than the three-year-olds. Similarly, 
Walker, Lombrozo, Williams, Rafferty and Gopnik (2017) found that, when making 
novel generalisations, five-year-old children who explained (as opposed to 
reported) observations using apparatus similar to the Blicket machine were more 
likely to favour hypotheses with broader scope. The participants were recruited in 
both university preschools, and a local museum. Demographic information was not 
collected. However, both preschool students and the museum visitors were 
approximately 60% white. Participants who generated explanations were also more 
likely to prefer hypotheses that concurred with their prior beliefs, as has been found 
previously (e.g. Gopnik et al., 2017). In order to investigate developmental 
differences in the relationship between explanation and exploration, Legare (2012) 
involved two- to six-year-old participants (predominantly Euro-American and 
middle-class.) Explanations regarding consistent and inconsistent outcomes were 
compared. For inconsistent outcomes only, the type of causal explanation 
differentially predicted exploratory behaviour. If children provided causal function 
explanations, they engaged in more hypothesis testing type behaviours. Legare 
(2012) did not find any age-related differences, suggesting that the task was too 
simple to identify developmental differences. However, the sample size in each age 
group was quite small so one particpant’s performance could have more of an 
impact. This, coupled with the fact that individual differences were not taken into 
account, may have clouded any age-related differences that might exist. 
However, providing explanations can also be problematic. In research with older 
children, Kuhn and Katz (2009) investigated whether self-generated explanations 
were always beneficial. Participants were nine to 10-year-olds, from a school with 
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around 50% white students, and a broad range of SES backgrounds. The study was 
part of a science class, where, over multiple sessions, participants investigated a 
causal system with the goal of identifying causal relations. Some participants 
provided explanations regarding their beliefs of the causal mechanisms, on a regular 
basis, whereas others did not. They found that participants who did not provide 
explanations did better on a transfer task compared with participants who did; they 
were more likely to ignore relevant evidence following explanation of causal 
relations. Kuhn and Katz (2009) suggest that explanation is reinforcing prior beliefs, 
which have already been observed negatively impacting on scientific reasoning 
tasks (e.g. Gopnik et al., 2017; Koerber et al., 2005). Explaining has also been 
observed leading to over generalisations in young adults.  Williams, Lombrozo, and 
Rehder (2013) found that undergraduate participants who explained were more 
likely to seek broad patterns, which hindered learning when patterns involved 
exceptions, in category learning tasks.  Similarly, Berthold, Röder, Knörzer, Kessler, 
and Renkl (2010) found that German tax-law students who provided conceptually 
based explanations were more likely to show good conceptual knowledge, 
compared with participants who did not. They provided more detail, and 
elaboration in their explanations. However, providing explanations negatively 
impacted on the acquisition of procedural knowledge. It is possible that providing 
repeated explanations functioned as a form of retrieval practice, which is well-
known strategy for learning (Brown, Roediger, & McDaniel, 2014), which then 
enhanced memory for conceptual information. However, providing explanations 
may also have drawn attention away from activities that would increase procedural 
knowledge, such as practising calculations.  
These findings suggest that, while providing explanations can aid understanding, 
they also can work to draw attention away from evidence, and other relevant 
information (Kuhn & Katz, 2009; Williams et al., 2013). It is possible that 
explanation is reinforcing prior beliefs, which may negatively impact on 
participants’ ability to evaluate new evidence (Gopnik et al., 2017; Koerber et al., 
2005). 
1.1.3.7 IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND GENDER 
As with the causal understanding literature, much of the research looking at 
scientific reasoning has been done with participants who were white, and from 
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middle-class backgrounds, without considering gender differences. This is the case 
even though both SES and gender are known to influence science attainment in 
school (Curran & Kellogg, 2016; Nunes, Bryant, Stran, Hillier, Rarros & Miller-
Fridmann, 2017). In particular, the research looking at younger children’s scientific 
reasoning skills, with more controlled tasks such as Blicket detector, has tended to 
be of this sort. It is likely that the impact of SES on causal understanding (see Wente 
et al., 2017, described in section 1.1.1.4) would be similar, whereby children from 
lower SES backgrounds would on average perform less well in these scientific 
reasoning tasks, compared with children from higher SES backgrounds. Other 
studies mentioned above, more frequently with older participants, report a broader 
range of ethnicity, and SES. They have not, however, explicitly assessed the impact 
of either on performance in those studies.  
Nevertheless, there is a substantial literature looking at the impact of SES on 
performance in school, and on science performance more generally. For example, in 
a longitudinal study in the USA, Saçkes, Trundle, Bell, and O’Connell (2011) looked 
at the impact of children’s early science experiences at age five on their science 
achievement at both five and eight years old, with a cohort of more than 8000 
children. Their cohort was balanced across gender, and about 60% white, 10% Black 
or African-American, and nearly 20% Hispanic. The rest of the cohort were of less 
common ethnicities or mixed-race. They assessed SES using income level, and 
parental education. They sought information on the science classroom learning 
environment, the amount of science teaching, and the type of activities the children 
participated in. They tested the children’s prior knowledge on a general knowledge 
test at the beginning and end of the kindergarten year at age five, as well as a third 
grade science achievement test at age eight. They also assessed approaches to 
learning including attentiveness, persistence, eagerness, independence, flexibility 
and coordination in learning at age five years. They found that SES, gender, prior 
knowledge, motivation, amount of science teaching, and engagement with science 
activities explained 75% of the variance in the end of kindergarten test, and that SES, 
gender, prior knowledge, motivation explained 61% of the variance in the third 
grade science achievement test at age eight.  Specifically, children from higher SES 
backgrounds had higher prior knowledge at the beginning of kindergarten, and the 
impact of SES continued, although decreased, by the end of kindergarten and third 
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grade science achievement tests. The gender attainment gap in science was also 
observable when assessing prior knowledge, and appeared to increase by the end of 
kindergarten, and more so by the end of third grade.  In contrast, girls had higher 
approaches to learning scores than boys. Given that approaches to learning were 
assessed by teachers, as was observed when discussing gender in the section on 
executive function (section 1.1.2), it is possible that the teachers ratings may be 
biased by gender, more favourable to girls, given the ratings do not appear to 
correspond to performance. Quinn and Cooc (2015) found that the gender gap at the 
end of third grade (age eight) narrowed slightly more by eighth grade (age 13), and 
disappeared after controlling for prior maths achievement (they used the same 
longitudinal study cohort that Saçkes et al. (2011) used). They also reported an 
ethnicity gap in science test scores, which remains constant from third to eighth 
grade for the Black/White comparison; decreases for the Hispanic/White 
comparison, and disappears for the Asian/White comparison (White students 
started with higher mean scores in all three comparisons).  
A recent UK report (Nunes et al., 2017), focusing on the impact of SES on attainment 
in science, provided an extensive review of the current literature, along with 
analysis on the performance of disadvantaged pupils in national science tests, 
compared with pupils from higher SES backgrounds. The review found that the 
impact of SES seems to be quite robust, and has been replicated multiple times over 
nearly 50 years, in many different countries, with different levels of affluence, using 
different measures of SES and science attainment. The impact of SES can be seen at 
the country level, where children from low income countries appear to learn less 
science than those from high income countries. It is observed at the school level, 
where those who go to lower SES schools appear to perform less well compared with 
children who go to higher SES schools (measured by the mean SES of the students). 
There also appears to be an impact at the individual level, over and above the school 
level SES impact, where children from lower SES backgrounds appear to do less well 
than children in higher SES backgrounds in the same school. They did not find any 
evidence for differences in performance being mediated by differences in interest 
or motivation.  
It has also been found that disadvantaged pupils had much lower scores in national 
science tests and examinations at all education levels (Key Stage 1-5, A-Level) when 
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compared with pupils from higher SES families (Nunes et al., 2017). The gap appears 
to grow over time, and seems to be largest towards the end of secondary school (age 
16). The review also concluded that early general performance (at age five) is 
predictive of later science achievement, concurring with the findings of Saçkes et al. 
(2011).  
Of particular interest here is the report of further analysis and data from Bryant, 
Nunes, Hillier, Gilroy, and Barros (2015) which looked at the relationship between 
SES and performance on a control of variable strategy (CVS) task, frequently used as 
a measure of scientific reasoning. In the original study, set in the UK, 11-year-old 
participants were given a CVS task, and their scores were then related to their 
performance in science for the following three years. The task had two components, 
one asked them to judge whether a particular comparison was suitable to determine 
the effect of the variable under question, and the second requiring a decision on the 
comparison based on their own opinion. Bryant et al. (2015) found that better 
performance on the task predicted higher attainment in science three years later, 
even after controlling for age and IQ. Furthermore, they found that the score when 
children had to compose the comparison themselves was a better predictor, than 
when they only had to evaluate the comparison. Further analysis of the data, showed 
that SES was related to performance on the CVS task, with children from lower SES 
backgrounds doing less well than children from higher SES backgrounds.  
These findings suggest that both gender and SES has a substantive impact on science 
attainment. There is also some evidence to suggest that SES impacts on scientific 
reasoning itself.  
1.1.4 LANGUAGE 
1.1.4.1 LANGUAGE AND SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING 
Scientific reasoning is, to a large extent, dependent on language skills. In studies that 
investigate scientific reasoning, child participants must be able to understand the 
verbally given instructions. As such, any inferences drawn assume at least some 
degree of language understanding, even with younger participants. In fact, the 
Blicket detector paradigm was developed in part to allow testing of implicit 
understanding in younger participants (as young as two years of age) in causal 
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understanding studies (Gopnik et al., 2001), who lacked the ability to explicitly 
reflect on causal relations, and produce verbal responses explaining their beliefs 
regarding a particular causal system. Variants of the Blicket detector have 
frequently been used in scientific reasoning studies in younger children. This is in 
part because of the simplicity in operation (e.g. Cook et al., 2011; Gopnik et al., 2001; 
Schultz et al., 2007), which allows assessment of scientific reasoning ability in the 
younger population. This population would not have the ability to participate in the 
more complex tasks frequently used to assess scientific reasoning, such as the causal 
variable strategy tasks (Chen & Klahr, 1999; Dean & Kuhn, 2007), where the 
instructions were delivered either verbally, or in text.  
Similarly, nearly everything children learn about science is mediated through 
language, spoken and written, either through the teacher or parents, textbooks, or 
communication with their peers. Furthermore, children’s ability to express their 
understanding of science in school is largely done through the medium of reading 
and writing, particularly as children get older. So to effectively express their science 
understanding in school, children need to have adequate linguistics skills to start 
with. In science class, they will also have to learn the language of science; that is, to 
scientifically reason in an explicit way using appropriate terminology so as to 
question, investigate, design, test, analyse, evaluate, theorise and so on. Added to 
this, children are also required to learn a whole new set of concepts and labels for 
technical information learned about in science class. To express the new linguistic 
information necessary for learning, Norris and Phillips (2002) drew a distinction 
between fundamental and derived senses of scientific literacy, where reading and 
writing with scientific content is seen as fundamental, and being knowledgeable and 
educated in science as derived. 
Much of the language of science is distinct from everyday language. Fang (2006) 
investigated the differences between language in science and everyday language in 
science textbooks aimed at middle school children aged 11 to 14 years old in the 
USA. They found that in science class, not only are children frequently exposed to 
technical words that rarely occur in everyday speech, but they also frequently have 
Latin and/or Greek origin and quite complex to read and understand. This is 
particularly the case when multiple such words are used in a single sentence. In 
addition to this, words sometimes mean different things in science and everyday 
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language (e.g. fault - break in rock formation or responsibility for mistake or act of 
wrongdoing; Fang, 2006). There are many other examples of words that are not 
used as they are typically used in everyday language (see Fang, 2006 for further 
examples); as well as other examples of differences which may lead to difficulties 
such as more complex sentence use, use of the passive voice, and so on. These 
differences place large demands on children who are learning both new vocabulary 
and new concepts. Children who have weaker language skills and/or are learning in 
their second language may be particularly likely to struggle (Kigel, McElvany, & 
Becker, 2015). This is notable when they go to secondary school and are exposed to 
much more complex language in the interaction between students and teacher or in 
textbooks, than in primary school.  
1.1.4.2 LANGUAGE BASED FACTORS RELATED TO SCIENCE LEARNING 
Fang (2006) suggested a number of language-based interventions to overcome 
problems (some) children may have with linguistic aspects of science learning, such 
as technical vocabulary, complex words and sentences, uncommon usage of words, 
and so on. These were largely comprised of language-based activities, using a 
scientific context, which draws attention to specific aspects of scientific language 
that may cause difficulty for children. Fang and Wei (2010) conducted an 
intervention, with 10- to 11-year-olds to improve children’s scientific literacy, in a 
school around 50% white, 35% black, with around half the student population 
considered to be low SES background. Students in the intervention group, received 
their typical science curriculum, plus reading strategy instruction, and a home 
science reading programme. Students in the control group received only their usual 
science curriculum. The study found that children who received extra reading 
strategy instruction, and a home science reading programme outperformed children 
who did not, in both a fundamental and derived sense of scientific literacy. Fang and 
Wei (2010) assumed that the improvements in fundamental scientific literacy could 
be ascribed to the reading strategy instruction, and improvements in the derived 
sense of scientific literacy to the home science reading programme. However, it is 
conceivable that reading scientific texts with parents or other family members may 
benefit reading and writing as well through explicit discussion of scientific topics 
(see below). In addition, while Fang and Wei (2010) expected there to be a benefit, 
establishing what aspect(s) of the intervention were doing the work is difficult in 
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the experimental design they used. Furthermore, it might be that students whose 
parents gave them permission to participate in the intervention, were parents who 
were predisposed towards participating in their children’s learning, where if such 
an intervention was adopted as part of the curriculum, it would not have the same 
impact as not all parents or family members would participate as actively as parents 
or family members did here. As a result, although Fang and Wei (2010) is suggestive, 
it is unclear what aspect(s) of the intervention were contributing to the improved 
scientific reasoning scores. 
There is evidence to suggest parental conversation is of benefit for science learning. 
For example, discussing content learned in science enhanced the memory of 
participants aged four- to six-years-old when asked to recall science related content 
discussed with parents several days later. Leichtman, Camilleri, Pillemer, Amato-
Wierda, Hogan, and Dongo (2017) tested participants from two schools, both 
predominantly white (over 70%), one upper middle class, the other lower middle 
class, from the USA. Children were taught about a science topic, and then later that 
day parents were asked to record two conversations, one about the science lesson 
(they were told the topic of the science lesson, but given no other information or 
instructions regarding how the conversation should be conducted) and the second 
about a separate personal event that their child had enjoyed. They found that the 
conversational style of parents (e.g. open ended questions, descriptive language) 
predicted the amount of information provided by the child, which then appeared to 
have benefitted memory six days later. They did not find any differences between 
the schools, which is surprising given the reliability of SES differences in attainment 
at the school level (Bryant et al., 2017). However, one quarter (26%,16 participants) 
of their original sample were excluded from the final sample, the majority because 
their parents did not complete the parent-child conversation. The samples were also 
small, with only 20 participants from each school. It is possible the lack of difference 
between high and low SES schools is related to the dropout of participants, as 
opposed to there being no differences in the different samples.  
The relevance of parent involvement and language has also been identified for 
slightly older children, in a more controlled context and with a larger sample. Philips 
and Tolmie (2007) examined the effect of parental support on six- to eight-year-old 
children’s understanding of a science problem – the balance scale problem. There 
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were around 150 children from 10 different schools in Scotland (no information on 
SES was given). Participants were given the task of balancing the scale beam, where 
the causal variables were distance from the centre point of the scale and weight. The 
experimenter put an arrangement of weights on their side of the scale beam, and the 
participants had to balance the scale without copying what the experimenter did. 
They were allowed to do this with the assistance of a parent, who had received 
instruction in the rules guiding causal behaviour of the system. Philips and Tolmie 
(2007) found that participants who had parental assistance provided appropriate 
solutions more quickly than participants who did not, although control participants 
caught up by the third session. However, this was not the case for appropriate 
explanations, where participants with parental assistance provided better 
explanations in all three sessions. This benefit was most notable with children 
whose parents focused on verbalising the interaction between distance and weight. 
Furthermore, Philips and Tolmie (2007) found that it was the combination of 
explicit operationalisation plus high level explanation that benefited progress. So 
the parent providing an explanation appeared to be more effective for progress, 
when participants also observed the correctness of the explanation. Philips and 
Tolmie (2007) did not specifically look at the impact of SES here but again one would 
imagine that it would have an impact, where higher SES parents would be more 
likely to provide appropriate boosts to learning, compared with lower SES parents. 
With adolescents, Gerber, Cavallo, and Marek (2001) looked at the impact of the 
informal learning environments on students’ scientific reasoning, in 12- to 15-year-
old students, where informal learning environments include activities with family, 
and/or friends, as well as at school. The initial sample consisted of over 1000 
students, and the final sample of around 500 students, where only students with 
enriched and impoverished informal learning environments were included. The 
sample was around 80% white, and of relatively equivalent SES and academic 
abilities (based on teacher interviews and questionnaire data - no further 
information was given). They found that participants with better informal learning 
environments perform better on tests designed to assess scientific reasoning. One 
issue with this study, is that although there appeared to be a benefit of informal 
learning environments, the assessment of informal learning environments included 
activities with family, activities done alone, at school, or someplace else, and other 
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factors such as employment, chores and travel. It is possible that some of these 
activities benefit their scientific reasoning more than others (for example, parental 
involvement), and that examining these factors separately in the future may shed 
more light on what aspects of the informal learning environment are doing the work. 
1.1.4.3 IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND GENDER 
With regards to SES, Bryant et al. (2017) suggested that the level of children’s 
literacy may be a possible mediator of the relationship between science attainment 
and SES. Their review found that there was frequently a positive relationship 
between children’s reading ability and their science attainment. However, they 
pointed out that most of the studies they reviewed assessed both reading ability and 
science attainment concurrently, making it challenging to establish cause and effect.  
They proposed a need for more longitudinal, and intervention studies. To address 
the longitudinal evidence, they conducted a new analysis based on the AVON 
longitudinal study of parents and children (ALSPAC) in the UK. This cohort included 
variables such as SES, IQ, reading comprehension, vocabulary, and science 
attainment at key stage 2 (11 years; over 5000 participants) and key stage 3 (14 
years; over 3000 participants). They found that, when reading comprehension was 
taken into account, the relationship between SES and science attainment decreased 
dramatically, and even further when reading comprehension and vocabulary were 
both taken into account. This was also the case for scientific reasoning, but to a lesser 
extent. These results point to the importance of language ability in science 
attainment, and also suggest factors that may mediate the SES science attainment 
gap.  
Differences related to SES in early language proficiency can be observed in children 
as young as one and a half to two years of age. By aged two, a six-month gap has been 
identified between high and low SES groups in processing skills critical to language 
development (Fernald, Marchman, & Wiesleder, 2013). Differences in early 
vocabulary development have been observed from as young as two years of age in 
high, compared with medium SES populations. Hoff (2003) found that higher SES 
children’s vocabularies grew more than lower SES children’s over a 10 week period. 
Hoff (2003) suggested that the properties of maternal speech that differed across 
the two groups could account for the difference. Given that the impact of SES can be 
seen on language from such a young age, if language ability plays a role in science 
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attainment, then it would not be a surprise to find an impact of SES on very early 
measures of science ability (see section 1.13 on scientific reasoning).  
Regarding gender, in the early years of language development females tend to 
outperform boys. For example, girls have been found to show greater vocabulary 
growth over a period from around one to two-years-old (Huttenlocher, Haight, Bryk, 
Seltzer, & Lyons, 1991). Girls are also likely to out-perform boys in both specific and 
general measures of language up until the age of five (Bornstein, Hahn, & Haynes, 
2004). Gender gaps in reading have also be observed at school, were girls frequently 
show better performance compared with boys (Ma, 2008). He looked at the gender 
gap in reading, mathematics, and scientific literacy across multiple countries, with 
data from the OECD’s 2000 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), 
based on a cohort of 15-year-old students, of around 200,000 students, from around 
over 7000 schools. Standardised achievement tests were administered to measure 
reading, mathematics, and science literacy. Ma (2008) found that there was a gender 
gap in reading performance that was biased towards girls in 40 out of 41 countries, 
with the mean difference between scores ranging from 5.31 (Indonesia) to 49.01 
(New Zealand). The extent of the difference ranged across countries. Most countries, 
including the UK, showed only small female advantage. This is in contrast to 
mathematics where 29 of 41 countries showed a performance in favour of boys, with 
the mean difference between scores ranging from 6.15 (UK) to 25.07 (France). The 
UK showed a small male advantage. For science, in 14 of 41 countries there was a 
performance bias towards boys, with mean difference scores ranging from 7.12 
(Mexico) to 23.66 (Poland); and 5 of 41 countries showed a performance bias 
towards girls, with mean difference scores ranging from 5.50 (Thailand) to 19.73 
(New Zealand), where the rest showed no difference. Interestingly, all five of the 
countries that show a female science bias, also show a relatively large female 
reading bias.  
The trend towards better male performance in science attainment (see section 1.1.3. 
on scientific reasoning), even though they are on average likely to do less well than 
girls in tests of reading, suggests that performance in science attainment cannot be 
purely explained by linguistic factors. However, they do appear to play a role, and 
therefore should be considered, both when attempting to gain an understanding of 
the development of scientific reasoning, as well as when considering a science 
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curriculum. This is especially the case if one wants to improve the performance of 
children from lower SES environments in science.  
In conclusion, language is likely to be relevant to scientific reasoning both on 
fundamental and derived levels, such that science learners with poorer language 
ability are likely to demonstrate poorer performance. 
1.1.5 SCIENCE EDUCATION  
The goal of the national curriculum in the UK, regarding science education, is to 
“provide the foundations for understanding the world to the specific disciplines of 
biology, chemistry and physics…and all pupils should be taught essential aspects of 
the knowledge, methods, processes and uses of science” (Department for Education, 
2015, para. 1).  
At the beginning of primary school, science education is largely exploratory, and 
seeks to encourage children to both become interested in the world around them, 
and to use different types of scientific enquiry to answer their own questions. As 
primary school continues, children are expected to start making decisions about 
what types of scientific enquiry may be best to answer questions they have about 
everyday phenomena. By the end of primary school, their knowledge and 
understanding are expected to have become more abstract, enabling them to be able 
to recognise how these more abstract ideas help them to understand and predict 
how the world works. They are expected to be able to answer science questions 
using different types of science enquiry such as observation over time, looking for 
patterns, carrying out fair tests, and using a wide range of secondary sources of 
information. By age 16 (the end of the prescribed national curriculum), children are 
expected to have a good understanding of the subject disciplines of biology, 
chemistry and physics, whilst also understanding the role that science plays in our 
lives. Scientific thinking is expected to underlie their learning throughout. It could 
be said that teaching scientific reasoning is one of the primary goal of science 
education, given the large majority of children leaving school do not go on to use the 
specific information regarding physics, chemistry, or biology (possibly except for 
information relating to human biology and development). The national curriculum 
for science (in the UK) aims illustrate this, indicating that their aims are to ensure 
that all pupils:  
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“develop scientific knowledge and conceptual understanding through specific disciplines of 
biology, chemistry and physics; develop understanding of the nature, processes and 
methods of science through different types of science enquiries that help them to answer 
scientific questions about the world around them; are equipped with the scientific 
knowledge required to understand the uses and implications of science today and for the 
future” (Department for education, 2015, para 2) 
The latter two of the three aims of the national curriculum directly relate to 
processes typically used in scientific reasoning. 
However, Li and Klahr (2006) claimed that viewing scientific reasoning as invoking 
an unordered set of relevant skills is problematic and does not necessarily lead to 
scientific reasoning. They suggested that it should be taught as a set of inter-related 
problem-solving strategies, and have provided suggestions for how one might 
implement that in the classroom. Of course, explicitly teaching scientific reasoning 
to children requires the teachers to have a deeper explicit understanding of the 
mechanics of scientific reasoning, and that the education system in place facilitates 
a scientific education that does more than tick the scientific reasoning checklist.  
However, national curricula have a tendency to generate lists of methods, processes, 
skills, and content the students should gain understanding of through the teaching 
of science, for example. The current national curriculum for science in the UK 
provides examples of this at each educational stage (Department for Education, 
2015, Key stage 1 programme of study – years 1 and 2). For example, during the key 
stage 1 programme study (five- to seven-year-olds), children should be taught to ask 
simple questions, and recognise that they can be answered in different ways; 
observe closely using simple equipment; perform simple tests; identify and classify; 
use observation and ideas to answer questions; and gather and record data to help 
answer questions. By key stage 4 (14- to 16-years-old), students are expected to 
show understanding and first-hand experience of the development of scientific 
thinking; experimental skills and strategies; analysis and evaluation; and 
vocabulary, units, symbols and nomenclature (Department for Education, 2015, Key 
stage 4).  
In conclusion, scientific reasoning skills can be seen from around four years of age, 
with continued development throughout the school period. This development is 
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slow, and requires extensive educational support (Morris et al., 2012), and 
appropriate epistemological understanding takes a long time to develop to its 
highest level, which may not be attained by all individuals. This suggests that the 
acquisition of scientific reasoning skills require more formal teaching compared to 
the acquisition of causal reasoning skills, which function implicitly and are evident 
from a very young age. 
1.2 SOURCE RELIABILITY 
1.2.1 DEFINITION 
One factor that is particularly relevant for scientific reasoning is source reliability. 
Both children and adults are faced with a plethora of information in their day to day 
lives that they are expected to use to make judgments about how they should act. 
This information comes from a number of different media (more than ever before) 
- such as newspapers, television, the Internet, advertisements, politicians, doctors, 
scientists, and scientific journal articles (where with the advent of the World Wide 
Web, the lay population has direct access to evidence reported by the scientist). 
When learning about science, children also receive information from a wide variety 
of sources, both in school and out. For example, students receive information from 
teachers, their peers, text books, the Internet, their parents, and so on. These 
different sources are differentially reliable. That is, some sources of information are 
more likely to provide correct information than others. For example, a doctor who 
has received several years of education relating to the health of human beings is 
expected to be more likely to be reliable with regards to information regarding 
health (their area of expertise) than information based on the personal opinion of 
someone writing on a blog (on a topic that is not their area of expertise). For a school 
child doing a test in science, trusting the information provided by the teacher who 
prepared and is guiding the lesson, is likely to be more sensible than trusting 
information provided by one of their peers, if that information is in conflict.  
Consequently, it is important that by adulthood people are able to appropriately 
evaluate the reliability of sources, in order that they make good decisions that give 
the best possible outcomes in their lives. Given the crucial importance of source 
reliability, gaining a greater understanding of the role of source reliability in 
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children’s reasoning about their everyday world is desirable, so that it can be 
incorporated into science education. 
1.2.2 CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF SOURCE RELIABILITY 
As stated, children are faced with information from multiple sources that they can 
incorporate into their reasoning about the world. Given that at a young age they are 
not capable of obtaining anything but the most obvious (observable) information for 
themselves, they rely on the testimony of their parents, teachers, peers, and, 
increasingly, the media where many children under the age of three now use screen 
based media (Duch, Fisher, Ensari, & Harrington, 2013). The selective trust 
paradigm, developed by Harris and colleagues (e.g. Koenig, Clément & Harris, 2004; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005), was designed to look at whether children as young as three 
or four years of age were sensitive to the reliability of the source of the information, 
and whether source reliability affects their understanding of outcomes. 
1.2.2.1 RESEARCH USING THE SELECTIVE TRUST PARADIGM 
In the typical selective trust paradigm children are presented with an accurate, and 
an inaccurate informant, usually by watching a video of the informants. These 
informants are identified as such during the familiarization phase in the following 
way. Children are shown a known object, such as a ball. The accurate informant 
consistently labels the known objects correctly. For example, when shown a ball, 
they say "that is a ball". The inaccurate informant consistently labels the known 
objects incorrectly. For example, when shown a ball, they say "that is a shoe". After 
the reliability of the informants had been established, children enter the test phase, 
where they witness the informants label unfamiliar objects. They then participate in 
a number of trials - an explicit reliability trial where they are asked questions such 
as "Did any of them [the informants] say something right/wrong?” Following that, 
children are asked to identify an unfamiliar object which had been identified 
differently by both the accurate and inaccurate informant. For example, when the 
novel object has been revealed, the accurate informant identifies it as a 'mido' and 
the inaccurate informant as a 'toma'. The experimenter then asks the child if the 
unfamiliar object is a 'mido' or a 'toma'. Finally, children receive a second explicit 
reliability trial, where they are asked "One of these people kept saying something 
right/wrong. Which one kept saying something right/wrong?" (Koenig et al., 2004). 
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Using the selective trust paradigm, Koenig et al. (2004) investigated three- and four-
year-old participants’ ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate 
informants. The participants were from university-based childcare centres (at a 
prestigious university) in the USA, with equal genders. They found that children 
appeared to be able to differentiate between the two informants, when asked if they 
had done something right/wrong at both time points. They also found that those 
participants who were able to discriminate between the two informants (around 
50% of three-year-olds, and 70% of four-year-olds) were above chance (around 
65%) at keeping track of an informant's previous accuracy, able to use that 
information to judge whether an informant should be trusted upon receipt of new 
information. They did not find an effect of age, although the four-year-olds appeared 
to be more competent than the three-year-olds. That is, from a young age, some 
children appear to be capable of evaluating source reliability and changing their 
behaviour accordingly.  
This understanding of source reliability appears to be quite sophisticated. For 
example, Koenig and Harris (2005) recruited children from both the university 
childcare centre, as well as the local Head Start centre (Head Start promotes school 
readiness of children under five from low income families; U.S. Department of Health 
& Human Services, Office of Head Start, n.d.) in the USA. They do not report what 
proportion from each childcare centre. Approximately 60% of the participants were 
white, and the rest different ethnicities. Most were from primarily middle class 
backgrounds, and the sample was balanced by gender. They used a similar paradigm 
to Koenig et al. (2004), except that with the explicit reliability questions, they were 
asked which of the informants was “not good at answering questions”. They found a 
similar pattern of results to Koenig et al. (2004) with regards to explicit reliability 
questions, and ignorance was a favoured explanation. However, they did find an age 
difference, where the four-year-olds exceeded chance in using information from the 
accurate informant to endorse claims and predict future assertions, whereas three-
year-olds did not. In a second experiment, participants were presented with 
accurate versus ignorant informants, finding that both age groups showed a 
preference for accurate informants. A third experiment assessed whether children 
would show preferences for more reliable informants in domains beyond where 
they had observed differential reliability (a greater proportion of these children 
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were white (80%), compared with the other two experiments, and were described 
as coming from middle to upper class backgrounds). They found that participants 
preferred to ask questions of the accurate informant, with regards to the same and 
different domains. They do not find an age difference. Koenig and Harris (2005) did 
not report any performance differences dependent on type of childcare centre. This 
would be of interest given that Head Start is designed to provide early years 
resources for low SES families. As discussed in each of the previous sections, low SES 
can impact on the development of cognition in many different domains. Although 
the participants are reported as coming from middle, and middle to upper class 
backgrounds, it is unclear how this tallies with participants recruited from the Head 
Start childcare centres. It is possible that age differences, or lack thereof (in Koenig 
et al., 2004 as well), reflects sample variation in age groups due to participants 
coming from different SES backgrounds. It would have been interesting to know if 
there are any performance differences between childcare centres. One would 
predict that the children from the University childcare centres perform better than 
those from the Head Start childcare centres. 
There is now a substantial body of literature using paradigms similar to that of the 
selective trust paradigm outlined above that suggests that children as young as 
three- and four-years-old can discriminate between more and less reliable sources. 
For example, Scofield and Behrend (2008) manipulated reliability of the informants, 
after informants had provided information that the participants had to decide to 
endorse or not. They tested three- and four-year-old participants from white middle 
class families in the USA. They found that just over 50% of the four-year-old 
participants, and just over 25% of the three-year-old participants reversed their 
trust in the face of newly discovered unreliability of an informant.  
Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig and Harris (2007) recruited three- and four-year-old 
participants from a childcare centre in the USA serving a broad SES range, of which 
50% were white, and the remainder a range of ethnicities. They sought to look at 
the relationship between false belief and selective trust. A potential explanation for 
three-year-olds underperforming in the selective trust studies is that they have 
difficulty interpreting false labels because they do not yet understand the false belief 
that may motivate them. In the selective trust task not only did the researchers 
manipulate accuracy, but they also manipulated relative accuracy, where 
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informants could be accurate 100%, 75%, 25%, or 0% of the time. They compared 
100% and 0%, 100% and 25%, and 75% and 0%. They found little evidence of a 
relationship between false belief understanding and success in the selective trust 
task, where children’s understanding of false belief did not predict performance, 
even after controlling for age. They also found that four-year-olds were above 
chance in all three comparisons whereas three-year-olds were above chance for 
100% and 0%, 100% and 25%, but at chance for 75% and 0%. That is, three-year-
olds seemed relatively unforgiving of the errors made by the source who was correct 
75% of the time; whereas four-year-olds accepted that the source would be more 
generally reliable. This age difference in performance was replicated in a second 
study, which also compared 75% and 25%.  
When reliability was manipulated by comparing child and adult informants, three- 
and four-year-old participants, from the USA (no more information given) doing a 
selective trust task, preferred information from the adult informant when both were 
reliable, and when the adult informant was reliable and the child informant not 
reliable. However, even though they showed a strong preference for adult 
informants, when the child was reliable and the adult unreliable, they showed a 
preference for the reliable child (Jaswal & Neely, 2006).  
Children also appear to prefer a consensus among sources. Corriveau, Fusaro and 
Harris (2009), doing a selective trust task with three- and four-year-old children 
(from preschools near the University, mostly white, with a range of ethnicities and 
SES represented - no proportions were given, from the USA). Children witnessed 
four informants, where there was a consensus among three of them. In both age 
groups children tended to accept information made by the majority. Furthermore, 
when faced with a choice between one of the majority, and the dissenting informant, 
they preferred the informant from the majority group.  
The majority of this research has been done with children aged around three to four 
years of age, with participants that come from middle-class families. Although some 
participant samples included children from lower SES environments, they did not 
assess the impact of SES. One study (Koenig & Woodward, 2010) involved two-year-
old participants who were recruited via advertisements or mailings, and were 
approximately 50% white, interacting with an accurate or an inaccurate informant 
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(the experimenter), observing how the children responded to information that came 
from an inaccurate or accurate informant. It was found that children responded 
more systematically to information from the accurate informant. They did not find 
an effect of gender. Of interest here however is that they recorded a measure of 
vocabulary levels, which they used to form two groups, one high and one low 
vocabulary group. They found that participants in the high vocabulary group 
showed more sensitivity to inaccurate sources compared with participants in the 
low vocabulary group. Given that poorer language skill is more likely for children 
coming from lower SES environments (see section 1.1.1 on language), it is possible 
that this is initial evidence of the impact of SES on selective trust. The majority of the 
selective trust literature mentioned previously does not specifically address the 
impact of SES or gender on source reliability evaluation. 
1.2.2.2 EPISTEMIC UNDERSTANDING OF SOURCE RELIABILITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN 
The literature is extensive and children show quite sophisticated preferences and 
background knowledge regarding who is likely to be reliable or not. For example, 
they appear to understand that an informant who is accurate in one domain is not 
necessarily accurate in other domains. However, they are also likely to believe that 
an inaccurate informant in one domain should be avoided in another (Koenig & 
Jaswal, 2011). Selective trust has also been shown across domains, in contexts other 
than word learning. For example, it can be seen when children are learning new 
object functions (Birch, Vautheir & Bloom, 2008); finding a target (Nurmsoo & 
Robinson, 2009a) or deciding whose advice to accept (Vanderbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 
2011). Children may also discriminate depending on how accurate sources have 
achieved their prior accuracy. Four- to five-year-olds preferred sources who did not 
rely on help from a third party (Vanderbilt et al., 2011). 
The fact that children are likely to show a preference for reliable sources of 
information in many different contexts has led to the claim that children are showing 
epistemic awareness regarding the knowledge of the informants (Koneig & Harris, 
2007). An alternative conception is that children base their responses purely on the 
output of the informant, without making any inferences regarding the informant’s 
interior knowledge. This alternative view suggests that the oddness of the behaviour 
of the inaccurate informant mis-naming common everyday items may be enough to 
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explain the preference for the accurate informant, without the need to infer the 
existence of epistemic awareness.  
Lucas and Lewis (2010) challenged Koenig and Harris’ (2007) claim that children 
are showing epistemic awareness. They suggested firstly, that if children really had 
epistemic awareness, then they would have an understanding of misinformed 
knowledge. That is, they would be able to distinguish between informants who had 
a good reason for inaccuracy (lack of exposure to conventional information or a lack 
of expertise), and those who were inaccurate for no apparent reason. Secondly, 
Lucas and Lewis (2010) suggested that children should understand the nature of 
misinformed knowledge whereby they can predict and forgive misinformed 
information. 
Mixed findings have been found when looking at children’s understanding of 
misinformed knowledge. Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009a), using puppets and a 
specific object finding task, found that children could distinguish between 
informants who had reason to be inaccurate and those who did not. They involved 
four- and five-year-old participants from white working and middle-class areas in 
the United Kingdom. The study differed slightly from the standard selective trust 
task, in that the source reliability manipulation was face-to-face. They decided to use 
a puppet to avoid having an apparently fully formed adult giving obviously 
inaccurate information to the child participant. In this study, based on the format of 
the selective trust paradigm, reliability of the informants was established, with two 
completely unreliable informants. However, the participants were aware that one 
unreliable informant was uninformed regarding the identification of the target toys 
(unreliable without evidence), whereas the other informant was informed 
(unreliable with evidence). Participants were then asked about a target toy in test 
trials. Once the participant had identified which toy they thought it was, the 
informant puppet then (always) contradicted them, and the child was asked if they 
want to switch to agree with the informant puppet. The participants were much 
more likely to switch if the information came from the uninformed informant 
(unreliable without evidence; about 70% of children switched). There were no age 
differences. At first glance, this appears to be support for epistemic awareness 
regarding the knowledge of informants, whereby children appear to predict and 
forgive misinformed information.  
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However, in a second experiment, using video informants and a generalisable word 
learning task, children as old as seven years of age failed to distinguish between the 
two types of inaccurate informants. Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009b) used four-, 
five-, and seven-year-old participants from white working and middle-class areas in 
the United Kingdom. They had two groups of participants who did slightly different 
tasks. One task was similar to the standard selective trust task. The second task was 
a setup similarly to Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009a), in that they had two inaccurate 
informants, providing word labels for objects. One inaccurate informant was 
blindfolded (unreliable without seeing object) and the second inaccurate informant 
could see (unreliable with seeing object). Once source reliability had been 
established in the test trials, both informants could see (i.e. the blindfold was 
removed), and the participant was asked which word label they preferred for new 
objects that had just been identified by both informants. In the first group, as has 
been previously found, children were sensitive to informant accuracy, and preferred 
to learn from accurate informants. However, for the second group, participants 
failed to discriminate between reasons for inaccuracy in the two informants, solely 
basing their responses on informants’ history. This was even though they seemed to 
understand that the blindfold could affect familiar object naming. Nurmsoo and 
Robinson (2009b) replicated the result, adding in previous reliability information 
that the blindfolded informant was accurate when not wearing the blindfold. 
Whereas Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009a) found children did appear to pay 
attention to whether the informant was misinformed, Nurmsoo and Robinson 
(2009b) found that they did not appear to do so, even at the age of seven.  
One likely explanation for these puzzling results might be that communicators and 
social cues necessary to engage in mentalistic reasoning (thus demonstrating 
epistemic awareness) may be missing from the task using video informants. None of 
the usual non-verbal information usually available to direct children's inferences 
regarding internal knowledge was present, and children are sensitive to non-verbal 
information.  For instance, children have been found to prefer informants who 
receive bystander assent such as nods and smiles, versus bystander dissent such as 
head shakes and frowns (Fusaro & Harris, 2008). However, Nurmsoo and Robinson 
(2009a) used puppets, and it seems unlikely that puppet informants provided more 
informative communicatons and social cues than a video of a human informant. A 
 
58 
more compelling explanation for the conflicting findings might be that children are 
particularly intolerant of inaccurate informants when they are learning 
generalisable information (new words) compared with learning specific 
information (identity of a hidden toy). It matters if one uses a word label incorrectly, 
so the nature of the inaccurate informant is important. It does not matter if the toy 
is not what the informant says it is. Clearly context is important, and it may be that 
children take source reliability into account when they deem the outcome important 
enough for it to be considered. This may be the case for the younger children in the 
study by Bernard, Proust and Clément (2015). They found that younger children 
(four- to five-year-olds) preferred consensus over reliability, whereas older 
children display the reverse pattern (six-year-olds). 
1.2.2.3 OTHER RESEARCH ON SOURCE RELIABILITY UNDERSTANDING 
There has been little research looking at children’s understanding of source 
reliability that does not use some variant of the selective trust paradigm. One such 
example, Fitneva (2001, see also 2008) looked at source reliability from a linguistic 
perspective. Fitneva was interested in how children use epistemic information in 
their judgments, and in the distinction between the source of information and 
speaker attitude (such as degree of commitment), when considering the reliability 
of statements. The prevailing view was that reliability of information from a speaker 
was judged by ‘speaker attitude’ and that ‘source of information’ contributed to the 
evaluation of speaker attitude (along with other epistemic devices such as lexical, 
intonational, or grammatical, which can characterise the origin, nature, and limit of 
the knowledge expressed by the speaker). However, Fitneva (2001) claimed that 
both elements were important when making judgements in the everyday world. 
Speaker attitude and source of information do not necessarily provide concurrent 
information. For example, a speaker may have high degree of commitment, but may 
not be a good source of information regarding an event (compare, for example, 
someone who witnessed an event versus someone who heard about an event from 
someone else; the direct witness would be considered to be a better source of 
information than the person who heard about it from someone else). Fitneva argued 
that both convey information regarding the reliability of information, but one would 
use them in different situations. Speaker attitude is used when the speaker is 
capable of competently deciding on the reliability of the information, and source of 
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information when the reliability of the source of information is questionable, 
whereby the speakers could debate the relevance of the information.  
In an experiment that draws on grammatical pointers in Bulgarian that differentiate 
between events that have been reported to the speaker (first-hand information), 
and events that have been inferred by the speaker (second-hand information), 
Fitneva (2001) argued that this difference maps neatly on to the difference between 
source of information and speaker attitude interpretations. This allowed Fitneva to 
evaluate whether six- and nine-year-old Bulgarian participants (no other 
information was given) differentially used source of information and speaker 
attitude when evaluating reliability of information. Were they to, it would suggest 
that the source of information is directly relevant to the evaluation of the reliability 
of statements. The task involved participants hearing a story and being asked which 
protagonist they believed. The first set of stories involved searching for a location, 
where one would expect first-hand information (source of information) would be 
more useful than second hand information (speaker attitude). She found that nine-
year-old participants were more likely to believe the informant that provided first-
hand information, when location was important, and did not show a preference for 
first over second-hand informants when location was not (the six-year-old children 
were also showing a trend in that direction). In a second study, Fitneva (2008) found 
that both six- and nine-year-old Bulgarian participants, from middle-class 
neighbourhoods were sensitive to modality information when making reliability 
judgements. Participants were asked to choose between information from two 
different sources, where perceptual (direct perception versus hearsay) and 
cognitive (direct inference versus report of inference) domains were manipulated. 
It was concluded that older children prefer perceptual sources (i.e., sources that 
claim to have observed the event), whereas younger children prefer cognitive 
sources (i.e., sources that claim to know). Older children were also thought to prefer 
first-hand information, whereas younger children did not appear to discriminate 
between first and second hand information. 
These results suggest that older children (and some younger children) might be 
using epistemic information to evaluate the reliability of statements, where they 
distinguish between statements based on minor grammatical changes. However, 
given that the effect was not strong in six-year-olds, it seems unlikely that three to 
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four-year-olds would access the epistemic information in the same way. Fitneva’s 
(2001, 2008) results have provided a further challenge to the claim that three to 
four-year-old children are accessing epistemic information when they demonstrate 
a preference for the accurate informant.  
Nurmsoo and Robinson’s (2009 a & b) contradictory findings may be offered a 
resolution here. In Nurmsoo and Robinson’s (2009a) study the children were asked 
to make a perceptual judgment regarding an object. As such, the reliability of source 
of information was important enough for them to pay particular attention to what 
the source of information may have perceived. However, in Nurmsoo and 
Robinson’s (2009b) study children were asked which label they prefer from the 
‘reason for inaccuracy’ and ‘no reason for inaccuracy’ informants. As the cognitive 
process by which a naming error occurs cannot be observed, the source of 
information may have been less salient to the children during the training phase 
(compared with when the informant is asked to make a perceptual judgment). When 
they were asked which label they preferred in the test phase, that lack of salience 
led to a failure to discriminate between informants who had good reasons for 
inaccuracy and informants that did not. In the standard selective trust tasks, the fact 
that an informant is inaccurate (compared with an accurate informant) is salient 
enough for the children to discriminate between informants. Furthermore, in 
another study requiring children to use perceptual information (identify the 
contents of boxes), Mills, Legare, Grant and Landrum (2011) found that in some 
cases, three- to five-year-old children could distinguish between accurate, ignorant 
(self -identified) and inaccurate informants. They were better at doing this when the 
ignorant informants explicitly stated their lack of certainty, a clear indicator of the 
reliability of the source of information. However, they were not always able to do 
this, and when the task was more epistemically challenging (fewer overt cues), they 
often failed. A similar pattern was found by Vanderbilt et al. (2011), in another 
location task. The sample consisted of three-, four- and five-year-olds, 50% of whom 
were white, from the USA (no information on SES was given). Source reliability was 
established where children were shown a video of an adult informant who either 
helped or tricked other actors when trying to locate an object. Participants were 
then asked to locate an object. Five-year-old children preferred informants who 
were ‘helpers’ over ‘trickers’. By contrast, three-year-old children appeared not to 
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recognise that deception had occurred. Four-year-old participants did appear to 
recognise the deception but it appeared not to influence their preference. Vanderbilt 
et al. (2011) suggested that the four-year-olds failed to understand the implications 
of their knowledge regarding helpers and trickers, which may explain the mismatch 
between knowledge and behaviour. This is in keeping with the idea that younger 
participants lack full epistemic awareness regarding what informants might know. 
Given this background, the claim that children as young as three years of age are 
demonstrating fully specified epistemic awareness regarding what the source 
knows seems unlikely. If Lucas and Lewis’s (2010) criteria are addressed - looking 
at what children understand when faced with misinformed knowledge - children 
frequently fail to discriminate between more and less reliable sources.  
1.2.2.4 PRIOR BELIEFS AND KNOWLEDGE 
Another problem with the research looking at children’s understanding of the role 
of source reliability is that the paradigms use information from differentially 
reliable sources on topics on which children are unlikely to have strong beliefs. 
Reliability of the sources is often manipulated externally, whereby children witness 
the source as being more or less reliable, or having more or less expertise. The 
information they receive does not contradict what they already know, or if it does 
(e.g. mislabelling objects), it is done by the unreliable source. It is unclear what 
would happen when children are provided information that is contradictory to what 
they know. In the literature on scientific reasoning (see section 1.1.3), prior beliefs 
have been shown to affect children’s scientific reasoning (e.g. Gopnik et al., 2017; 
Koerber et al., 2005), and that this effect increases with age (e.g. Gopnik et al., 2017). 
In science class children are frequently provided with information from nominally 
reliable sources, teachers, which may differ from their naive beliefs, regarding 
physical objects for example. How they incorporate this information into their 
reasoning, and how the source of this information impacts on that is important to 
understand given the ongoing desire for children to leave school as efficient 
scientific reasoners. Landrum, Eaves Jr, and Shafto (2015) suggested that learning 
from other people, which includes an appreciation of source reliability, requires the 
integration of reasoning about an informant’s psychological properties, and 
reasoning about the implications of the information presented by the informant. 
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Predictions include a preference for more reliable sources, as outlined earlier. It is 
also predicted that learners recognise the importance of both an informant’s 
knowledge and intention. That five-year-olds more often prefer helpers with good 
intentions (Vanderbilt et al., 2011), and nice experts rather than mean ones 
(Landrum, Mills, & Johnston, 2013) provides evidence for this contention. Landrum 
et al. (2013) found that predominantly white middle class participants were more 
likely to prefer information from previously established experts, and that this 
increased with age. When considering whether expertise in competition with 
benevolence would prevail, children were provided with information regarding 
informants’ expertise, and whether they engaged in nice or mean behaviour. They 
found that information regarding niceness/meanness was more influential than 
information regarding expertise. They were likely to prefer the nice informant, even 
if they were a (mean) expert (Landrum et al., 2013). It is possible that what children 
perceive the informant as intending may dominate preference, particularly at an 
early age, and may be why they prefer cognitive over perceptual modalities (Fitneva, 
2008). Adults also pay attention to the motivation of those providing information 
(Kunda, 1990), including believing that others are more susceptible to manipulation 
than themselves (Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004). 
When looking at what factors older children consider when judging the reliability of 
sources, Durkin and Shafto (2016), used a format similar to the selective trust 
paradigm, in an academic domain. They found that source reliability also affected 
learning a mathematical topic in nine- to 11-year-old participants, nearly all white, 
from middle and upper-class backgrounds. Reliability of the source training was 
established via worked examples, whereby two informants provided written 
examples that were either always or never correct, and two informants that were 
both inconsistently correct 50% of the time.  Participants were assessed on their 
knowledge regarding the topic before and after the training. They showed that 
receiving information from the high reliability informant, who provided only correct 
examples, improved the learning in the nine-year-old participants, who had no 
instruction in the mathematical topic. 11-year-old participants, who already had 
some experience in the mathematical topic, showed more learning with the low 
reliability informant, who provided both correct and incorrect examples. This is 
possibly because older participants had to reinforce their learning by considering 
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whether the example was correct or not, which they did not have to do with high 
reliable informant. However younger participants, having no experience with the 
topic, found accurate examples more illuminating, compared with examples that 
had 50% chance of error.  
Another assessment of source reliability understanding in an academic 
environment was done with 11- to 13-year-olds, from an inner-city school in the 
USA, which was predominantly African-American (60%), and low SES (60%) with 
40% not meeting reading ability levels expected for their age. These participants 
were given a question and asked to rate the usefulness of a number of different 
sources which were characterised by six attributes (title, author, where published 
(e.g. newspaper or textbook), type of source (e.g. letter, editorial), date published, 
and brief summary). Each of the six attributes was varied according to what one 
might come across during an Internet search. Experts designated the set of sources 
as useful, or not useful based on the question. They had to rate all six attributes as 
well as providing a holistic rating on a three-point scale ranging from useful to not 
useful. Braasch et al. (2009) wanted to investigate whether students who were 
better and poorer at differentiating useful/less useful sources based their 
judgements on different types of attributes. They divided their participant group 
into three based on performance, and used the top and bottom performing group 
for the analysis. They found that, for participants who were better at differentiating 
between the usefulness of sources, the only attribute that correlated with holistic 
rating for useful sources was summary, whereas for not useful sources, holistic rating 
was related to both summary and title. That is, they appeared to pay attention to 
content information when making usefulness judgements. However, for 
participants who were less good at differentiating, for useful sources the only 
significant correlation was between author and holistic rating, and for not useful 
sources the significant correlations were related to author, and venue of publication, 
and holistic rating. It appears that these participants were paying less attention to 
source content when making their judgements. One might expect that where a 
source was published would play a role in its evaluation, however it does not appear 
to with either group of participants. But the sample size was very small (33 
participants in the analysis), and spurious significant correlations are common 
among multiple comparisons. Even though there appeared to be differences in 
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attention to attributes between people who were good at differentiating, and those 
who were not, one would be reluctant to draw any strong conclusions until this 
result is replicated. The sample is also largely students from a lower SES 
background. Given that these participants are known to perform less well in reading 
(see section 1.1.4 on language) it may be that performance in participants from a 
higher SES background would show a different result. For example, holistic ratings 
of each source may correlate with more than one attribute, where published and 
type of source also give an indication of reliability, as well as summary.  
In slightly older middle class Norwegian children, Bråten, Ferguson, Strømsø, and 
Anmarkrud (2012) investigated what type of justification 14- to 15-year-olds 
preferred in relation to knowledge claims in science. That is, how did they rate 
different types of sources. They compared personal justification with justification 
by authority (information based on scientific research and conveyed by teachers, 
textbooks, and scientists), and justification by multiple sources. Participants filled in 
a justification for knowing questionnaire, as well as completing three short essay 
questions on a scientific issue such as explaining the relationship between sun 
exposure, health, and illness. Participants were rated on how well they explained 
the issue, and integrated different perspectives discussed in the source documents. 
They found that the teenagers preferred justification by authority, followed by 
multiple sources, then by personal justification. They also found that a preference 
for personal justification negatively predicted good performance on the essays, and 
that justification by multiple sources positively predicted good performance on the 
essays. It is possible that these tasks discriminate between higher performing 
children who have achieved an evaluativist level of epistemological understanding, 
as compared with the low performing children who have only reached a multiplist 
level of epistemological understanding (Kuhn, 2010). It is also worth noting that the 
higher performing participants appear to be paying attention to the same type of 
evidence that adults pay attention to, source reliability (justification by authority) 
and strength of evidence (justification by multiple sources; Corner & Hahn, 2009). 
There appears to be little direct research in the developmental literature that 
specifically looks at the impact of SES or gender on source reliability understanding. 
When gender is mentioned, is largely to state that preliminary analysis has not found 
an effect of gender, which is therefore not included in the main analysis. Given that 
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language plays a role in evaluation of sources with older children, where the tasks 
tend to utilise literacy based tasks, it is possible that there would be an impact of 
SES.  
1.2.3 ADULTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF SOURCE RELIABILITY  
Adults also take source reliability into account. For example, research that takes a 
Bayesian approach has found that people rate arguments from more reliable 
sources as being more convincing (e.g. Hahn, Oaksford, & Bayindir, 2005; Hahn, 
Harris, & Corner, 2009). Here, source reliability is manipulated in a much more 
naturalistic way. People are asked to evaluate information from sources they are 
likely to have come across in their everyday lives (such as a research body vs. TV 
interview in Hahn et al., (2005); or information that comes from journal article vs. 
an advertisement in Hahn et al., 2009).  
Adults also show a wishful thinking bias (Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005). This 
concurs with research that children appear to reflect on the intention of the source 
of the information, such as preferring kind over mean sources, to the extent that they 
prefer the kind low reliability source to the mean high reliable one (Landrum et al., 
2013). Gordon et al. (2005) found that participants showed a bias, in that they 
thought to attribute desirable predictions to the reliable source and vice versa. This 
effect was observed whether source reliability information was available at 
encoding, or only at retrieval.  
Similar phenomena have also been seen in research that looks at the role of politics 
as it affects decision relevant science (see the work by Dan Kahan), where people’s 
beliefs about climate change, for example, tended to follow their political leanings. 
In this case, people appeared to believe sources that cohered with their own 
(politically based) thinking, without placing as much importance on actual source 
reliability. Contrary to popular belief, Kahan, Peters, Dawson and Slovic (2014) 
found that science comprehension did not reduce the effect. Instead they found that 
a higher ability and disposition to make use of quantitative information increased, 
rather than decreased, polarisation. It is possible that these errors in evaluating 
source reliability in these particular circumstances are to do with the assessment of 
the motivation of the source, where people downplay the information because they 
believe the source has ulterior motives. 
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In conclusion, both children and adults have been shown to pay attention to source 
reliability. However, it is unclear at what age children begin to show epistemic 
understanding regarding what the differentially reliable sources might know. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how well these findings regarding children’s 
understanding of source reliability explain how children understand and use source 
reliability information in their everyday environments. 
1.3 AIMS OF THESIS (RATIONALE) 
The aims of this thesis were to assess the development of understanding regarding 
the role played by source reliability when reasoning about causal systems. 
Understanding source reliability is a crucial aspect of scientific reasoning, and is 
particularly important in the 21st-century, when, with the development of the 
Internet, there is an extraordinary range of sources pertaining to a particular 
(scientific) topic.  Although there is a wide body of research focusing on source 
reliability in younger children, this largely involves paradigms such as the selective 
trust paradigm (see section 1.2.1), where source reliability was frequently 
artificially manipulated (for example, the child would observe one proponent in the 
experiment make more errors than the other, be they human collaborators, video 
actors, puppets, or other sources used in these experiments).  
As a result of children’s appropriate responses in these source reliability tasks, it has 
been concluded that even three- and four-year-olds are capable of incorporating 
information regarding source reliability into their reasoning about the world 
around them (e.g. Koenig & Harris, 2005).  It is also claimed that they show epistemic 
awareness regarding the knowledge of the informants (Koenig & Harris, 2007). 
However, Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009b), looking at children’s understanding of 
misinformation, did not find an understanding of source reliability even in seven-
year-olds. Furthermore, research using a different paradigm altogether suggested 
that nine-year-olds paid attention to source reliability, but six-year-olds did not 
(Fitneva, 2001), indicating a disparity in the age at which source reliability 
understanding is observable in children. As such, it is unclear at what age children 
show epistemic awareness regarding the knowledge of the informants and this 
needs further clarification. 
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One way to add clarification is to use research methods that more closely reflect 
children’s day to day experiences. Research that focusses on source reliability 
understanding in more naturalistic environments, using more everyday activities, is 
less frequent. The selective trust tasks tend to rely on an artificial manipulation of 
source reliability, where children may have few preconceived conceptions 
regarding the reliability of the informants at the beginning of the task, which is 
unlikely to be the case in real life. When a more naturalistic paradigm was used 
(Fitneva, 2001), the age at which children appeared to discriminate between 
sources was much older (nine years old) than is typically found in selective trust 
tasks (three- to four-year-olds). It may be that, whilst children can discriminate 
between artificially manipulated sources where the differences between them are 
obvious, in real life they may find it much more difficult, such that appropriate 
discrimination between sources would not be observed until children are older. 
Furthermore, even if children are able to discriminate between clearly defined 
sources, it is not clear that they would be able to use that information to guide 
reasoning in more naturalistic environments. 
There is research using more naturalistic contexts, but this has focussed on older 
children and adolescents, for whom there is less evidence regarding the relevance 
of source reliability. Furthermore, the naturalistic paradigms used to investigate 
older children and adults’ understanding of source reliability tend to be very 
different from those used for younger children. They often manipulate source 
reliability in more naturalistic ways (e.g. participants are required to evaluate actual 
sources, Braasch et al., 2009; or consider scenarios that potentially could come from 
real life, Hahn et al., 2005), and frequently are embedded in academic environments 
(Braasch et al., 2009).  However, these tasks are too difficult for younger children to 
do, so preclude direct comparison of performance.  
It is likely that the development of implicit and explicit understanding of causal 
systems take place at different rates. For example, as the literature on the 
development of causal understanding (see section 1.1.1) suggests, children’s 
intuitive understanding of simple causal systems appears to develop at a very young 
age (e.g. Schulz & Gopnik, 2004). Examples of discrimination between sources also 
appears to be evident from a young age (e.g. Koenig & Harris, 2005). However, 
explicit understanding is likely to appear later during the primary school years into 
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adolescence (e.g. Klahr et al., 1993), with input from science education in school. 
These two development trajectories are rarely compared. Using a paradigm with 
participants across multiple age groups would allow the developmental trajectories 
to be compared. 
Although source reliability has been established as an important component when 
reasoning scientifically, and adolescent and adult tasks frequently assess source 
reliability within a scientific context (e.g. Bråten et al., 2012; Hahn et al., 2005), this 
is not the case for the literature looking at younger children’s understanding of 
source reliability. It is important to understand the development of components of 
scientific reasoning, such as source reliability, for the purposes of developing the 
most effective strategies for teaching science, and scientific reasoning. Furthermore, 
it would be useful to provide a point of comparison between the adult literature, 
which tends to focus on ratings for the strength of arguments in source reliability, 
and the child literature which usually focuses on discrimination and endorsement 
in younger children, and evaluation of sources in adolescents.  
As such, the aims of the thesis were firstly, to investigate the development of 
epistemic awareness in relation to what sources might be assumed to know. This 
was done by manipulating source reliability more naturalistically, and examining 
how it is related to reasoning regarding a familiar causal system in a familiar 
environment – school. The paradigm used, consequently, incorporated activities 
that were not substantially different from activities that might be learned about in a 
science class, where scientific knowledge is gained both through receiving 
knowledge from a source (such as a science teacher), and through direct enquiry 
and experimentation.  To do this, participants were given unexpected information 
regarding a familiar causal system, from a more and less reliable source, or were 
given no information. 
Secondly, in order to gain a greater understanding of the developmental trajectory, 
implicit and explicit understanding of a specific causal system was investigated in 
both children and adolescents. Implicit understanding was investigated by 
collecting their predictions of possible outcomes regarding the familiar causal 
system. Explicit understanding was investigated by collecting explanations for why 
those specific predictions were made. Degree of conviction in the prediction was 
 
69 
also collected, to allow the point of comparison with the adult literature. If children 
have an epistemic understanding of what different sources can be expected to know, 
then that understanding may impact on predictions, explanations, and their degree 
of conviction.  
The relevance of factors that have been shown to potentially play a role in scientific 
reasoning, such as language ability, and gender, are examined. They are frequently 
not taken into account when investigating source reliability understanding in 
children (beyond including demographic information regarding the participant 
sample), even though they are known to impact reasoning in other related areas 
(such as scientific reasoning when it is assessed in the school environment, see 
section 1.1.3).  Thus a third aim of the thesis was to investigate if and how source 
reliability was related to language ability and gender in relation to understanding of 
a familiar causal system.  
1.4 EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM 
The causal system chosen for investigation needed to fulfil a number of 
requirements. It needed to be a familiar causal system, that even young participants 
understood. If the younger participants did not have a basic understanding of how 
the causal system worked, then they would not be able to make appropriate 
predictions or explanations regarding the system. It would therefore be difficult to 
assess the impact of source reliability, where observation of systematic changes in 
prediction and explanation dependent on source of information will provide 
evidence of epistemic awareness of source reliability. Furthermore, there needed to 
be information relating to how the causal system worked, that was not common 
knowledge among either children or adolescents. 
The causal system that was chosen was motion on an incline, specifically a car 
travelling down an inclined track. Motion on an incline was one of the tasks chosen 
by Inhelder and Piaget (1958) to examine the growth of logical thinking from 
childhood to adolescence, so it fits the criteria that it is suitable for all age groups. It 
is also a topic that is learned in both primary and secondary school, to various 
degrees (Department for Education, 2015). Furthermore, although the impact of 
altering variables such as height of the incline, starting point on the incline, or 
surface friction on the incline, and distance travelled are well-known, the effect of 
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weight on distance travelled is not. That is, many children (and adults) have 
misconceptions regarding the effect of weight on distance travelled, and frequently 
think that weight does impact on distance travelled, even though it does not (Hast & 
Howe, 2012). This is the case even for secondary school children who learn about 
Newtonian mechanics at school, yet still report misconceptions regarding the 
impact of weight on motion (Mildenhall & Williams, 2001). The majority of children 
are likely to know that height, starting point on the incline, and surface friction affect 
how far the car travels, and are also likely to think that weight affects how far the 
car travels (Ferretti, Butterfield, Cahn, & Kerkman, 1985; Howe, Tolmie, & Rodgers, 
1992; Hast & Howe, 2012; Hast & Howe, 2013). 
These misconceptions made it possible to give participants ‘unknown’ information 
regarding the system at hand – that weight does not affect how far the car travels – 
from differentially reliable sources, and assess whether the source information was 
related to their reasoning regarding the causal system.  The paradigm made it 
possible to ask participants for predictions, explanations, and degrees of conviction 
regarding how far they think the car will travel, for the different variables (weight, 
height, starting point, friction). Participants were only asked questions regarding 
variables in a single dimension, as children are more likely to make errors of 
understanding when variables interact (Ferretti et al., 1985). This is because a basic 
understanding of how the causal system works is desirable, so that systematic 
changes in understanding could in principle be observed.   
Degree of conviction was measured using a rating scale that was similar to the scale 
used in Schlottmann and Anderson (1990) to assess children’s understanding of 
expected value. 
Prior to testing, participants were able to ‘play’ with the causal system, by allowing 
the car to run down the incline and observing how far it travelled for a number of 
trials. Information on how often children spontaneously and correctly assess the 
effect of specific variables, along with how frequently they assess scope of the 
system (least and furthest the car could travel), and repeat trials, was collected. Both 
children and adolescents frequently do not spontaneously engage control of 
variable testing (Cook et al., 2011) when left to ‘play’ with a system. This enables the 
study to conduct exploratory analyses examining what children might seek to 
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discover when faced with a conceptually familiar causal system, but specifically 
unfamiliar. 
The study was designed to ask participants to make predictions, explanations, and 
report a rating of degree of conviction, for each variable of the causal system - car 
on an incline - where variables were height of the incline, starting point on the 
incline, surface friction, and weight, before and after they received information from 
differentially reliable sources, or no information. Participants were also asked to 
intervene on the system, where they observed that weight did not, in fact, affect how 
far the car travelled. After this they were asked to make a third set of predictions, 
explanations and report a rating of degree of conviction.  
1.5 HYPOTHESES 
1.5.1 IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUSAL SYSTEM (PREDICTION) 
If source reliability is associated with participants’ understanding of the causal 
system, then one would predict that participants will differentially utilise 
information from high and low sources when making predictions regarding the 
effect of weight on distance travelled down an incline. Participants who received 
information from high reliability sources would be more likely to make predictions 
that suggested they did not think weight affected how far the car travels compared 
with participants who hear no information. However, participants who received 
information from low reliability sources will be less likely to do this, and show no 
difference when compared which participants who received no information.  
1.5.1.1 AGE 
If young children are showing epistemic awareness of what sources know, then one 
would predict that source reliability is related to predicting that weight does not 
have any relation to the distance the car travels, even in the younger participants. 
However, if epistemic awareness is slower to develop, particularly in more 
naturalistic environments, then the prediction is that an age difference will be 
identified, with older participants but not younger participants showing a source 
reliability effect.  
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Alternatively, given the inconclusive evidence, it could be predicted that source 
reliability is more relevant for younger participants than older participants, whose 
stronger prior beliefs regarding the familiar causal system will be more relevant.  
After participants had the opportunity to intervene on the system, and witness that 
weight really did not affect how far the car travelled, if participants understand the 
implications of what they have observed, then the prediction is that source 
reliability will not be relevant to predictions about changing the weight of the car 
and the distance travelled. If participants did not understand the implications of the 
information, or did not fully understand how the system worked, then it is possible 
that some participants would continue to predict that weight does have an effect on 
distance travelled. This is more likely to occur with younger children, where their 
executive function skills are less well developed such that they cannot fully integrate 
the new information with their understanding of the system. They may also struggle 
to inhibit their strong prior beliefs regarding the effect of weight, even in the face of 
recent observational evidence to the contrary of their belief. 
1.5.1.2 LANGUAGE 
It is unclear from the existing literature whether language ability will be associated 
with making correct predictions. Given that generating predictions is part of 
scientific reasoning, and language ability has been shown to impact on scientific 
reasoning skills, the expectation is that better language development will be 
associated with generating more correct predictions regarding the effect of weight 
(an aspect of scientific reasoning).  
1.5.1.3 DEGREE OF CONVICTION 
Regarding degree of conviction, based on research that has been conducted with 
adults, if there is an effect of source reliability, then the prediction is that 
participants who receive unexpected information from a high reliable source will be 
more convinced by their prediction, compared with participants who received no 
information. This would be in contrast to participants who received unexpected 
information from a low reliable source. The prediction is that participants receiving 
information from a low reliability source will not differ from participants who 
received no information.  
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1.5.2 EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUSAL SYSTEM (EXPLANATION) 
As with implicit understanding of the system as it related to predictions about the 
distance the car will travel, participants who receive information from the high 
reliability source will be more likely to incorporate that information into their 
explanations regarding the effect of weight on how far the car travels, compared 
with participants who received no information. It is predicted that this will be less 
likely for participants who received information from a low reliable source, in 
comparison with participants who received no information. 
After participants observed that the information was ‘true’, essentially receiving 
evidence that was much more salient regarding the effect of weight, then it is 
predicted that there will be no differences in correct explanations related to source 
reliability. Instead, the differences will be between participants who had heard the 
true information (either from a high or a low reliable source) and those that did not. 
That is, being provided with a verbal explanation that explains what they have 
observed allows the generation of a better explanation for the event, not likely for 
participants who have heard no explanation. 
1.5.2.1 AGE 
The ability to generate appropriate explanations improves with age, particularly as 
language ability improves with age. Given this, it is expected that older participants 
will be more likely to provide correct explanations compared with younger 
participants. However, the provision of an appropriate explanation is more 
cognitively demanding than providing an appropriate prediction. This is because 
providing an explanation requires an explicit understanding of the mechanics of the 
causal system. As such, it is predicted that the ability to provide appropriate 
explanations will be more likely for older children. 
1.5.2.2 LANGUAGE 
It is more likely that generating explanations will be affected by language ability 
(compared with prediction). This is because generating appropriate explanations 
relies on fundamental language skills that generating predictions does not. As such, 
it is predicted that level of language skill will affect participants’ ability to generate 
appropriate explanations. 
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1.5.2.3 DEGREE OF CONVICTION 
The previous literature suggests that providing an explanation reinforces both 
children and adults’ beliefs regarding the causal system. As participants’ 
explanations are guided by their predictions, it is likely that the degree of conviction 
will also show a relationship with their explanations. The prediction is that 
participants who receive information from high reliable sources will show a higher 
degree of conviction in their prediction, and will provide better explanations.  
1.5.3 GENDER 
Previous research suggests that gender is related to scientific reasoning in that 
males are likely to perform more highly in science at school. Research also indicates 
that females tend to show better language ability.  It has also been suggested that 
language ability is related to performance in science at school, although the gender 
differences in language, and in science performance are frequently quite small, 
particularly with younger children. As such, gender may influence both prediction 
and explanation. Specifically, if there are gender differences, then it would be 
expected that males will be more likely to provide correct predictions but females, 
with better language ability, could be predicted to provide better explanations to 
justify their decisions.  
1.5.4 UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSAL SYSTEM 
In order for participants to demonstrate a preference for more reliable sources they 
need to be able to do a number of things. They need to decide to: 
 use the information from reliable sources;  
 understand the causal system,  
 understand the implications of the information they receive regarding the 
causal system, and  
 generate predictions/explanations regarding the causal system, based on 
this new information.  
Therefore, it is important to assess participants’ general understanding of the causal 
system. It is predicted that all age groups will be able to generate appropriate 
predictions regarding distance travelled when varying each of the variables that can 
be manipulated in the causal system.  
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1.6 THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS  
In order to address the goals of the thesis, testing was done in two primary and two 
secondary schools. Chapter 2 describes the general methodology used. Chapter 3 
presents the results, and chapter 4 provides a general discussion of the findings in 
the study.  The reference list, and appendix follows.   
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2 GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
2.1 SCHOOL INFORMATION 
2.1.1 PRIMARY SCHOOL RECRUITMENT 
Before beginning recruitment, ethical consent to do research with minors (under 16 
years) was gained from the Ethics Committee in the Department of Psychological 
Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London.  
The primary schools came from two different boroughs. The choice of the first 
borough was opportunistic as it was near to the researcher’s home. School A was 
contained within this borough. The second borough was chosen as it contained 
different socioeconomic status characteristics to the first. School B was contained 
within this borough.  
A list of potential primary schools in the borough of interest was available from each 
borough’s education department, for parents choosing primary schools for their 
children. School reception staff were then contacted and asked who would be the 
best person to contact regarding this matter. If possible, the head teachers were 
contacted directly as they were the people who would make the final decisions 
regarding whether a study could be run at their school. However, usually the schools 
requested that the information was sent to a generic school email, which would then 
be forwarded to the head teacher. Schools (N=32) were then contacted with a 
speculative email (see Appendix A) that was either addressed to the head teacher or 
generically addressed, depending on what information was given by the school 
reception team. An information sheet was included containing brief background 
information on the study as well as what would be required of the school and the 
participating pupils. This included all the researcher’s contact details, as well as 
those of the study supervisor (see Appendix A). A phone call to reception was made 
following up on the email. This process resulted in two primary schools agreeing to 
participate, school A and school B. 
2.1.1.1 SCHOOL A 
Primary school A is a single form entry church school that serves a reasonably 
affluent area of London. Priority admission is given to parents who are regular 
worshippers. In comparison with the national average, differences of note include a 
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much higher proportion of pupils with English as a second language (41%), and 
fewer pupils with free school meals (see Table 2-1; Department for Education, 2015 
- 16 Cohort). It is likely that the higher proportion of pupils with English as a second 
language is related to being within London, which is much more ethnically diverse 
than much of the UK. Free school meals are frequently used as a proxy for indicating 
low family income (Hobbs & Vignoles, 2010), and the small proportion of eligible 
pupils suggests that fewer pupils at school A come from deprived family 
environments. In the UK, students’ educational progress in reading, writing and 
mathematics, is evaluated at age 6-7 (year 2), 10-11 (year 6), and 13-14 (year 9) 
using Standard Assessment Tests (SATS; National Curriculum Assessments, 2017).  
Records indicated that pupils in school A performed either well above average or 
average in the SATS taken in year 6, with the majority reaching the expected 
standard in English and mathematics (93%). The school A website provided 
curriculum-based information for parents, including a detailed breakdown of what 
students learn in all subjects in each year of primary school, as well as curriculum 
leaflets which briefly describe what the pupil will be learning in each term. 
 Primary School A 
National Average 
(England) 
Yearly pupil intake 30 N/A 
Admissions Criteria 
Priority church 
applicants 
N/A 
Pupil/Teacher ratio 19.6 20.5 
Demographics     
Gender 49% female 49% female 
English as a 2nd language 41% 20% 
Special Educational Needs 0.5% 2.6% 
Free School Meals 4.0% 25% 
Absences 2.2% 4.0% 
Performance in Year 6 SATS1     
Reading Well Above Average N/A 
Writing Average N/A 
Maths Average N/A 
% reaching expected standard in 
English/Maths 93% 61% 
1Standard Assessment Tests 
 
Table 2-1  Primary school A demographics and performance, compared with the national 
average.  
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SCHOOL A PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT 
When recruiting the participants in school A, the researcher provided the head 
teacher with copies of the information sheet for parents (Appendix A) and the 
parental consent form (Appendix B) to give to all the parents in each year group. The 
head teacher actively promoted the study to the parents in a newsletter, and 
following that, the information sheet and consent forms were handed to the 
students to take home to their parents. The school collected the signed consent 
forms and collated a list of students whose parents had consented. This list was 
given to the researcher along with the consent forms. Approximately two thirds of 
the students participated from each class. Details of the exact proportion of students 
who participated in the study per age group is recorded in the ‘Participants’ section, 
in Table 2-5. The consent of the student was solicited verbally at the beginning of 
each testing session. The school provided a small room to carry out the experiment, 
which overlooked the playground, which was noisy when testing coincided with 
students being on a break. Year groups were tested when they were available 
(determined by the year group teacher). 
2.1.1.2 SCHOOL B 
Primary school B is also a single form entry church school, although the area of 
London it serves is less affluent. Unlike school A, only 60% of students receive 
priority admission, when their parents are regular worshippers. The remainder of 
places are given to students based on distance from the school. Similar to school A, 
School B has a higher proportion of students with English as a second language 
(36%) than the national average (20%). However, unlike school A, they have many 
more students receiving free school meals (21% - similar to the national average), 
suggesting that a greater number of students in school B come from a more deprived 
family environment, compared with school A. Students in school B performed either 
well above average or average in reading, writing and mathematics, with most 
students in the school reaching the expected standard in English and mathematics 
SATS (74% - above the national average of 61%; Department for Education, 2015-
16 cohort). See Table 2-2 for specific details. School B provides parents with details 
of their learning and teaching ethos, whereby they have a creative curriculum, 
seeking to use art and music within their everyday teaching. They also provide 
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detailed curricula for maths and English, as well as curriculum leaflets for each term 
which briefly describe what the student will be learning.  
 Primary School B 
National Average 
(England) 
Yearly student intake 30 N/A 
Admissions Criteria 
60% Priority Church 
applicants 
40% Distance 
N/A 
Student/Teacher ratio 20.3 20.5 
Demographics    
Gender 52% female 49% female 
English as a 2nd language 36% 20% 
Special Educational Needs 0% 2.6% 
Free School Meals 21% 25% 
Absences 2.7% 4.0% 
Performance in Year 6 SATS1     
Reading Well Above Average N/A 
Writing Average N/A 
Maths Well Above Average N/A 
% reaching expected standard in 
English/Maths 74% 61% 
1Standard Assessment Tests 
SCHOOL B PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT  
The researcher used a similar procedure for recruitment compared with school A, 
whereby she provided the head teacher with copies of the information sheet and 
parental consent form (see Appendix A and B). The class teachers handed them out 
to all the parents in each age group and collected the signed consent forms. These 
were returned to the researcher. The study was not promoted to the parents to the 
same extent compared with school A and a smaller proportion of students in school 
B signed up to participate in the study (see Table 2-5). The consent of the student 
was solicited verbally at the beginning of each testing session. The research took 
place both in a small office (where a teacher sometimes quietly worked during 
testing) or in an empty classroom. The classroom was occasionally noisy due to 
classroom activities in adjacent classrooms. Year groups were included when they 
were available (dictated by the head teacher). 
 
Table 2-2  Primary school B demographics and performance, compared with the national 
average.  
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2.1.2 SECONDARY SCHOOL RECRUITMENT 
Before beginning secondary school recruitment, a second ethical approval to do 
research with minors (under 16 years) was gained from the Ethics Committee in the 
Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London. The second 
ethics application was made because the age range of the participants had changed, 
as well as the addition of a reward for participation. 
Both secondary schools were recruited via direct contact with a teacher within the 
science department. The researcher knew a student in school C (a girls’ school), 
which led to direct contact with the head of psychology. This teacher was interested 
in the study, and solicited permission for the study to take place in the school from 
the head teacher, and agreed to be the main point of contact.  A similar process took 
place with the recruitment of School D (a boys’ school), where the researcher’s 
supervisor knew a chemistry teacher who also solicited the head teacher for 
permission for the study to take place at the school, as well as agreeing to be the 
main point of contact.  
2.1.2.1 SCHOOL C 
Secondary school C is a seven form entry girls’ Academy, serving both affluent and 
non-affluent adjacent areas of London. It also has a coeducational sixth form. It 
serves a large ethnic population where around 40-50% of inhabitants were born 
outside England according to the 2011 census. Admission is mainly based on 
distance between home and school, although 25% of the yearly student intake is 
based on performance on the Year 6 SATS for students living in the appropriate 
borough. It is a science specialist school, providing an enriched science and 
mathematics curriculum. Given the large minority ethnic population from which 
they draw, unsurprisingly a large proportion of students have English as a second 
language, which is much greater than the national average (60% versus 16%). There 
is also a greater proportion than the national average in England of students 
receiving free school meals (45% versus 29%). School C is actively engaged in trying 
to reduce the attainment gap between students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
and report on number of students receiving pupil premium (government funding 
for disadvantaged students, based on receipt of free school meals).  They indicate 
that they have successfully managed to reduce the gap between students who 
received the pupil premium and their peers from 27% in 2014 to 18% in 2016 
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(information from school website, accessed on 29th March, 2017). Students in 
school C performed above average at GCSE, with 70% getting C or higher in 
English/maths (59% national average). 54% of students receiving the pupil 
premium received five A* to C GCSE grades and their non-disadvantaged peers 
received 72% A* to C GCSE grades (information from school website, accessed on 
29th March, 2017). However, the average results for A-level were slightly below 
average (C- versus C+). Information accessed on Find and Compare Schools in 
England (Department for Education, 2015-16 cohort; See Table 2-3 for details). 
 Secondary School C 
National Average 
(England) 
Yearly student intake 280 N/A 
Admissions Criteria 
25% Performance on Year 6 SATS1 
within borough N/A 
75% Distance from home 
Student/Teacher ratio 15.2 15.3 
Demographics     
Gender 99% female (boys in sixth form) 49% female 
English as a 2nd 
language 
60% 16% 
Special Educational 
Needs 
1.20% 3.90% 
Free School Meals 45% 29% 
Absences 5.7% 5.3% 
Performance      
Overall Performance at 
GCSE 
Above average 
N/A 
GCSE C or higher in 
English/Maths 
70% 59% 
Overall Performance at 
A-Level 
Average 
N/A 
Average Result C- C+ 
% with AAB or better 6.80% 17% 
1Standard Assessment Tests 
SCHOOL C PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT 
When recruiting the participants in school C, the researcher provided the contact 
teacher with a pack for students aged 12-15, containing the information sheet for 
parents (Appendix A), the parental consent form (Appendix B), and a consent form 
for the student (Appendix C) as the majority of students in this study would be over 
13 (where signed consent is required). The written consent of the few students who 
Table 2-3  Secondary school C demographics and performance, compared with the national 
average.  
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were under 13 was collected for the sake of consistency. Students aged 16 – 17 did 
not need parental consent to participate in the study, so they were provided with 
their own information sheet and consent form (Appendix C).  
In order to encourage participation, secondary school students were also offered a 
£5 gift voucher for participating, which was made known to them as part of the 
recruitment process by the contact teacher, as well as being mentioned in the 
information sheet. The contact teacher promoted the study both in classrooms, and 
in school assemblies (which covered the entire year group). Any student who was 
interested in participating would then seek out this teacher. She signed up the 12- 
to 15-year-old participants for testing as soon as they returned the signed parental 
consent forms, as well as providing their own signed consent form. Participants over 
16 needed only to provide a consent form to be signed up for the research.  The 
teacher used an appointment schedule provided by the researcher. The teacher also 
reminded participants when they were due to take part. Without this help, far fewer 
participants would have been involved (in fact, the contact teacher became very 
busy with school work when Year 8 were taking part, which is noticeable in the 
fewer number of participants in that year group). Verbal consent was also solicited 
from the participants at the beginning of each session.  
The school only permitted the research to take place in break times, lunch, and after 
school. However, students were allowed to leave class on occasion, which was 
negotiated by the teacher contact. An unused science lab was provided for the 
majority of the research, shifting to an unused classroom for the remaining 
participants. These rooms were not very noisy, even when students were on a break. 
2.1.2.2 SCHOOL D 
Secondary School D is a four form entry boys’ Academy, serving less affluent areas 
of London. Admission is mainly based on distance, with 10% musical aptitude, as 
this school has a long-standing musical tradition. It also has a mixed gender sixth 
form. Around 30% of inhabitants of the local area were born outside of England 
according to the 2011 census which is reflected in the number of students with 
English as a second language (49%). Even more students than secondary school C 
receive free school meals (57%), which is almost double the national average. 
Students in school D performed below average overall in their GCSEs, but above 
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average when just considering English and maths, where 67% scored C or higher. 
School D also reports on the impact of receiving the pupil premium, although 
provides slightly different data than school C. They report a gap of 28% for 
disadvantaged compared with non-disadvantaged students, achieving at least a 
grade C in GCSE English/maths (pupil premium students - 59% versus peers - 87%). 
This is in line with the national average - 27%. School D also performs lower than 
average at A-level (D+ versus C+). Information accessed on Find and Compare 
Schools in England (2015-16 cohort; See Table 2-4 for details).  
 School D 
National Average 
(England) 
Yearly pupil intake 130 N/A 
Admissions Criteria 
10% Musical Aptitude 
N/A 
90% Distance from home 
Pupil/Teacher ratio 13:1 15.3 
Demographics     
Gender 
88% male (girls in sixth 
form) 
49% female 
English as a 2nd language 49% 16% 
Special Educational Needs 2.10% 3.90% 
Free School Meals 57% 29% 
Absences 5% 5.3% 
Performance      
Overall Performance at GCSE Below average N/A 
GCSE C or higher in 
English/Maths 
67% 59% 
Overall Performance at A-
Level 
Below Average 
N/A 
Average Result D+ C+ 
% with AAB or better 2.70% 17% 
 
SCHOOL D PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT 
The procedure for recruitment in school D differed slightly from school C. The 
contact teacher in school C arranged permission from the head teacher, and handed 
out packs with information sheets and consent forms for both parents and pupils 
(see Appendices A to C) to form teachers to hand out in class. This differed from 
school C, where only pupils who volunteered were given the information sheets and 
consent forms. Pupils who wanted to participate would return their signed consent 
forms (theirs and their parents) to the science office, and sign up for an appointment 
Table 2-4  Secondary school D demographics and performance, compared with the national 
average.  
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from a schedule that was left near the contact teacher’s desk in the science office. As 
there was no single room available for the duration of the research, the contact 
teacher would book rooms, and a sign would be left on the science office door saying 
in what room the research would take place on a particular day. Verbal consent was 
also solicited from the participants at the beginning of each session.  
Recruitment in school D was quite challenging. All the teachers were busy, including 
the contact teacher, and did not have much time to help with recruitment, and 
scheduling of participants. If the participants were not reminded when to attend a 
research session, they often would not show up, and locating the missing student 
was difficult. The researcher frequently had to collect the participant, if she could 
find them, to ensure participation. As a result of that there were many fewer 
participants in school D, where many more potential participants signed up than 
participated.  
The school only permitted the research to take place in break times, lunch, and after 
school. Unused science labs were used for testing, which were sometimes noisy at 
break time or after school when many pupils were departing school at the same 
time.   
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2.2 PARTICIPANTS 
The research involved participants ranging in age from six to 17 years. The mean 
age (S.D.), age range, gender as a proportion of females in the age group, number of 
participants and percentage of the school year group that participated are recorded 
in Table 2-5. The following participants had some data collected but were not 
included in the study. One child in school A (10-11 years) failed to provide 
appropriate responses, and failed to complete testing. One child in school C (16-17 
years), and one in school D (12-13 years) provided incomplete data (doing only the 
first testing session). 
Age group School Mean S.D. Range 
Total 
N 
 (N 
female) 
% of 
Year 
6-7 years 
A 7.2 0.31 6.6 – 7.5 20 10 67 
B 7.3 0.40 6.8 – 7.8 13 8 43 
Overall 7.2 0.35 6.6 – 7.8 33 18 55 
8-9 years 
A 9.1 0.36 8.5 – 9.5 20 10 67 
B 9.2 0.19 8.9 – 9.4 6 3 20 
Overall 9.1 0.33 8.5 – 9.5 26 13 44 
10-11 years 
A 11.3 0.28 10.9 – 11.8 18 8 60 
B 11.4 0.42 10.9 – 11.8 9 4 30 
Overall 11.3 0.33 10.9 -11.8 27 12 45 
12-13 years 
C 13.3 0.23 13.0 – 13.7 11 11 4 
D 12.9 0.27 12.6 – 13.3 9 All male 7 
Overall 13.1 0.31 12.6 - 13.7 20 11 6 
14-15 years 
C 15.1 0.36 14.5 – 15.7 29 29 10 
D 15.2 0.38 14.6 – 15.4 4 All male 3 
Overall 15.1 0.36 14.5 - 15.7 33 29 7 
16-17 years 
C 17.0 0.38 16.4 – 17.9 22 22 8 
D 17.0 0.35 16.5 – 17.4 8 6 6 
Overall 17.0 0.36 16.4 - 17.9 30 28 7 
 
A further nine participants were removed from the analysis as they had receptive 
vocabulary scores (measured using British Picture Vocabulary Scale; see section 
2.5.4) more than 2 S.D. below the mean (see Table 2-6). 
Table 2-5  Participant characteristics: mean and S.D. by age group; age range; number 
participating per age group; number of participating females; the proportion of the year 
group participating. 
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Age BPVS1 Score Gender School 
8-9 Years 67 Female Primary School B 
10-11 Years 62 Female Primary School B 
12-13 Years 68 Female Secondary School C 
12-13 Years 70 Male Secondary School D 
14-15 Years 48 Female Secondary School C 
16-17 Years 56 Female Secondary School C 
16-17 Years 58 Female Secondary School C 
16-17 Years 59 Female Secondary School C 
16-17 Years 45 Female Secondary School D 
1 British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
2.3 APPARATUS 
CARS ON AN INCLINE GAME 
The familiar causal system that was used addressed participants’ understanding of 
motion on an inclined plane. This was created using cars that could change weight, 
and start at different heights, starting points, and with different surface frictions on 
the inclined planes. Most school children (and many adults) think that weight does 
affect how far the car travels (even though it does not), younger children thinking 
that lighter vehicles travel farther and older children that heavier vehicles travel 
farther (Hast & Howe, 2012). These misconceptions allow children to receive 
unexpected ‘expert’ information from more, or less, reliable sources. 
Furthermore, the majority of primary school pupils know that height, starting point 
on the incline, and surface friction affect how far a car travels (Ferretti et al., 1985; 
Howe et al., 1992; Hast & Howe, 2012; Hast & Howe, 2013), and asking about it 
allows for assessment of understanding of the causal system.  
The ‘Car on an Incline’ game assesses understanding of the causal system associated 
with how far a car could travel down an incline, changing friction on the incline, 
height of the incline, starting point on the incline, and weight of the car. The causal 
variables affecting distance travelled are height of the incline, starting point on the 
Table 2-6  Age group, BPVS1 score, gender, and school of the nine participants who were 
removed from the analysis. 
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incline, and surface friction of the incline. The weight of the car is not a causal 
variable as it does not affect how far the car travels.  
The game consisted of a frame upon which four inclined ramps rested in a row. Each 
incline measured 78cm x 10cm, with 0.5cm raised sides and was made of wood with 
a flexible plastic section at the lower end (this allowed the incline to smoothly segue 
onto the floor). Each incline rested on an adjustable bar connected to the frame 
(50cm wide) that could be raised/lowered to three equally spaced positions (high - 
20.5cm, medium - 15.5cm, and low - 10.5cm, from the floor). Three of the inclines 
had observably different surface friction in varying degrees; one smooth (shiny 
sticky backed plastic), one medium (slightly textured wallpaper), and one a rough 
(very textured wallpaper). There was an extra incline identical to the medium 
friction surface ramp, included to remind participants where the car went on the 
standard setup (see below).  
Each incline had three starting points (high - 56cm, medium - 43.5cm, and low - 
31cm, from the bottom), where a gate could be inserted at a starting point, and 
removed to allow the car to travel down the incline onto the track.  
A 13.5cm Burago BMW Cabriolet model car was used with three small equally 
weighted bags filled with lead shot, of around 2.5cm in diameter and small enough 
to fit in the back seat of the (open-topped) car. The light car contained one bag, the 
medium-weight car had two, and the heavy car had three bags.  
The track was drawn onto cream coloured canvas, 175cm long by 70cm wide and 
equally divided into seven boxes, numbered 1-7 on the left-hand side, each 25cm 
long by 70cm wide. When the game was in use, the track was adhered to the ground 
with sticky tape at the four corners and along the long sides to make sure it remained 
flat at all times. 
The game was calibrated so that the medium weight car arrived in the number 4 box 
when it started on the medium surface (friction), medium starting point (on the 
incline), medium height (of incline). This was referred to as the standard setup. The 
fourth incline had a medium friction surface, and was set at the medium height, with 
a gate at the medium starting point. A second car, identical to the first, with two bags 
inside, was left at the side of the track beside number 4 to remind participants where 
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the car would land when the set up was in the standard position. A diagrammatic 
representation of the standard setup can be seen in Figure 2-1.  
When height or starting point were on the low position, and everything else was on 
medium position, the car landed in number 3. When height or starting point were 
on the high position, and everything else in medium position, the car landed on 
number 5. However, for surface friction, although the car landed in number 3 for the 
rough surface (similar to above), it landed in number 4 for both the medium and 
smooth surface positions (with the car landing slightly higher in the box for 
smoother surface position). 
The car landed in number 4 for the light, medium and heavy weight car, 
demonstrating that weight does not affect how far the car travels. The light car did 
travel a little further in number 4, compared with the medium or heavy car, but this 
was difficult to notice unless many trials were completed.  
 
STICK SCALE 
The stick scale used to collect ratings had a wooden base, 26cm (length) x 4cm 
(depth) x 5cm (height). Protruding from the base were seven differing lengths of 
Figure 2-1  Car on an incline game in the standard set up. 
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wooden dowel in height order. The shortest dowel was 2.5cm. They increased in 
height by 1cm, with the tallest dowel being 8.5cm. There were also visual reminders 
of what each end of the rating scale represented. The guessing end of the scale (the 
smallest dowel) was represented by a cartoon figure flipping a coin with a thought 
bubble containing images of a coin showing both heads and tails and two ‘??’. The 
completely sure end was represented by a cartoon figure with a thought bubble 
containing an image of the sun. See Figure 2-2 for a diagrammatic representation of 
the stick scale.  
 
 
 
The primary school participants’ responses were video recorded using a Macbook, 
an Olympus LS-20 PCM Digital Recorder, or an IPad Air 2. For secondary school 
participants, only audio was recorded, using Voice Record Pro (an app for IPad).  
  
Figure 2-2  Diagrammatic representation of the stick scale with examples of the visual 
reminder to what each end of the scale represented. 
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2.4 DESIGN 
2.5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Source reliability, age and receptive vocabulary were between-subject factors, and 
type of variable and time of testing were within-subject factors. 
2.5.1 SOURCE RELIABILITY 
There were a high and a low reliability source condition, and a ‘no information’ 
condition. In the high and low source reliability conditions, participants were told 
by the researcher: 
“I was discussing this with a [science or physics teacher/nursery child] last week. They 
said that they thought that the weight of the car does not make a difference to how far 
the car travels. What do you think?” 
A science teacher was used as the high reliability source for primary school 
participants. Not only do children tend to trust what adults tell them (e.g. Harris & 
Koenig, 2006), but they are also likely to recognise expertise when evaluating 
whether to trust a statement (Kushnir, Vredenburg, & Schneider, 2013). Fitneva 
(2010) also found that six-year-olds generally discriminate between adult and child 
information, perceiving adults as more knowledgeable, but four-year-olds do not. 
Furthermore, Yeo and Tan (2010) found that receiving relevant information from 
an authoritative source, such as a teacher, is likely to improve students’ learning in 
secondary school, suggesting that teachers can function as high reliability sources 
even with older children. Bråten et al. (2012) also found that secondary school 
students were likely to prefer justification by authority, over justification by 
multiple sources and personal justification, when asked about justification of 
knowledge in science. Children in the UK studying the national curriculum 
(Department for Education, 2014), also learn about forces and motion in their 
science class from around five years old, so they have had exposure to the relevant 
concepts regarding the behaviour of cars on inclines in their ‘science’ class. 
However, while participants should regard a science teacher as being an expert in 
science, and therefore knowledgeable regarding the variables under consideration, 
it is likely the participants will not consider the science teacher completely reliable 
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(never incorrect). This is because children tend to defer to adults as being reliable 
sources of information regarding particular topics (e.g., Lutz & Kyle, 2002), unless 
they consider themselves ‘experts’ (e.g. regarding the action of particular toys; 
Vanderborght & Jaswal, 2009). It is possible that even young children would feel that 
they are ‘knowledgeable’ about the effects of the variables under consideration here, 
which may impact on the degree to which they think the science teacher is reliable.   
A physics teacher was used as the reliable source for secondary school participants. 
This was because pilot work indicated that adults appear not to rate the science 
teacher as reliable (unlike primary school participants), and it was felt that this 
might be the case for secondary school participants as well. This was especially 
relevant as they do ‘science’ under more specific labels of physics, chemistry, and 
biology (see Department for Education, 2013). Given that the intention was for the 
participants to associate the reliable ‘expert’ source with the causal (physical) 
system directly, it was decided that the ‘physics teacher’ would be a better reliable 
source.  
A nursery school child (three- to four-year-olds) was used as the low reliability 
source for both primary and secondary school participants. Children regard 
‘children’ as being more unreliable than adults, as having less knowledge than adults 
(the younger the child, the less knowledgeable), and preferring to learn from adults 
(e.g. Taylor, Cartwright & Bowden, 1991). As such, participants should regard a child 
younger than them as knowing less, and therefore not a reliable source of 
information.  
The statements used to manipulate source reliability were similar to Hahn et al. 
(2005), who found source reliability differences in adults. Younger participants have 
also been shown to be capable of discriminating between sources.  Fitneva (2001) 
used brief statements indicating the reliability of the source via grammatical 
implication. As such, information regarding source reliability was given to the 
participants verbally. 
A ‘no information condition’ was also included, where participants were given no 
information regarding the effect of weight on distance travelled. The ‘no 
information’ condition functioned as a control, where weight was made pertinent, 
but they were given no further information regarding its effects. The intention was 
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to avoid the problem, particularly with younger participants, that they might not pay 
attention to weight, because weight had not been made pertinent (as it has been in 
the other two conditions). At the point where the information regarding weight 
would be revealed to the child in the high and low reliability conditions, the child 
was asked: 
“So what effect do you think, say, weight will have on how far the car travels?” 
To ensure that the source reliability manipulation worked, all the participants were 
asked the following question, at the end of the study: 
“Out of 10, how often do you think a [nursery child; science/physics teacher] would be 
right if you ask them a question?” 
Children as young as four years of age are likely to be able to understand and identify 
who would know about adult specific and child specific knowledge (Fitneva, 2010). 
Primary school participants had no problems answering this question. Secondary 
school participants usually asked what kind of question, at which point the 
researcher told them the kind of question one might ask in a primary school science 
class. 
2.5.2 WEIGHT AND CAUSAL VARIABLES 
Four variables that could impact on the causal system were manipulated in the ‘cars 
on an incline’ game (see Figure 2-1). They were height of the incline, starting point 
on the incline, surface friction, and weight of the car. The first three are causal 
variables - changing them impacts on how far the car travels. However, weight is not 
a causal variable - changing the weight of the car makes little or no difference to how 
far the car travels. Height, starting point, surface friction and weight could be varied, 
each having three possible setups as follows: height (high, medium, low); starting 
point (high, medium, low); surface friction (smooth, medium, rough); and weight 
(heavy, medium, light). For the causal variables, the high or smooth setup equated 
to the furthest position the car could travel from that position, the medium setup, 
equating to the in-between distance from that position, and low or rough setups, 
equating to the least distance the car would travel in that position. For weight, the 
car would travel to approximately the same place, regardless of how heavy the car 
was. 
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2.5.3 TIME POINT 
Data were collected from the participants at three time points. At baseline - just after 
participants had done their practice trials; post reliability information – just after 
participants had received information (or not), regarding the effect of weight, from 
differentially reliable sources; and post intervention – just after participants have 
intervened on the system and witnessed that weight does not have an effect on how 
far the car travels.  
2.5.4 RECEPTIVE VOCABULARY 
Participants were given a receptive vocabulary assessment – the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn & Dunn, 2009). 
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT, Dunn & Dunn, 1981) is a widely used 
measure of receptive vocabulary. Validity studies in the United States have shown 
that it correlates positively with other vocabulary tests and with individual 
intelligence tests (see Robertson & Eisenberg, 1981, for a review). The British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS, Dunn & Dunn, Whetton & Pintillie, 1997) was based 
on the PPVT, with standardisation on a British national sample, and the drawings 
reworked for a better gender and ethnic balance as well as to remove content that 
was not representative of British culture.  
The BPVS was particularly useful as it is appropriate for the entire age range 
included in this study (6-17 years), and it can be implemented fairly quickly (15-20 
minutes). Furthermore, vocabulary is a good index of school success (Dale & 
Reichert, 1957) and is a big contributor in measures of intelligence (Elliot, 1982). 
The participants were told a word and asked which of four numbered pictures 
matched the word. They had four practice trials, where they were told if they were 
correct or not. For subsequent words they were not told if they were correct. The 
words to identify were easy to start with, and got progressively more difficult. There 
were 32 potential picture sets. The task ended when participants failed to identify 
the picture that correctly matched the word four out of six times. The final correctly 
identified word picture pair is known as the ceiling item. The errors made by the 
participant were recorded, along with the ceiling item.  
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The raw scores were calculated by subtracting the number of errors from the ceiling 
item. These raw scores were converted to standardised scores, by age by using the 
tables provided in the manual for the BPVS (Dunn, & Dunn, 1981). 
2.5.5 AGE 
In primary school, participants were selected from three different year groups, Year 
2 (six- to seven-year-olds), Year 4 (eight to nine-year-olds), and Year 6 (10 to 11-
year-olds ). In secondary school, participants were selected from three different 
year groups, Year 8 (12- to 13-year-olds), Year 10 (14- to 15-year-olds), and Year 12 
(16- to 17-year-olds).  
2.6 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
2.6.1 PRACTICE TRIAL MEASURES 
Participants’ choices of practice trials were recorded. This was done to examine 
what sort of knowledge the participants sought to gain when doing the practice 
trials. Whether or not the participant did the following types of trials was counted.   
SEQUENTIAL FAIR TEST TRIALS 
A fair test is when only one variable was changed at a time. For example, a fair test 
on height would be done where the high and low set up for height was compared, 
and the other three variables remained constant. A fair test was counted as such 
when the two set ups were compared sequentially. As there were six trials, it was 
possible for a participant to do a non-consecutive fair test. However, as sequential 
fair test set ups suggested the greatest likelihood of the participant attempting to 
compare distance travelled for different set ups, only they were counted.  
EXTREME SET UP TRIALS 
The extreme set ups of the causal system are the set ups where the car would travel 
the least and furthest on the track. Whether the participant did an extreme set up 
trial at either or both ends were counted. The car would land in Box. 6 for high 
height, high starting point, and smooth surface friction (with any weight), and in 
Box. 2 for low height, low starting point, and rough surface friction. Finding these 
points would give the participant more information regarding the causal system as 
it dictates the boundary of possible distance travelled by the car.  
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NUMBER OF REPEAT TRIALS 
Participants could either repeat a trial because they may have forgotten what they 
had already done, or to confirm what they have observed. Number of repeat trials 
were counted.  
2.6.2 VARIABLE PREDICTION MEASURE 
The variable prediction measure allowed for assessment of whether participants 
correctly understood the effect of weight and the causal variables (starting point on 
slope, height of slope, surface friction).  
The difference between participants’ predictions for the high and low set up for each 
variable were calculated by subtracting the predicted distance from the low set up 
from the predicted distance for the high set up for that variable. The high set up was 
equivalent to the one where the car would travel furthest, and the low set up where 
the car would travel the least far. 
WEIGHT PREDICTION 
For weight, if this difference was 0, then the participant’s understanding of the effect 
of weight was considered correct. This is because predicting that the heavy (high) 
and light (low) car will land in the same box (hence difference = 0) suggested the 
participant believed weight did not have an effect on distance travelled (in this 
instance). If the absolute difference was bigger than 0, then the prediction was 
incorrect. A positive difference suggested the participant thought the heavy car 
would travel further, and a negative difference suggested the participant thought 
the light car would travel further.  
CAUSAL VARIABLES PREDICTION 
For the causal variables, if the difference was positive, then the participant’s 
understanding of the effect of the causal variable would be considered correct as 
they would be predicting that the high set up for that variable will travel further than 
the low set up. There are two types of causal variable prediction errors. The first 
was when the prediction difference was negative. An example of this type of error 
would be the participant predicting that the car starting at the lower starting point 
on the slope would go further on the track than if it started at the higher starting 
point. The second type of prediction error would be when participants have a 
prediction difference of zero. This suggested that the participant believed that a 
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causal variable had no effect (in this instance). It was also possible that the 
participant believed that the causal variable only has a small causal effect within that 
causal system, resulting in the participant predicting they both land in the same box.  
However, this did not occur in the cars on an incline game, and all causal variable 
prediction differences of zero were considered to be prediction errors.  
Each participant made three sets of predictions for the high and low set up per 
weight/causal variable, at each time of testing. 
2.6.3 DEGREE OF CONVICTION MEASURE 
The degree of conviction measure allowed for assessment of how sure participants 
were regarding their weight predictions. The scale ranged from 1-7, where 1 
indicated that they reported that were just guessing, and 7 indicated that they were 
completely sure. Participants’ degree of conviction rating for each prediction 
regarding the heavy and light set up for weight were combined to create a total 
degree of conviction rating for the weight prediction.  
2.6.4 WEIGHT EXPLANATION MEASURE 
During the data collection phase participants were required to state how far they 
thought the car would travel for a particular set up (prediction), how sure they were 
(degree of conviction), and why they thought that (explanation). They did this for 
both weight (non-causal variable) and the causal variables. 
The audio recordings regarding explanations for the effect of the weight were 
transcribed using a professional transcriber. This was done at baseline, post 
reliability information, and post intervention. The explanation data were uploaded 
into the Atlas.ti software, designed to assist in analysing large bodies of textual 
information. This allows easily generated sets of explanations (e.g. age six to seven 
weight explanations), and all weight explanations were coded, with explanations 
scored depending on how well they mapped onto the correct generic explanation 
for weight. 
The correct generic explanation for weight is as follows: 
“Change in degree (heaviness) does not affect speed (stays the same) so it does not 
affect distance (stays the same)” 
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The participants scored according to the following criteria 
0 - If they did not provide an explanation. For example - don’t know; it just is; I can 
tell by looking; I just saw it (usually said after witnessing weight not having an 
effect). 
1 - If their explanation provided was incorrect.  For example - saying weight does 
have an effect; doesn’t make sense (even if on right track); explanation involves 
other variables (e.g. saying friction/height/starting point play role when talking 
about weight). 
2 - If their explanation was inadequate, missing information or very unclear. For 
example - saying “it is heavy”; missing out any other pertinent information; or off 
base in some way. 
3 - If they provided a correct specific explanation. For example - saying that all 
degrees of weight (light, medium and heavy) will land in the same place. E.g. “they 
will all land in 4”.  
4 - If they provide a correct general explanation, where it is claimed that degree (of 
weight) does not affect how far the car travels (the latter may be implied). For 
example - saying “weight doesn’t make a difference (to how far the car travels)”. 
Weight does not make much of a difference was also accepted as there is a very small 
difference in reality. 
5 - If they provided a correct explanation where degree, speed, and distance are all 
taken into account when explaining the prediction. Sometimes degree will be 
implied rather than stated explicitly. For example – saying it (weight) does not affect 
speed, so it does not affect how far the car travels. 
Participants generated two explanations, one for the heavy and one for the light set 
up.  As participants frequently treated these two explanations as two components 
of a single explanation both these explanations were treated as one for coding 
purposes. See Table 2-7 for examples of coded explanations for 0-3+ (there were 
very few explanations accorded higher scores than three).  
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Explanation Score Sample quote  
0 
-I'm not sure, I'm not too sure. I don't know 
 
-I can see it going there 
 
-I don't know I just guess. Just a random guess 
 
1 
-Because it’s quite light and not very heavy it would go slow  
 
-Because the car is heavier and… yes, the car is heavier 
 
-Because it is heavier now, so it's less to go down 
 
2 
-Cause of the science teacher and about the weight and because it 
was on medium so I think it will go to 4 
 
-Because it has one beanbag but it has two middle bits, so you 
add them both together they might make 4 
 
-Because I would think that weight would make it go further, but 
obviously with the teacher and a bit more confused 
 
3+ 
-Because of, well, it's like a science teacher said that weight 
doesn't really make much difference, so- and its medium high and 
medium surface, so I thought it would go to 4 
 
-Because the weight doesn’t matter. And if it has medium thing… 
a medium roughness, medium starting point and medium weight, 
it will go to 4, because the weight doesn’t really matter 
 
-Well, as the physics teacher said that weight does not affect the 
car's speed, then yes it would go to 4 
 
 
2.7 PROCEDURE 
All the trials took place in a private room within the participant’s school. There were 
two sessions, 1-10 days apart. The researcher sat on a small chair behind the 
apparatus, and the participant sat facing the researcher, with a good view of the ‘cars 
on inclines’ game, and the numbered track. A procedure timeline is included below 
in Table 2-8. 
Table 2-7  Sample quotes coded for ranking 0-3+ in the explanation scoring system. 
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Session 1 (10-20 minutes) 
 Welcome 
o Participant welcomed to the study, shown the apparatus, and asked if they wish to 
participate. 
 Language Test 
o British Picture Vocabulary Scale. 
 Introduction Phase 
o Participant’s attention directed to variables that can change, and how they change, 
in the cars on an incline game. 
o Participant shown standard setup and witness that the car lands on box number 4 
(repeated twice), with the standard setup. 
 Practice Trials 
o Participant performs six practice trials (of their own choice) 
 Training Phase 
o Participant told what questions they would be asked. 
o Participant told how to use the degree of conviction scale. 
o Participant practice using the degree of conviction scale. 
 Test Phase I (Baseline) 
o Participant asked how far they thought the car would travel for the heaviest and 
lightest car, and the high and low positions for each of the causal variables. 
o Participant asked how sure they were, regarding each prediction. 
o Participant asked why they thought that, regarding each prediction. 
 
A break of 1-10 days occurred between sessions. 
 
Session 2 (10-15 minutes) 
 Welcome 
o Participant welcomed to the study and asked if they wish to participate again. 
o Participant reminded of how game worked, and where car landed when on the 
standard setup. 
 Reliability Information  
o Participant either told new information regarding the causal system that came 
from science/physics teacher or nursery child, or received no information. 
 Test Phase II (Post Information) 
o Same as Test Phase I 
 Intervention 
o Participant performed a fair test on weight, seeing how far the car travelled for 
the heavy medium and lightweight car. They did this twice. 
 Test Phase III (Post Intervention) 
o Same as Test Phase I 
o Participant asked to give reliability ratings for science/physics teacher and 
nursery child. 
 
 
Table 2-8  Main procedure timeline for the studies. 
 
100 
SESSION 1 (10-20 MINUTES) 
LANGUAGE TEST 
Firstly, the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) task was 
administered. 
INTRODUCTION PHASE 
After the language test, participants were introduced to the ‘cars on an incline’ game. 
The researcher demonstrated how the game worked, touching the surfaces of the 
inclines and directing attention to the smooth, medium and rough surfaces, noting 
that there were high, medium, and low starting points, changed using gates. The 
inclines were raised up and down to demonstrate the low, medium, and high height 
positions. Finally, the researcher demonstrated how the weight of the car could be 
changed by putting different numbers of weights in the back seat. The car with three 
weights was referred to as the heavy weight car, two weights as the medium weight 
car, and one weight as the light weight car. 
The researcher then pointed out that if the game was set up with the car on the 
medium surface, medium starting point, medium height, and medium weight then 
the car stopped in the middle of the track in the box number 4. The researcher then 
released the car so that the participant witnessed the car the landing where it was 
supposed to. This was repeated twice. The car was then left at the side of the number 
4 box to remind the participant of where it stops in the standard set up.  
PRACTICE TRIALS 
Following the introduction to the apparatus, the participant was allowed to play 
with the game, with no intervention from the researcher. The participant was told 
they could do anything they want, and that they have six practice trials. 
TRAINING PHASE 
In the training phase, the researcher returned the game to the standard set up. Then 
told the participant that the setup would be changed around, and that they would to 
be asked three questions, which were:  
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I. Where they think the car will land, where they would report the number of the box 
they think it would land in. The participant was then reminded that if the game was 
set up with medium weight car/height/starting point/friction (standard set up) 
then the car would land in box number 4. 
II. How sure are they are about their prediction regarding how far the car would travel. 
They are also shown the stick scale at this point.  
III. Why they think that. 
The participant was then introduced to the stick scale. Their attention was drawn to 
the increasing height of sticks. They were told that the higher sticks mean they are 
more sure, and the lower sticks mean they are less sure. Then they were told the 
highest stick means they are completely sure.  
To test their understanding, the researcher asked them how sure they were that the 
sun is going to come up tomorrow and that there is going to be another day. Their 
attention was drawn to the fact that this has happened during the entire lives of 
family members, for millions of years. The participant was judged to understand 
when they agreed that they would be very, very, sure. The researcher then referred 
to the lowest stick, and told the participant it means they are completely guessing. 
The researcher and participant discuss tossing a coin, and the fact that they would 
have to guess if it was head or tails. The participant was judged to understand when 
they agreed that they would be guessing. To remind the participant of which end is 
which, a cartoon picture of a person imagining a sun and a flipping coin was attached 
to the appropriate end of the stick scale.  
Participants were then asked a series of questions to check they knew how to use 
the scale appropriately. The questions were designed to get them to use the middle 
of the scale as pilot studies suggest younger participants will often ignore the middle 
if they are not prompted. Primary school participants were usually asked questions 
such as ‘how sure are you that this rubber will bounce’ or ‘how sure are you that if I 
push this toy car it will drive off the table’ to get them to use the middle of the scale. 
Secondary school participants were asked questions regarding the weather such as 
‘how sure are you that it will rain tomorrow’. This questioning continued until 
participants used the middle of the scale to indicate their degree of conviction.  
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TEST PHASE I 
The researcher, starting with a standard set up, asked the participant about each of 
the variables in turn, with weight always going first, and height/starting 
point/friction in a different order at each time of testing. For each variable, the 
higher and lower setup was demonstrated, where the other three variables were 
kept constant (in the medium position) and the participant was asked for their 
prediction regarding the distance the car would travel, how sure they were, and why 
did they think that (described above). The order of questioning regarding the higher 
and lower set up was systematically varied.  
SESSION 2 (10-15 MINUTES) 
RELIABILITY INFORMATION 
On arrival, the participant was told they were going to do the same thing as last time, 
and was reminded of how the stick scale worked, and that they would get another 
chance to play the game later. Whilst arranging the set up for the first variable, the 
researcher casually said to the participant either (for the high and low reliability 
conditions):  
“I was discussing this with a [science or physics teacher/nursery child] last week. They 
said that they thought that the weight of the car is does not make a difference to how 
far the car travels. What do you think?” 
Or (for the no information condition):  
 
“So what effect do you think, say, weight will have on how far the car travels” 
TEST PHASE II 
After this, the participant was asked for their prediction regarding the distance the 
car would travel, how sure they were, and why did they think that, as before.  
INTERVENTION 
The participant was told by the researcher they could now have another go, but this 
time it would be different, because the researcher was going to tell them which 
setups to try. The researcher said the following: 
“We are going to do a fair test. Do you know what that is?” 
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After the participant responded, the researcher continued: 
“That is when you change only one thing, but leave everything else the same.”  
This was said regardless of the participant’s response.  
 
“You are going to do a fair test on weight. I want you to do this for the light car, medium 
car, and the heavy car. You are going to do this a couple of times. You are always going 
to do this from the same place.” 
The researcher then indicated where the participant should do the fair test from (in 
the standard set up position). The participant then conducted the fair test by 
running the car down the track with each of the three weights, and then repeating 
it. They could do the fair test in any order they wished. The apparatus was fairly 
reliable, and the car almost always landed in box number 4, regardless of weight 
(there is a tiny difference with lighter cars travelling further than heavier cars, 
although this is rarely noticeable under these conditions). The researcher checked 
the participant was doing it correctly, and made sure the car was straight on the 
incline. If the car was not straight, it would bang into the side and not land in box 
number 4. If this clearly happened, the researcher commented that it has happened, 
and told the participant they could have another go.  
TEST PHASE III 
Once the participant has finished the fair test, the researcher reminded them of the 
standard set up and how to use the stick scale (if needed), and then the participant 
was asked for their prediction regarding the distance the car would travel under 
each set up, how sure they were, and why did they think that, as before. 
Finally, to establish that the participant did, in fact, think that science teachers are 
more reliable than nursery children, they were asked:  
“Out of 10, how often do you think a [nursery child; science or physics teacher] would 
be right if you ask them a question?” 
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2.8 ANALYSIS 
PRACTICE TRIALS 
A binary variable was created for each practice trial measure (sequential fair trials, 
extreme set up, repeats). If the participant did at least one trial of the measured kind, 
they were coded as 1, otherwise they were coded as 0. This then created two groups 
that could be assessed according to age, BPVS score and gender. Between-
participant t-tests were used for continuous variables and chi-square tests for 
categorical variables.  
WEIGHT PREDICTION AND EXPLANATION 
The aim of the analysis was to examine the impact of hearing new information 
regarding the effect of weight on how far a car travelled on causal reasoning. Of 
particular interest was whether reliability of the source of the new information 
affected participants’ reasoning regarding the effect of weight.  
To assess children’s initial beliefs regarding the effect of weight at baseline, the 
frequency of each type of prediction (heavy travels further, light travels further, no 
difference) was calculated. Chi-square was used to examine the relationship 
between initial belief about weight and age group.  
To check whether the participants did think science or physics teachers were more 
reliable than nursery children, and whether this was impacted by participant age, a 
two-way mixed model ANOVA was performed on the ratings data.  
For weight prediction, a binary variable was created where participants who made 
a correct weight prediction were coded as 1, and participants who made an incorrect 
prediction were coded as 0.  
A similar binary variable was also created for weight explanation, where correct 
explanations were coded as 1, and incorrect explanations as 0. They would be 
considered to have made an incorrect explanation if they scored 0 - 1. They would 
be considered to have made a correct score if they scored 3 or above (see section 
2.6.2 for more details regarding score criteria). Coding participants who scored 2 
(ambiguous explanations) was more complex as it was not clear that ‘ambiguous’ 
explanations should be included in the incorrect or correct explanation category. 
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Here they could have been trying and failing to make an incorrect explanation or 
trying and failing to make a correct explanation. Given that the participants were 
generally capable of making explanations that explained their actual predictions 
regarding weight when the explanation concurred with their beliefs, it was possible 
that hearing new information that challenges one’s beliefs regarding the effect of 
weight may have led to a more confused explanation, especially as the participants 
did not have much time between hearing the new information and providing an 
explanation.  If this was the case, one would expect participants to be particularly 
confused in the high reliability condition where they have heard information 
incompatible with their beliefs from a source that they would usually trust. 
Examples of these types of explanation can be seen in Table 2-7, and suggest that 
some did seem confused by the new information. Given this, and that the number 
making correct explanations were too small for suitable statistical analyses to be 
carried out, it was decided that 0-1 would be coded as incorrect, and 2-5 coded as 
correct (and attempted correct) explanations.  
Univariate analyses were conducted on both the weight prediction and explanation 
data. Firstly, this was to assess whether source reliability had an impact on 
participants’ reasoning, and secondly, to identify potential relationships between 
factors commonly known to influence causal reasoning. These analyses were done 
at each of three time points: at baseline; after hearing information regarding weight; 
and after witnessing that weight did not affect how far the car travelled. Chi-square 
tests were used for categorical variables and between-participant t-tests for 
continuous variables. The odds ratios are presented for participants who correctly 
responded to information regarding the effect of weight, relative to participants who 
did not correctly respond. Interrelationships between personal characteristics 
variables were also assessed, including a check for multicollinearity between age 
and BPVS, age and gender, and gender and BPVS. 
However, some of the explanatory variables were interrelated. In order to examine 
which factors had an independent influence on responses regarding the effect of 
weight, multivariate analyses using logistic progression programmes from IBM SPSS 
Version 23, suitable for estimation influences on binary outcome variables were 
performed. Multiple logistic regression was used to examine which factors had 
independent effects on making correct predictions regarding weight. Dummy 
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coding was used to enter source reliability into the analysis, where the no 
information group was used as a reference category. In order to facilitate 
comparison across the three time points, the source reliability and degree of 
conviction variables (our primary theoretical focus) were included in all the logistic 
regression models. However, of the other variables, only those that proved 
significant in the univariate analyses (age, gender and BPVS score) were entered 
into the logistic regression models at each time point.   
CAUSAL VARIABLES 
Exploratory analyses were undertaken on the causal variable prediction date to 
examine participants’ understanding of the causal variables, and how that might 
change after receiving information regarding one of the variables (weight) in the 
system.  
Correct causal variable predictions were coded as 1, and incorrect causal variable 
predictions (both wrong direction, and same distance predictions) as 0. Changes in 
the number of correct predictions over time, and between causal variables were 
assessed using McNemar’s tests. Differences between size of causal variable 
prediction difference were compared using within-participant one-way ANOVA.  
The univariate analyses reflect the number of participants who provided complete 
responses for each relevant response. The multivariate regression analyses include 
only participants who gave complete responses. All variables in the final models met 
the 5% level of significance. All P values are 2-tailed.  
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3 RESULTS 
3.1 PRACTICE TRIALS 
NUMBER OF REPEAT TRIALS 
Participants repeated at least one practice trial 30% of the time. There was an effect 
of age where participants who repeated at least one trial were significantly younger, 
t(158) = 4.04, p<.001, (see Table 3-1).  
  N (%) Mean Age (S.D.) BPVS1 Score (S.D.) 
Repeat Trials    
Repeat Trials 48 (30%) 9.95 (3.40) 103.63 (16.95) 
No Repeat Trials 112 (70%) 12.29 (3.33) 99.80 (17.66) 
Extreme Set Up     
Extreme Set Up  67 (42%) 11.31 (3.14) 105.15 (16.74) 
No Extreme Set Up 93 (58%) 11.78 (3.75) 97.92 (16.74) 
Sequential Fair Test    
Fair Test 94 (59%) 11.53 (3.73) 100.03 (18.27) 
No Fair Test 66 (41%) 11.66 (3.19) 102.26 (16.36) 
 1 British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
Further analyses by age group showed that within the primary school age 
participants, those in the younger age groups were more likely to repeat trials, χ2(5) 
= 16.88, p<.01: 55% of 6-7 year olds, 40% of 8-9 year olds, and 27% of 10-11 year 
olds repeated trials. From the 12-13 age group onwards, there was no evidence of 
any difference by age (see Table 3-2).  
BPVS scores were not associated with repeating trials; the mean BPVS score for 
participants who made repeats was similar to those who did not, t(158) = 1.23, 
p>.05 (see Table 3-1).  
There was a trend for more males to make more repeat trials than females (38% and 
26% respectively; see Table 3-2). but this difference was not significant, χ2(1) = 2.62, 
p=.11 
 
Table 3-1  Number of participants (%), mean age (S.D.) and mean BPVS Score (S.D.) in 
relation to repeating trials, using extreme set up and doing a sequential fair test (N=160). 
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    Number of Repeats (%) 
Age Group   
6-7 years 33 18 (55%) 
8-9 Years 25 10 (40%) 
10-11 Years 26 7 (27%) 
12-13 Years 18 3 (17%) 
14-15 Years 28 5 (18%) 
16-17 Years 26 5 (19%) 
   
Gender   
Female 96 25 (26%) 
Male 60 23 (38%) 
 
EXTREME SET UP TRIALS 
At least one extreme set up was used by 42% of the participants as one of their 
practice trials. Age was not related to participants choosing to do practice trials 
using set ups that would indicate the furthest and least furthest the car could travel, 
t(158) = 0.85, p>.05  (see Table 3.1). 
However, participants conducting an extreme set up practice trial were more likely 
to have higher BPVS scores than those who did not, t(158) = 2.63, p<.01(see Table 
3-1).  
There was also an effect of gender, whereby males were more likely to use an 
extreme set up than females (χ2(1)=6.79, p<.01; see Table 3-3;). 
  N Extreme Set Up (%) Sequential Fair Tests (%) 
Gender    
Females 100 34 (34%) 58 (58%). 
Males 60 33 (55%) 36 (60%) 
 
 
Table 3-2  Frequency of repeat trials (%) by age group and gender (N = 156). 
Table 3-3  Frequency of participants (%) who used an extreme set up as one of their trials, 
or did a sequential fair test, by gender (N = 160). 
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SEQUENTIAL FAIR TEST TRIALS 
A sequential fair test on one of the three causal variables or weight was done by 59% 
of participants. Age was not related to whether participants did a sequential fair test, 
t(158) = .23, p>.05.  Similarly, BPVS scores were not associated with doing a 
sequential fair test, t(158) = 0.79, p>.05 (see Table 3-1).  Neither was there any 
relationship with gender, χ2(1) = .06, p>.05 (see Table 3-3). 
3.2 PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS INTER-RELATIONSHIPS 
There is a statistically significant negative relationship between age and BPVS 
score, whereby older participants were likely to have lower BPVS scores, r(160) = -
.57, p<.001.  The variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated to assess 
multicollinearity between them, VIF=1.15. As the VIF value was not substantially 
greater than 1, multicollinearity was not considered an issue (Bowerman & 
O’Connell, 1990). 
There were also significant relationships between age and gender in that females 
were on average older, t(158) = 5.28, p<.001, VIF = 1.16, and between BPVS scores 
and gender, with males on average having higher scores, t(158) = 4.78, p<.001, VIF 
= 1.19 (see Table 3-4). Multicollinearity was not considered an issue in either case. 
  N Mean Age (S.D.) BPVS Score (S.D.) 
Gender    
Female 100 12.63 (3.50) 96.15 (16.25) 
Male 60 9.84 (2.75) 108.85 (16.63) 
   
3.3 PARTICIPANTS’ INITIAL BELIEFS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF 
WEIGHT 
Almost half (45%) of participants believed the light car would travel further while a 
similar proportion (41%) of participants believed the heavier car would travel 
further, with only a minority (14%) expecting no difference. This was related to age 
group, where younger participants were more likely to predict that the heavier car 
Table 3-4  Mean age (S.D.) in years and BPVS Score (S.D.) by gender (N  = 160). 
 
110 
would travel further, and older participants were more likely to predict the lighter 
car would travel further, χ2(10) = 20.60, p<.05 (see Table 3.5). 
 
Age Group 
Which car travels further? 
Lighter (%) No difference (%) Heavier (%) 
6-7 Years 10 (30%) 4 (12%) 19 (38%) 
8-9 Years 8 (32%) 2 (8%) 15 (60%) 
10-11 Years 12 (46%) 4 (15%) 10 (39%) 
Primary School 30 (36%) 10 (12%) 44 (52%) 
12-13 Years 6 (33%) 2 (11%) 10 (56%) 
14-15 Years 19 (59%) 7 (22%) 6 (19%) 
16-17 Years 17 (65%) 3 (12%) 6 (23%) 
Secondary School 42 (55%) 12 (16%) 22 (29%) 
 
3.4 ASSESSMENT OF SOURCE RELIABILITY MANIPULATION 
To establish that the source reliability manipulation included appropriately 
different informants, participants were asked on a scale of 1 to 10, how likely they 
thought it was that a science/physics teacher, and nursery child, would be right if 
you asked them a question. As expected, 98% of participants rated the 
science/physics teacher as more reliable than a nursery child.  
A 2 (Reliable Source: nursery child, science/physics teacher) X 6 (Age Group) Mixed 
Model ANOVA was performed on the reliability ratings data, where age group was a 
between-participant variable, and reliable source a within-participant variable. 
Participants rated the science/physics teacher as a more reliable source than the 
nursery child, F(1,154) = 770.43, p<0.001 (see Table 3-6).  
There was also an effect of age F(5,154) = 2.52, p < .05, where younger participants 
gave higher ratings overall than older participants. However, pairwise comparisons 
showed no significant differences between age groups.  
Table 3-5  Prediction of distance travelled based on car weight, by age group (N = 160), 
percentage of year group in parentheses. 
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There was a significant interaction between age and reliability rating, F(5, 154) = 
5.87, p<.001. All age groups made similar predictions regarding the reliability of a 
nursery child, whereas older participants rated science/physics teachers as less 
reliable sources compared with younger participants (see Figure 3-1).  
 Ratings 
Age Group Science Teacher (S.D.) Nursery Child (S.D.) 
6-7 Years 9.72 (.57) 3.69 (1.98) 
8-9 Years 9.22 (.96) 4.04 (1.40) 
10-11 Years 8.69 (1.05) 4.42 (1.60) 
12-13 Years 7.88 (1.64) 4.00 (1.24) 
14-15 Years 7.93 (1.70) 4.38 (1.29) 
16-17 Years 8.42 (1.58) 3.92 (1.35) 
 
 
Table 3-6  Mean participant ratings for the science teacher (S.D.)/nursery child (S.D.) by age 
group. 
Figure 3-1  Mean rating of reliability for science/physics teacher and nursery child by age 
group. 
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A post hoc between-participant one-way ANOVA was carried out on both the 
science/physics and nursery child ratings data comparing age groups. Ratings of the 
nursery child’s reliability showed no differences between ages, F(5, 154) = .98, 
p>.05. However, the science/physics teacher ratings showed an effect of age, F(5. 
154) = 8.83, p<.001. Pairwise comparisons on age group showed that younger 
participants had a higher score for science/physics teacher ratings than older 
participants (see Table 3-7). 
Age 
Group  
N 
Mean 
Teacher 
Rating 
(S.D.) 
Pairwise Comparisons for 
Science/Physics Teacher 
Mean 
Nursery 
Child 
Rating 
(S.D.) 
Pairwise 
Comparisons 
for Nursery 
Child 
6-7 33 9.7 (0.6) >10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 3.7 (2.0) n.s. 
8-9 25 9.2 (1.0) >12-13, 14-15 4.0 (1.4) n.s. 
10-11 26 8.7 (1.0) n.s. 4.4 (1.6) n.s. 
12-13 18 7.9 (1.6) n.s. 4.0 (1.2) n.s. 
14-15  32 7.9 (1.7) n.s. 4.4 (1.3) n.s. 
16-17  26 8.4 (1.6) n.s. 3.9 (1.4) n.s. 
 
3.5 WEIGHT PREDICTION 
3.5.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSES FOR WEIGHT PREDICTION:  
3.5.1.1 SOURCE RELIABILITY 
At baseline, before participants received new information regarding the causal 
system from differentially reliable sources, there was no relationship between 
source reliability and participants who made correct predictions regarding weight 
and those who did not (see Table 3-8).  
After hearing new information regarding the causal system, participants whose new 
information came from a high reliability source were more likely to make a correct 
response, compared with participants who were told that the information was from 
a low reliability source, or participants who heard no new information, χ2(2)=7.99, 
p<.05  (see Table 3-8).   
Table 3-7  Mean reliability rating (S.D.) and significant pairwise comparisons between age 
groups for the science/physics teacher and nursery child (N = 160). 
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After participants had intervened personally on the causal system and witnessed 
that weight did not affect how far the car travelled, most participants made the 
correct response regarding the effect of weight, regardless of source reliability. 
There was no relationship between source reliability and participants who made 
correct responses or not (see Table 3-8).  
3.5.1.2 DEGREE OF CONVICTION 
At baseline, participants who made a correct prediction were no more convinced by 
their prediction than participants who did not make a correct prediction. Also, there 
were no differences related to source reliability (see Table 3-9).  
After hearing new information from differentially reliable sources, participants who 
made correct predictions were more convinced by their prediction than those who 
made incorrect predictions, F(2,154)=3.78, p<.05. This difference was related to 
source reliability whereby participants who made correct predictions in the high 
reliability condition had on average a higher level of conviction about their 
prediction than participants who made incorrect predictions (p<.001). This was not 
the case for participants in the low reliability and no information conditions (see 
Table 3-9).   
After witnessing that weight did not affect distance travelled, participants who made 
correct predictions had on average a higher level of conviction about their response 
compared with participants who made incorrect predictions regarding weight,  
F(2,154)=7.31, p<.01. This difference was also related to source reliability. 
Participants who made a correct prediction had on average more conviction, 
compared with those who made incorrect predictions, in both the low reliability 
(p<.001) and no information conditions (p<.001). This was not the case for 
participants in the high reliability condition (see Table 3-9). 
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    Baseline   Post Information   Post Intervention 
Factor N 
Correct Prediction 
(%) 
Odds Ratio  
(95% C.I.) 
 Correct Prediction 
(%) 
Odds Ratio  
(95% C.I.) 
 Correct Prediction 
(%) 
Odds Ratio  
(95% C.I.) 
Source Reliability          
High reliability Source 55 7 (13%) 0.88 (.33-2.29)  21 (38%) 2.80 (1.34-5.84)**  50 (91%) 1.17 (.39-3.56) 
Low reliability Source 55 6 (11%) 0.68 (.25-1.85)  11 (20%) 0.66 (.30-1.44)  51 (93%) 1.64 (.51-5.37) 
No Information 50 9 (16%) 1  8 (15%) 1  43 (86%) 1 
  χ2(2)=1.18, p>.05  χ2(2)=7.99, p<.05  χ2(2)=1.39, p>.05 
Gender          
Male 60 10 (17%) 1.47 (.59-3.64)  21 (35%) 2.30 (1.11-4.76)*  54 (90%) 1.00 (.34-2.91) 
Female 100 12 (12%) 1  19 (19%) 1  90 (90%) 1 
  χ2(1)=.69, p>.05  χ2(1)=5.12, p<.05  χ2(1)=0, p>.05 
*P<.05,**P<.01          
 
  
Table 3-8  Univariate analyses of the relevance of source reliability and gender (categorical factors) at each time point for weight prediction (N = 160).  
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  Baseline   Post Info   Post Intervention 
Factor n Mean (S.D.) T value P   n Mean (S.D.) T value P   n Mean (S.D.) T value P 
Age 
              
Correct Prediction 22 12.18 (3.62) 0.85 n.s 
 40 11.18 (3.30) -0.835 n.s  144 11.86 (3.44) 3.12 <.01 
Incorrect Prediction 138 11.49 (3.49) 
   120 11.72 (3.57)    16 9.06 (3.16)   
BPVS 
              
Correct Prediction 22 102.36 (19.03) 0.41 n.s 
 40 104.63 (17.07) 0.99 n.s  144 101.31 (17.39) 0.79 n.s 
Incorrect Prediction 138 100.72 (17.29) 
   120 99.73 (17.52)    16 97.69 (18.56)   
Degree of Conviction 
              
Correct Prediction 22 9.91 (2.04) 0.13 n.s 
 40 11.23 (2.21) 4.53 <.001  144 13.25 (1.38) 6.53 <.001 
Incorrect Prediction 138 9.85 (2.07) 
   120 9.53 (2.00)    16 10.56 (2.73)   
 
              
Degree of Conviction - Interaction Effects with Source Reliability 
          
High Reliability 
              
Correct Prediction 7 10.00 (2.38) -0.07 n.s 
 21 11.95 (1.77) 5.56 <.001  50 13.22 (1.47) 0.89 n.s 
Incorrect Prediction 48 10.06 (2.19) 
   34 9.15 (1.84)    5 12.6 (1.67)   
Low Reliability 
              
Correct Prediction 6 9.67 (2.66) -0.06 n.s 
 11 9.91 (2.77) 0.58 n.s  51 13.29 (1.29) 5.69 <.001 
Incorrect Prediction 49 9.71 (1.91) 
   44 9.43 (2.36)    4 8.75 (3.77)   
No Information 
              
Correct Prediction 9 10.00 (1.50) 0.33 n.s 
 8 11.13 (1.73) 1.85 n.s  43 13.23 (1.41) 5.09 <.001 
Incorrect Prediction 41 9.76 (2.13) 
   42 9.93 (1.67)    7 10.14 (1.95)   
 
  F(2,154)=.05, p>.05    F(2,154)=3.78, p<.05   F(2,154)=7.31, p<.01 
Table 3-9  Univariate analyses of age, BPVS, and degree of conviction (continuous factors) at each time point for the weight prediction outcome.  
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Explanatory Variables  Baseline   Post Information   Post Intervention 
  Odds ratio (95% CI) P Wald   Odds ratio (95% CI) P Wald   Odds ratio (95% CI) P Wald 
High Reliability 0.66 (.23-1.94) n.s 0.57  3.62 (1.32-9.93) p<.05 6.25  0.85 (.19-3.73) n.s 0.05 
Low Reliability 0.56 (.18-1.70) n.s 1.05  1.71 (.58-5.01) n.s 0.95  2.65 (.46-15.22) n.s 1.20 
Degree of Conviction 1.02 (.81-1.27) n.s 0.02  1.54 (1.24-1.91) p<.001 15.30  2.14 (1.51-3.03) p<.001 18.14 
Gender Not in model    2.76 (1.21-6.30) p<.05 5.84  Not in model   
Age Not in model    Not in model    1.37 (1.12-1.69) p<.01 9.02 
 χ2(3) = 1.17, p>.05    χ2(4) = 32.65, p<.001    χ2(4) = 37.50, p<.001   
Table 3-10  Results of a logistic regression to predict a correct prediction regarding the effect of weight on distance travelled. 
 117 
3.5.1.3 PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
AGE 
After participants had observed that weight does not affect how far the car travels, 
participants who made correct predictions regarding the effect of weight were likely 
to be older than participants who made incorrect predictions, t(158) = 3.12, p<.01. 
There were no differences in age relating to correctness of predictions at baseline 
or after hearing new information (see Table 3-9).  
GENDER 
There was no relationship between gender and number of correct predictions at 
baseline. However, boys were more likely than girls to make correct predictions 
after hearing that weight does not affect distance travelled, χ2(1) = 5.12, p<.05. This 
relationship was not evident when participants observed that weight did not affect 
distance travelled, where the majority of participants made correct predictions 
regarding weight different (see Table 3-8).  
LANGUAGE 
There was no significant association between receptive language based on BPVS 
scores and making a correct prediction at any time point (see Table 3-9). 
3.5.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF CORRECT PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF 
WEIGHT 
The factors found by use of logistic regression to be independently associated with 
making a correct prediction regarding the effect of weight at each time point, once 
other factors had been taken into account are presented in Table 3-10.  
At baseline, the included predictors, the high and low reliability variables, as well as 
degree of conviction did not function as accurate predictors of a correct prediction, 
χ2(3) = 1.17, p>.05. 
 After participants heard new information, the prediction accuracy of the model was 
82%, χ2(4) = 32.65, p<.001. Participants who heard new information regarding the 
effect of weight from a high reliability source were 4.36 times more likely to make a 
correct prediction, compared with participants who heard no new information, 
whereas hearing information from a low reliability source was not an independent 
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predictor of correctness. Furthermore, male participants were 2.76 times more 
likely to make correct predictions compared with females. Degree of conviction in 
participants’ response was also associated with a greater likelihood of making a 
correct explanation (OR = 1.54). Neither age nor hearing information from a low 
reliability source were significant independent predictors of correctness (see Table 
3-10). 
After participants had intervened on the system, the prediction accuracy of the 
model was 94%, χ2(4) = 37.50, p<.001. Hearing new information from either a high 
or low reliability source did not improve the odds of making correct predictions, 
compared with hearing no information. However, degree of conviction continued to 
function as an independent predictor, where more conviction increased the odds of 
making a correct prediction (OR = 2.14).  Likewise, age was also an independent 
predictor, where older participants were more likely to make correct predictions 
regarding the effect of weight (OR = 1.37; see Table 3-10).   
3.6 WEIGHT EXPLANATION 
As the recordings of the verbal explanations were sometimes inaudible due to both 
external noise outside the testing room, and quietness of the voice of the participant, 
there are missing data points. One child contributed no data points due to 
inaudibility, and 6 data points were missing at baseline, 0 post reliable information, 
and 2 post intervention.  
The majority of participants provided explanations that were incorrect (scoring 1) 
at baseline (89%) and after hearing information regarding the effect of weight 
(78%). After participants witnessed that weight did not affect how far the car 
travelled, the number of incorrect predictions (scoring 1) decreased to 23% (see 
Table 3-11). Very few participants did not provide an explanation for their weight 
prediction (scoring 0) - 3% at baseline and 2% after hearing new information. The 
proportion was higher after participants witnessed that weight did not affect 
distance travelled (54%).  
Few participants made explanations scoring three or more: 3% at baseline, 9% after 
hearing new information, and 12% after witnessing that weight did not affect 
distance travelled.  
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Considering ambiguous explanations, only 5% of participants scored 2 at baseline. 
However, after hearing new information, the proportion of participants making 
ambiguous explanations appeared to be higher (11%). Furthermore, to examine 
whether being in the high reliability condition led to an increase in ambiguous 
explanations, post information participants in the high reliability condition achieved 
both more correct explanation scores and more ambiguous scores than the low 
reliability or no information groups after hearing that weight does not affect 
distance travelled, χ2(6) = 13.64, p<.05 (see Table 3-11). 
  Explanation Score (%) 
  0 1 2 3+ Total 
Time of Testing      
Baseline 5 (3%) 136 (89%) 7 (5%) 4 (3%) 153 
Post Information 3 (2%) 122 (78%) 18 (11%) 14 (9%) 157 
Post Intervention 87 (56%)  36 (23%) 14 (9%)   19 (12%) 156 
      
Source Reliability (Post 
Information, N=157) 
     
High Reliability 1 (2%) 36 (65%) 9 (16%) 9 (16%) 55 
Low Reliability 2 (4%) 42 (79%) 4 (8%) 5 (8%) 53 
No Information 0 (0%) 44 (90%) 5 (10%) 0 (0%) 49 
 χ2(6)=13.64, p<.05  
 
3.6.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSES FOR WEIGHT EXPLANATION 
3.6.1.1 SOURCE RELIABILITY 
At baseline, before participants received information regarding the causal system 
from differentially reliable sources, there was no relationship between source 
reliability and participants who made correct explanations regarding weight and 
those that did not (see Table 3-12). 
After hearing new information regarding the causal system, participants who heard 
new information from a high reliability source were more likely than expected to 
make a correct explanation (33%), compared with participants who were heard 
new information from a low reliability source (17%), or participants who heard no 
new information (10%), χ2(2) = 8.67, p<.05 (see Table 3-12).  
Table 3-11  Quality of explanations at each time point and for each source reliability 
condition, after hearing that weight does not affect distance travelled. 
 120 
After participants intervened on the causal system, and witnessed that weight did 
not affect how far the car travelled, source reliability again was not related 
significantly to correctness of participants’ explanations (see Table 3-12).  
3.6.1.2 DEGREE OF CONVICTION 
After the ‘receiving information’ stage (post information) participants who made 
correct explanations had on average higher scores for degree of conviction about 
explanations than participants who did not make correct explanations, t(158) = 
3.29, p<.01.  However, there was no significant difference between conviction scores 
as they related to correctness of explanation at baseline or after participants had 
witnessed for themselves that weight did not affect how far the car travelled (see 
Table 3-13).  
3.6.1.3 PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
AGE 
Correctness of explanations was not related to age, at any time point (see Table 
3-13).  
GENDER 
There was no relationship between gender and making a correct explanation at 
baseline. However, a greater proportion of boys made correct explanations after 
hearing that weight does not affect distance travelled, compared with girls, 
χ2(1)=4.14, p<.05. This relationship was not evident after witnessing that weight 
did not affect distance travelled, where the proportion of participants who made 
correct explanations was similar by gender (see Table 3-12). 
LANGUAGE 
As with weight prediction, making a correct explanation was not related to the BPVS 
score at any time point (see Table 3-13).  
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    Baseline   Post Information   Post Intervention 
Factor N 
Correct 
Explanation (%) 
Odds Ratio  
(95% C.I.) 
N 
Correct 
Explanation (%) 
Odds Ratio  
(95% C.I.) 
N 
Correct 
Explanation (%) 
Odds Ratio  
(95% C.I.) 
Total 153   157   156   
Source Reliability          
High reliability Source 53 4 (6%) 0.94 (.27-3.27) 55 18 (33%) 3.06 (1.38-6.79)** 55 16 (29%) 2.03 (.93-4.43) 
Low reliability Source 53 4 (6%) 0.94 (.27-3.27) 53 9 (17%) 0.72 (.31-1.69) 53 7 (13%) 0.45 (.18-1.12) 
No Information 47 4 (9%) 1 49 5 (10%) 1 48 10 (21%) 1 
  χ2(2)=0.04, p>.05  χ2(2)=8.67, p<.05  χ2(2)=4.09, p>.05 
Gender          
Male 56 4 (7%) 0.87 (.25-2.98) 59 17 (29%) 2.24 (1.02-4.92)* 60 11 (18%) 0.76 (.34-1.70) 
Female 97 8 (8%) 1 98 15 (15%) 1 96 22 (23%) 1 
  χ2(1)=0.06, p>.05  χ2(1)=4.14, p<.05  χ2(1)=0.47, p>.05 
*P<.05,**P<.01          
 
 
 
Table 3-12  Univariate analyses of source reliability and gender (categorical factors) at each time point for making a correct weight explanation. 
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  Baseline   Post Information   Post Intervention 
Factor n Mean (S.D.) T value P   n Mean (S.D.) T value P   n Mean (S.D.) T value P 
Total 153     157     156    
Age 
              
Correct Explanation 12 12.88 (4.26) 1.23 n.s 
 32 11.47 (3.28) -0.28 n.s  33 11.33 (3.12) -0.61 n.s 
Incorrect Explanation 141 11.57 (3.48) 
   125 11.67 (3.59)    123 11.75 (3.61)   
BPVS 
              
Correct Explanation 12 99.92 (20.72) -0.18 n.s 
 32 104.03 (18.73) 1.14 n.s  33 102.12 (19.89) 0.43 n.s 
Incorrect Explanation 141 100.87 (17.35) 
   125 100.07 (17.22)    123 100.63 (17.06)   
Degree of Conviction 
              
Correct Explanation 12 10.83 (1.80) 1.73 n.s 
 32 11.06 (2.17) 3.29 p<.01  33 13.45 (1.12) 1.74 n.s 
Incorrect Explanation 141 9.77 (2.06) 
   125 9.69 (2.30)    123 12.85 (1.89)   
 
 
 
 
Table 3-13  Univariate analyses of age, BPVS, and degree of conviction (continuous factors) at each time point for making a correct  weight explanation.  
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Explanatory Variables  Baseline   Post Information   Post Intervention 
  Odds ratio (95% C.I.) P Wald   Odds ratio (95% C.I.) P Wald   Odds ratio (95% C.I.) P Wald 
High Reliability 0.78 (.18-3.41) n.s. 0.11  4.70 (1.51-14.59) p<.01 7.17  1.46 (.58-3.66) n.s. 0.65 
Low Reliability 0.94 (0.22-4.05) n.s. 0.01  2.40 (.71-8.12) n.s. 1.98  0.55 (.19-1.59) n.s. 1.22 
Degree of Conviction 1.34 (.96-1.87) n.s. 2.93  1.38 (1.12-1.70) p<.01 8.81  1.30 (.96-1.76) n.s. 2.79 
Gender Not in model    2.64 (1.11-6.24) p<.05 4.85  Not in model   
 χ2(3)=0.11, p>.05    χ2(3)=13.64, p<.01    χ2(3)=7.61, p>.05   
 
 
Table 3-14  Results of a logistic regression to predict a correct explanation regarding the effect of weight on distance travelled. 
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3.6.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF CORRECT EXPLANATION REGARDING THE EFFECT OF 
WEIGHT 
At baseline, the included predictors - the high and low reliability variables, as well 
as degree of conviction did not function as significant predictors of a correct 
explanation, χ2(3) = 0.11, p>.05 (See Table 3-14). 
After participants heard new information, the prediction accuracy of the model was 
80%, χ2(3) = 13.64, p<.01. Participants who heard new information regarding the 
effect of weight from a high reliability source were 4.7 times more likely to make a 
correct explanation, compared with hearing no new information. Hearing 
information from a low reliability source was not an independent predictor of 
correctness. Gender was also related to the likelihood of making a correct 
explanation, whereby males were 2.64 times more likely to make a correct 
prediction, compared with females. The degree of conviction in their response also 
remained significantly related to making a correct explanation, where more 
conviction was associated with a greater likelihood of making a correct explanation 
(OR = 1.38; see Table 3-14). 
After participants had witnessed that weight did not affect distance travelled, the 
model was not significant in relation to making a correct explanation, χ2(3) = 7.61, 
p>.05. 
3.7 CAUSAL VARIABLE PREDICTION 
CORRECT PREDICTIONS 
At baseline, nearly all participants made correct predictions for the effect of the 
height of the incline (99%), and most made correct predictions about the relevance 
of the starting point on the incline (88%), and surface friction of the incline (86%). 
This pattern remained similar after participants had received new information 
regarding weight (post information; height – 98%; starting point – 91%; surface 
friction 88%). However, after witnessing that weight did not affect how far the car 
travelled (post intervention), the proportion of correct predictions decreased for 
height (89%), starting point (83%), and surface friction (68%; see Table 3-15).  
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INCORRECT PREDICTIONS (NO EFFECT) 
At baseline, no participants predicted that there was no effect of height of the incline 
on distance travelled (0%), where the prediction difference was 0. The proportion 
increased for starting point (8%), and more so for surface friction (11%). This 
pattern was similar post information (height –1%; starting point – 5%; surface 
friction - 11%). However, post intervention, the number of participants who 
predicted no effect increased for all three variables (height – 10%; starting point – 
14%; surface friction - 31%; see Table 3-15). 
INCORRECT PREDICTIONS (WRONG DIRECTION) 
Relatively few participants made prediction errors in the wrong direction, by 
predicting that a car on the lower set up for a particular causal variable would travel 
further than the car on the higher set up, with little difference across time points  
(height – 1%; starting point – 3-4%; surface friction – 1-3%; see Table 3-15).  
In total, only 9% of participants made causal variable predictions in the wrong 
direction. For each causal variable, participants could make a prediction error at 
each of the three time points, for a total of three possible errors. Participants ranged 
from making predictions in the wrong direction once, to making errors at all three 
time points (see Table 3-16).  
There was little difference between age groups (7-12%). The majority of errors 
related to starting point on the incline, where 80% of the participants who made 
errors made them regarding starting point, 33% for surface friction and 12% for 
height of incline. Three participants made prediction errors regarding two causal 
variables, and no participants made such errors for all three variables (see Table 
3-16).  
As the number of participants who incorrectly predicted no effect, was much higher 
than for participants who made prediction errors in the wrong direction, the two 
types of prediction errors were collapsed for analyses, whereby number of correct 
and incorrect predictions were compared.  
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  Baseline   Post Information   Post Intervention 
Factor N(%) Mean (S.D.)   N(%) Mean (S.D.)   N(%) Mean (S.D.) 
All Cases 160        
         
Height of Incline         
Correct Prediction (steeper further) 158 (99%) 2.36 (.78)  156 (98%) 2.15 (.85)  142 (89%) 1.89 (.73) 
Incorrect Prediction (no effect) 0 (0%) 0  2 (1%) 0  16 (10%) 0 
Incorrect Prediction (flatter further) 2 (1%) -2.00 (0)  2 (1%) -2.00 (1.41)  2 (1%) -1.50 (.71) 
Incorrect Prediction Total 2 (1%)   4 (2%)   18 (11%)  
 
        
Starting Point on Incline         
Correct Prediction (higher further) 141 (88%) 1.82 (.71)  146 (91%) 1.84 (.67)  133 (83%) 1.64 (.63) 
Incorrect Prediction (no effect) 12 (8%) 0  8 (5%) 0  22 (14%) 0 
Incorrect Prediction (lower further) 7 (4%) -1.86 (1.21)  6 (4%) -1.83 (.41)  5 (3%) -1.00 (0) 
Incorrect Prediction Total 19 (12%)   14 (9%)   27 (17%)  
 
        
Surface Friction of Incline         
Correct Prediction (smoother further) 137 (86%) 1.66 (.65)  141 (88%) 1.62 (.69)  108 (68%) 1.56 (.60) 
Incorrect Prediction (no effect) 18 (11%) 0  18 (11%) 0  49 (31%) 0 
Incorrect Prediction (rougher further) 5 (3%) -1.00 (0)  1 (1%) -2  3 (2%) -1.00 (0) 
Incorrect Prediction Total 23 (14%)   19 (12%)   52 (33%)  
Table 3-15  Number and percentage of participants making correct and incorrect predictions (no effect and wrong direction), and mean difference (S.D.) 
between high and low set up predictions at each time of testing. 
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    No. of 
Predictions 
in Wrong 
Direction 
(%) 
  Causal Variables 
  N School Starting Point Height Surface Friction 
All Cases 160 15 (9%)     
       
Age Group       
6-7 years 33 4 (12%) A 1/3 0 0 
   B 3/3 0 0 
   B 2/3 0 0 
   B 1/3 0 0 
8-9 Years 25 2 (8%) A 1/3 0 0 
   B 0 0 2/3 
10-11 Years 26 3 (12%) B 3/3 2/3 0 
   B 0 0 1/3 
   B 2/3 0 1/3 
12-13 Years 18 2 (11%) C 1/3 0 0 
   D 0 0 2/3 
14-15 Years 28 2 (7%) C 1/3 0 0 
   C 2/3 0 0 
16-17 Years 26 2 (8%) C 1/3 3/3 0 
   D 0 0 2/3 
Total (%)    12 (80%) 2 (13%) 5 (33%) 
 
3.7.1 CAUSAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS 
As observed earlier, the pattern of overall prediction errors changed across time of 
testing, whereby prediction errors remained relatively static across the first two 
time points, and increased after the third time point, most prominently for height 
(baseline – 1%; post information – 2%; post intervention – 11%) and surface friction 
(baseline – 14%; post information – 12%; post intervention – 33%). The pattern was 
less prominent for starting point (baseline – 12%; post information – 9%; post 
intervention – 17%; see Table 3-15). Given this, comparisons were made between 
baseline, and after participants had witnessed that weight did not affect distance 
travelled.  
 
Table 3-16  Age group, number and proportion of participants making incorrect predictions 
in the wrong direction. For each causal variable, there are three possible errors, one at each 
time point (number of errors/3).    
  
128 
A McNemar’s test compared the pattern of correct and incorrect predictions for each 
causal variable at baseline and after participants had witnessed that weight does not 
affect how far the car travels (post intervention).  
For height of the incline, 89% of participants made a correct prediction both at 
baseline and post intervention. A further 10 % made correct predictions at baseline 
only, whereas no participants made correct predictions post intervention only 
(p<.001; see Table 3.16).  
For starting point on the incline, 75% of participants made a correct prediction at 
baseline and post intervention. A further 13% made correct predictions at baseline 
only, and 4% made correct predictions post intervention only, (p>.05; see Table 
3.16).  
For surface friction on the incline, 62% of participants made correct predictions at 
baseline and post intervention. A further 24% made correct predictions at baseline 
only, whereas only 6% made correct predictions post intervention only (p<.001; see 
Table 3-17). 
  Height Starting Point Surface Friction 
 
   
Correct Predictions - At baseline 
and Post Intervention 
142 (89%) 120 (75%) 99 (62%) 
Correct Predictions - At baseline 
only 
16 (10%) 21 (13%) 38 (24%) 
Correct Predictions - Post 
Intervention only 
0 (0%) 6 (4%) 9 (6%) 
Incorrect Predictions – At 
baseline and post intervention 
2 (1%) 13 (8%) 14 (9%) 
P p<.001 n.s. p<.001 
 
There were more correct predictions for height than starting point or surface 
friction (at baseline: height – 99%; starting point – 88%; surface friction – 86%; post 
intervention: height – 89%; starting point – 83%; surface friction – 68%); where the 
proportion of correct predictions was greater for height at each time point. Surface 
friction saw the greatest number of prediction errors, where the number of correct 
Table 3-17  No. of correct/incorrect predictions before and after the intervention on weight, 
and reports the outcome of McNemar’s test, for each causal variable (N = 160). 
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predictions was lowest at each time point, and particularly so after the weight 
intervention (see Table 3-15).  
A McNemar’s Test was used to assess the nature of this pattern between the three 
causal variables. As the number of prediction errors increased from height with the 
fewest errors, to starting point, then surface friction, height was compared with 
starting point, and starting point with friction, at each time of testing.  
At baseline, 88% of participants made correct predictions regarding both height and 
starting point. An additional 11% of participants made correct predictions 
regarding height only, whereas only an additional 0.5% were correct regarding 
starting point (p<.001; see Table 3-18). For starting point compared with surface 
friction, 75% of participants made correct predictions regarding both variables. A 
similar proportion were correct regarding starting point only (13%) and surface 
friction only (11%; p>.05; see Table 3-18). 
This pattern held after receiving new information (post information) for height and 
starting point (both correct – 91%), where participants made correct predictions 
regarding height only more frequently compared with starting point only (height - 
7%; starting point - 0.5%; p<.01). For starting point and friction, the pattern was 
also similar (both correct – 82%), where starting point had a similar number of 
correct predictions (9%) compared with surface friction (6%; p>.05; see Table 
3-18).  
However, post intervention, the number of correct predictions overall for both 
height and starting point was 79%, and a similar proportion of participants were 
correct regarding height only (9%) and starting point only (4%; p>.05). For starting 
point and surface prediction, the number of correct predictions for both was 59%, 
where proportionally more were correct for starting point only (24%) compared 
with surface friction only (9%; see Table 3-18).  
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  Time of Testing 
  
Baseline 
(%) 
Post 
Information 
(%) 
Post Intervention 
(%) 
 
   
Correct Prediction - Height & 
Starting Point 
140 (88%) 145 (91%) 127 (79%) 
Correct Prediction - Height 
Only 
18 (11%) 11 (7%) 15 (9%) 
Correct Prediction - Starting 
Point Only 
1 (.5%) 1 (.5%) 6 (4%) 
Incorrect Prediction Height & 
Starting Point  
1 (.5%) 3 (1.5%) 12 (8%) 
P p<.001 p<.01 n.s. 
 
   
Correct Prediction - Starting 
Point & Surface Friction  
120 (75%) 131 (82%) 94 (59%) 
Correct Prediction - Starting 
Point Only 
21 (13%) 15 (9%) 39 (24%) 
Correct Prediction – Surface 
Friction Only 
17 (11%) 10 (6%) 14 (9%) 
Correct Prediction - Starting 
Point & Surface Friction  
2 (1%) 4 (3%) 13 (8%) 
P n.s. n.s. p<.001 
 
As can be seen in Table 3-15, the size of the mean difference between predictions 
for the high and low set up for each causal variable differs, where the mean 
prediction difference for height was greatest, followed by starting point, and then 
friction. A within-participant one-way ANOVA was performed on the causal variable 
prediction difference data, comparing the three causal variables. There was a 
difference at baseline, F(2, 318) = 7.34, p<.001, where the height prediction 
difference was larger than the friction prediction difference (p<.001). After the 
weight intervention, the mean prediction difference ranking of height, starting 
point, friction was the same, F(2, 318) = 18.33, p<.001, where mean prediction 
difference for height was greater than starting point (p<.001) which was greater 
than friction (p<.001).  
 
Table 3-18  Number of correct/incorrect predictions comparing height and starting point, 
and starting point and friction, at each time point, and reports the outcome of McNemar’s 
test (N = 160). 
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4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Source reliability plays a key role in judging the quality of information bearing on a 
particular issue, crucially important in both everyday life and scientific reasoning. 
Young children, adolescents and adults have all been shown to pay attention to 
source reliability. However, it has been difficult to understand whether there are 
developmental trajectories as the paradigms used to assess source reliability change 
substantially dependent on the age group that is being assessed. By studying a 
sample that spanned five to 17 years, using the same paradigm, this study aimed to 
contribute to the literature in the following ways: first, to establish whether 
participants would discriminate between differentially reliable sources when 
reasoning about a familiar causal system, and how this might change 
developmentally; second, to  compare the developmental trajectories of implicit 
(prediction) and explicit (explanation) causal understanding; and third, to 
investigate whether  gender and language are relevant in predicting  children’s 
reasoning regarding a familiar causal system when faced with unexpected 
information from differentially reliable sources.  Additional goals were to conduct 
exploratory analyses examining how participants engaged in unguided ‘play’ with 
the causal system, and seeking to discover how well the causal system was 
understood. 
4.1 IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUSAL SYSTEM (WEIGHT 
PREDICTION) 
It was predicted that participants would differentially utilise information from high 
and low reliability sources when reasoning about a familiar causal system. As 
expected, source reliability did appear to play a role in participants’ reasoning. 
Participants who received unexpected, but ‘true’ information from a high reliability 
source were more likely to make a correct prediction regarding the effect of weight 
on distance travelled than participants who received no information. Participants 
who received information from a low reliability source were no more likely to make 
correct predictions regarding weight than participants who received no 
information. This concurs with the literature looking at source reliability, which 
suggests that humans are sensitive to source reliability information and use it to 
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inform reasoning regarding every day and scientific matters (e.g. Bråten et al., 2012; 
Hahn et al., 2005; Koenig & Harris, 2005).  
4.1.1 AGE 
Contrary to expectation, age was not found to be related to making correct 
predictions regarding the effect of weight in this study, nor was it relevant when 
participants were faced with unexpected information from differentially reliable 
sources. It is possible that source reliability understanding occurs at a young age, 
and that the simplicity of the task requirements meant that there were therefore no 
age-related improvements in performance. 
However, as predicted, age was relevant once participants had witnessed that 
weight did not affect distance travelled. At this point, most participants predicted 
that there would be no effect of the car’s weight, but those who did incorrectly 
predict there would be an effect were more likely to be younger. It is possible that 
some younger children found it difficult to inhibit their strong prior beliefs 
regarding the causal system, even when faced with observational evidence that their 
prior beliefs were incorrect. Best et al. (2011) found evidence to suggest that 
performance on the three core executive functions, including inhibition, improved 
with age. Children experience significant improvements in performance in executive 
function tasks (including inhibition) over the ages of five to seven years. It might be 
that, for some of the study participants, the ability to demonstrate inhibition control 
was developing more slowly, resulting in their failing to adjust their predictions. 
There is evidence that children can revise their beliefs from as young as four to five 
years of age, as demonstrated by Macris and Sobel (2017) who found that 
participants revised their beliefs when faced with disconfirming evidence regarding 
an unfamiliar system (see also Koerber et al., 2005).  Similarly, Schulz and Gopnik 
(2004) also found evidence to suggest that four- and five-year-olds were, in 
principle, capable of overriding prior beliefs regarding causal relations (physical 
causes lead to physical effects; psychological causes lead to psychological effects). 
However, the tasks were simple, and fairly artificial in construction, involving 
participants being asked to draw on prior beliefs regarding the world, in relation to 
puppets, and other toys. They were also asked to draw on their prior beliefs to make 
judgements about an unfamiliar causal system. It is possible that prior beliefs would 
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have had more of an impact in more realistic situations, and with more familiar 
systems. Even adult experts appear to have an intuitive response that they then need 
to inhibit, when faced with problems that do not align with prior beliefs about the 
world; they just happen to be better at inhibiting intuitive responses than novices 
(Masson, Potvin, Riopel, & Foisy, 2014). As such, it would be no surprise that the 
younger children also find it difficult.  
An alternative explanation might be that some younger children did not fully 
assimilate the implications of what they had observed in this study. So rather than 
understanding the implication, but failing to inhibit an incorrect response, some 
younger participants may not have understood the implication of what they 
observed in relation to future predictions regarding the effect of the car’s weight. 
However, since very young children can observe minimal evidence of the 
functioning of an unfamiliar causal system, and demonstrate understanding of the 
causal system via prediction (e.g. Gopnik et al., 2001), it seems unlikely that they 
lack the cognitive ability required to revise their beliefs regarding a familiar causal 
system (unless constrained by prior beliefs).  
If some of the younger participants did not make appropriate predictions regarding 
weight following observing that weight does not affect distance the car travelled, 
then it is possible that they may be even less likely to override their prior beliefs 
when faced with second-hand information they have heard (“the science teacher 
told me…”). However, Fitneva (2008) found that nine-year-old participants 
preferred first-hand perceptually based evidence (information that was observed 
by the source), whereas, six-year-olds preferred cognitive sources (sources that 
claim to ‘know’ the information), and did not discriminate between first and second 
hand sources. This suggests that some six- to seven-year-olds, the age of the 
youngest group of participants, were not showing epistemic awareness regarding 
who/what would be a better source, depending on what they want to know. In the 
current study, the younger participants may not yet be ranking perceptual evidence 
above less salient types of evidence. As a result, their prior beliefs were not 
overridden by the higher ranking perceptual evidence – observing that weight does 
not affect distance travelled.  It should be noted that the task used by Fitneva (2008) 
was linguistically based, whereas this study is based on the demonstration of causal 
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understanding. It is likely that the same mechanisms are used to evaluate source 
reliability. One would expect this to be the case as it has been observed in young 
children; four-year-olds have been observed making causal predictions in similar 
ways in different domains (Schultz & Gopnik, 2004). This does not, however, explain 
the lack of an age difference with regards to source reliability. 
Another potential explanation for why age, contrary to the prediction based on 
previous research, did not appear to affect participants’ predictions regarding the 
effect of weight, in light of information from differentially reliable sources, may be 
explained by the fact that the older you get, the harder it is to let go of your prior 
beliefs (Gopnik et al., 2017). If there was an age-related effect then one would expect 
more of the older participants to adjust their predictions relating to weight when 
provided with unexpected evidence from a high reliability source, compared with 
younger participants, but this was not the case. Older participants were capable of 
overriding their prior beliefs in the face of perceptual evidence, and almost all of 
them did so, so it is not an issue with strong prior beliefs per se. It is possible that 
providing an explanation at baseline reinforced the strength of their prior beliefs. 
There is evidence to suggest that five-year-olds are more likely to prefer hypotheses 
that concur with their prior beliefs after providing an explanation, and nine- to 10-
year-olds are more likely to ignore relevant evidence following explanation of causal 
claims (Kuhn & Katz, 2009), and that explaining also leads to over generalisations in 
young adults (Williams et al., 2013).  
It may also be possible that the older participants did not find a high reliability 
source to be reliable enough, to override their prior beliefs. They may not have 
thought a physics teacher was either a suitably reliable source of information in 
general or in this specific causal system. There is some evidence to suggest that 
younger participants perceived the high reliability source as more reliable 
compared to the older participants; the two youngest age groups provided higher 
ratings of perceived reliability for the high reliability source compared with the 
older groups. There were no age differences in ratings for the low reliability source. 
Secondary school children do not always have good relationships with their 
teachers (Feldlaufer, Midgley, & Eccles, 1988), particularly children from lower SES 
environments. This can impact on their learning, particularly with children from 
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ethnic minorities (Crosnoe, Johnson, & Elder, 2004; Decker, Dona, & Christenson, 
2007), who were a substantial proportion of the population in both school C and 
school D. If the children’s evaluation focused on the teacher component of the source 
rather than the ‘physics’ component, and many secondary school children 
participating did not have positive relationships with their teachers, then they may 
have felt that teachers were not reliable in general. Teachers in both secondary 
schools commented to the researcher informally on the difficulties they faced in 
dealing with behavioural problems as part of their ongoing teacher responsibilities, 
and a number of conflicts between teachers and students were also observed during 
testing at the schools. There may not have been an age-related source reliability 
effect for that reason. 
Alternatively, it is possible that participants did not think that the physics teacher 
was a highly reliable source, regarding the causal system at hand. That is, although 
they thought teachers are generally reliable, they did not think that a physics teacher 
would have ‘expert’ knowledge compared with them. This could be because some 
participants did not recognise that ‘physics’ knowledge related to the causal system.  
It is difficult to ascertain how likely this is. A number of participants spontaneously 
commented on the apparatus, referring to physics, which suggests that at least some 
participants were aware that a physics teacher should have expert knowledge 
regarding system. However, this would only be relevant if those participants heard 
information from a high reliability source (comments outside of data collection were 
not recorded so it is not known which source reliability groups they were in). In 
school D, it was widely known that the teachers who taught physics did not have 
physics degrees (there was a poster on the wall in the science block, identifying the 
school science teachers, that included information regarding their university 
education). On being asked why his reliability score for the physics teacher was so 
low, one participants from school D derided the knowledge of his physics teacher, 
who had, according to the participants, made an error in his most recent physics 
class.  
An alternative conception is that some of the older participants may have sought to 
intuit what was going on in the study. They may have recognised that being told this 
information (in general) was somehow relevant to the outcome of the study, and 
  
136 
adjusted their predictions as a result of that. Landrum et al. (2015) suggested that 
learning from other people requires integration of reasoning about the informant’s 
psychological properties, and the implications of the information at hand. The fact 
that the participants only received information from either a high or low reliability 
source meant that understanding the goal (looking for source reliability related 
differences) may not have been accessible to the participants. However, they may 
have wondered if there was a ‘trick’ that they needed to avoid, and tried to provide 
predictions that avoided falling for the trick. Recruitment in school C was provided 
via a psychology teacher and many of the older participants were studying for 
psychology A-level. They may have been aware that psychology experiments 
frequently seek to conceal the purpose of the experiment. This type of metacognition 
may have led participants to provide predictions that were not related to source 
reliability, or related to it in unexpected ways. There is some evidence that knowing 
about methods for understanding human behaviour in psychology experiments 
alters responses in future testing. Silverman, Shulman, and Wiesenthal (1970) found 
that, when participating in a deception study and then debriefed regarding the 
deception, undergraduates differed from participants who participated in an 
experiment without deception and debriefing. In this case, they found that deception 
increased the tendency for favourable self-presentation, and compliance with 
demand characteristics. In another study of the effects demand characteristics 
might have on participants’ behaviour, Nichols and Maner (2008) found that when 
undergraduate participants knew the experimental focus, there was an increased 
demand characteristic effect. This tendency to confirm the ‘hypothesis’ was 
increased for those with positive attitudes to the experiment/experimenter. In a 
review regarding the costs of deception in psychology experiments, Ortmann and 
Hertwig (2002) concluded that experience with deception had the potential to alter 
experimental performance, and also to generate suspicion and second guessing 
when participating in later experiments. While participants were asked not to 
discuss the experiment with their participating peers, some of them might have 
shared information, which may have impacted on their responding. Taylor and 
Shepperd (1996) found that participants would often communicate with each other 
when left alone, even when asked not to, and would then not report this to the 
experimenter. While this may not be an issue for many experiments, where 
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participants do not have social relationships, this is not the case in schools. 
Particularly in secondary school, small groups of friends would volunteer to 
participate, and those that had participated may have discussed their experience 
with those that did not.  
In conclusion, there was, as predicted, an effect of source reliability, suggesting that 
source reliability is associated with participants’ understanding of the causal 
system. However, there did not appear to be any age-related effects. This could mean 
that younger participants show epistemic awareness regarding what sources know, 
and how that relates to the causal system at hand. However, some younger 
participants did show evidence that they may not have understood the implications 
of the unexpected information they had heard regarding the causal system, and/or 
not be able to override their prior beliefs, given they ignored the observational 
evidence. This failure to incorporate relevant evidence into reasoning regarding a 
causal system suggests that age-related differences do exist. An alternative view is 
that older participants were not more likely to discriminate between the 
differentially reliable sources, because they were unable to override their prior 
beliefs regarding the system, or because of possible prejudices about teachers being 
knowledgeable. The high reliability source was not ‘reliable’ enough, which 
inhibited any age advantage there might have been.  
4.1.2 LANGUAGE 
Receptive vocabulary measured by the BPVS scale was, contrary to expectation, not 
associated with the likelihood of making correct predictions regarding weight. This 
was despite the fact that the measure used is known to correlate positively with 
other vocabulary tests, and with individual intelligence tests (Robertson & 
Eisenberg, 1981). There are a number of potential explanations for this: first, that 
receptive vocabulary, and potentially language ability, do not affect performance in 
this task; second, that either the task used to measure receptive vocabulary, or 
receptive vocabulary itself, were not adequate measures of the elements of language 
ability that would be associated with making correct predictions; and third, that the 
assessment used did not appropriately measure vocabulary across all the age 
groups.  
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With regard to the first issue, it is possible that the simple nature of the task, 
providing a prediction regarding how far you think the car will travel, based on 
intuition, is such that superior language ability is not necessary to perform it 
appropriately. The work of Gopnik and colleagues examining children’s 
understanding of unfamiliar causal systems found that children were capable of 
making correct predictions regarding causal outcomes, even as young as two years 
of age (Gopnik et al., 2001). However, an improvement in performance with age was 
also not found, and it is possible that similar types of explanations could be found 
for why there was no benefit for language ability. 
As to the question of whether receptive vocabulary was an appropriate measure as 
an indicator of language ability, Bryant et al. (2017) found that both reading 
comprehension and vocabulary explained a substantial amount of the relationship 
between SES and science attainment. Vocabulary is also a strong predictor of 
reading comprehension skills (e.g. Lervåg & Aukrust, 2010). It seems unlikely that 
the requirement of receiving and understanding verbal information is not impacted 
by language ability.  
This leads to the third issue, that the assessment used did not appropriately measure 
vocabulary across all the age groups. There was a negative relationship between age 
and BPVS score, where, as the participants got older, the BPVS scores decreased. 
This is likely to be an artefact of bias in the school populations, with the secondary 
schools having more students from a lower SES environment, compared with the 
primary schools. Students from lower SES environments tend to perform less well 
in many aspects of attainment and in language or IQ tests (Bryant et al., 2017). 
Added to this, the secondary schools also have a higher proportion of students for 
whom English was a second language (school C – 49%, school D – 60%), in 
comparison with the primary schools (school A – 41%, school B – 36%).  It is likely 
that having English as a second language impacted negatively on the vocabulary test, 
such that it did not give an appropriate measure of ‘language ability’. Mahon and 
Crutchley (2006) found that monolingual children had higher BPVS scores than 
those with English as a second language. Melby-Lervåg and Lervåg (2014) 
conducted a meta-analysis looking at language comprehension in monolingual and 
English as a second language learners. They found a large deficit in language 
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comprehension, as well as a medium-size deficit in reading comprehension. The 
largest group differences in relation to language comprehension were studies with 
samples from low SES backgrounds, and where the first language was only used at 
home. Together, this suggests that the secondary school and primary school sample 
differed on characteristics that could add systematic variance into the data, such 
that differences, or lack thereof, could be explained by differences in the two 
samples. This problem could explain the lack of an effect of language ability (as 
measured by the BPVS scale), as well as the lack of an effect of age. 
In conclusion, whilst there appears to be no relationship between language ability 
and making correct predictions, it is possible that there are systematic differences 
between the primary school and secondary school samples, which may explain the 
lack of relationship. 
4.1.3 DEGREE OF CONVICTION 
According to the predictions, the univariate analyses showed that participants who 
made correct predictions were more likely to provide higher ratings of conviction, 
compared with participants who made incorrect predictions after hearing 
unexpected information regarding the causal system. Participants who received 
information from the high reliability source appeared to be driving this effect. This 
is in keeping with what has been found in studies involving adults (e.g. Hahn et al., 
2009; Hahn et al., 2005), which found that adults rated arguments from higher 
reliability sources as being more convincing compared with arguments from lower 
reliability sources. There was also, as expected, an effect of degree of conviction after 
participants had observed that the unexpected information was ‘correct’. In this 
case, it appeared to be the low reliability source and no information groups who 
were driving the effect. This may be because participants feel more conviction 
making a prediction that concurs with what they have observed, than one that does 
not. The difference was not observed for the high reliability source group, although 
it was expected that a difference would be evident. Furthermore, of the participants 
who made incorrect predictions in all three groups combined, 56% were in the 
youngest age group. As was discussed previously, it was not clear that the younger 
participants were able to inhibit their prior beliefs, or fully understood the causal 
system, and this may have influenced their ratings. However, the number of 
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participants who made incorrect predictions after they had witnessed that weight 
does not affect distance travelled, was fairly small in all three groups, so these 
results must be regarded with caution. 
In addition, due to the small sample and relatively small number of participants who 
made correct predictions, it was not possible to do a multivariate analysis including 
the source reliability by correctness of prediction interaction term. As such, it was 
not possible to demonstrate that source reliability by correctness was 
independently associated with making a correct prediction once the other factors 
have been taken into account.  
In conclusion, as expected and similarly to the adult literature, this study found 
preliminary evidence to suggest that participants show a higher degree of 
conviction in their correct predictions when they concur with information that 
comes from a high reliability source, in comparison with participants who make 
incorrect predictions that disagree with information from the same source. Even 
though these participants disregard the relevant information, it did appear to have 
impacted on their beliefs regarding the system, if only to decrease their certainty 
regarding how the system works. 
 
4.2 EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUSAL SYSTEM (WEIGHT 
EXPLANATION) 
As predicted, source reliability was relevant in participants’ explanations regarding 
familiar causal systems. Participants who received relevant information from a high 
reliability source were more likely to incorporate that information into their 
explanation, compared with participants who received no information. Participants 
who received information from low reliability sources did not do this. This 
suggested that participants were able to demonstrate epistemic awareness 
regarding what a source might know, and utilise that information in an explicit way, 
by providing a correct explanation regarding what has occurred. 
After participants had witnessed that the weight of the car had no effect on distance 
travelled, contrary to what was predicted, there was no advantage to hearing 
  
141 
relevant information (from either source). This is unexpected given that there is 
evidence to suggest hearing relevant information from an adult (in this case a 
parent) aids understanding in scientific reasoning, particularly when participants 
also observed the correctness of the explanation (Philips & Tolmie, 2007). It is 
possible that the limited information the children received in this study precluded 
the learning that occurred in Philips and Tolmie (2007), or that the information 
exchange between the parent and child is privileged in some way.  
However, one methodological problem with the weight explanation data was that, 
when children had just observed that weight did not affect how far the car travelled, 
they commonly responded to the request for an explanation with “because I just saw 
it” or words to that effect. This response was quite resistant to change, and led to 
children having poorer explanation scores after witnessing that weight did not affect 
how far the car travelled (when one would expect the explanations to be better). 
This may provide a reason why the number of correct explanations barely increased 
after observing that weight did not affect distance travelled (9% versus 12%), as 
well as why no differences were observed between source reliability and no 
information groups as predicted. It is not possible to know whether participants 
who provided a “because I just saw it” response were, in principle, capable of 
generating a correct explanation. However, it seems likely that at least some of the 
participants would be able to do it, especially the older ones. 
This issue clouds understanding of one of the main difference between participants’ 
predictions and explanations regarding the effect of weight. This is because the 
majority of participants made correct predictions after observing that weight did 
not affect distance travelled. However, this was not the case for explanations. One 
might expect differences between performance making predictions, which could 
demonstrate implicit understanding, and performance making explanations, which 
could demonstrate explicit understanding. For example, the participants who 
received no relevant information regarding the effect of weight might easily be able 
to generate correct predictions after observing that weight did not affect distance 
travelled. However, generating a correct explanation regarding a causal system, one 
that directly contravenes their prior beliefs, may be more difficult if they have not 
been provided with information that could structure their explanation. The only 
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indication that this might be the case was the fact that none of the participants in the 
‘no information’ group provided a correct explanation, although some did provide 
ambiguous explanations. 
In summary, as predicted, there was an effect of source reliability, whereby 
participants who received information from a high reliability source were more 
likely to incorporate that information into their explanations regarding the effect of 
weight. However, there was no advantage to hearing relevant information regarding 
the effect of weight on explanations, after participants had observed that weight did 
not affect distance travelled. It is likely that this lack of an advantage is due to a 
methodological issue, whereby many participants resorted to providing an 
explanation by reporting that they have just observed that weight did not affect 
distance travelled. The fact that the large majority of participants did not provide 
correct explanations was the main difference between performance regarding 
prediction, and explanation. Although resorting to an easier type of explanation may 
indicate that participants found generating explanations harder than generating 
predictions, that conclusion cannot be drawn at this point. 
4.2.1 AGE 
Contrary to expectation, age was not relevant to the quality of explanations, since 
explanations were not better for older participants. This was unexpected given that 
(in a homogeneous sample) language ability improves with age, and explanation 
relies on fundamental language skills. However, there was also no effect of age for 
prediction. In particular, if some older participants were either unable to override 
their prior beliefs, or did not find the high reliability source reliable enough, then 
they would not be expected to make correct explanations regarding the effect of 
weight either. If that was the case, then any advantage of age would not be observed 
as they would have continued to provide incorrect explanations. Although these 
‘incorrect’ explanations may be better than the ‘incorrect’ explanations of the 
younger participants, that was not the question of interest.  
Furthermore, as discussed in section 4.1.2, there were more participants with 
English as a second language in the older age groups, which is known to affect 
language ability (e.g. Melby-Lervåg and Lervåg, 2014). Given that explanation relies 
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on fundamental language skills and knowledge of English, it is possible that the 
larger number of participants with English as a second language contributed to the 
lack of age-related relationship on correctness of explanations, by negatively 
impacting on performance in the older participants to a greater extent.  
Given that the only age-related differences observed with regards to the prediction 
data were following observation that weight did not affect distance travelled, it 
might be expected to see a similar difference here. However, this lack of difference 
may relate back to the default explanation of many participants, “because I just saw 
it”. This response may have been used by participants because they were not sure 
how to provide a correct response, given evidence that prior beliefs were not ‘true’. 
If that was the case, then any age-related differences may be masked due to the low 
correct explanation rate that resulted.  
Another issue may be that the provision of an explanation for their original beliefs 
regarding weight increased the chances of many participants ignoring relevance 
evidence, resulting in fewer correct explanations (Kuhn & Katz, 2009; Williams et 
al., 2013). Here, providing an explanation before being given the new evidence (at 
baseline) may have decreased the attention paid to the new information, at least by 
some participants. Participants in Kuhn and Katz’s (2009) study repeatedly 
provided explanations, directly followed by a prediction task, over a number of time 
periods. That study might provide evidence for an argument to suggest that the 
provision of an explanation after hearing unexpected information may impact on the 
explanation directly following observing that weight does not affect distance 
travelled. This is because these events occurred during a single session. This was not 
the case for participants who provided an explanation in the first session with a 
delay before the second session.  There was usually a delay of at least a few days 
between provision of the first explanation regarding the effect of weight at baseline 
and receiving the information which occurred at the beginning of the second session 
for the primary school participants (and often more, as their availability was 
determined by the school). However, testing in secondary school was different in 
that it did not take place during class time, so testing sessions were frequently closer 
together. This was done to ensure that participants completed both sessions 
(secondary school participants were required to remember their testing 
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appointments, so keeping them closer together increased full participation). Given 
the shorter period between providing an explanation at baseline, it is possible that 
the effect of explanations increasing prior beliefs may have been stronger in the 
older participants, and this may have resulted in a lack of age differences. 
Another potential issue that may have influenced age-related differences was that 
the explanations provided may not have reflected the younger participants’ true 
ability to provide explanations. They could merely have reflected the fact that the 
participants in the source reliability conditions were given the correct explanation 
“weight does not make a difference to how far the car travels”, which they then 
utilised. As stated earlier, all the participants who made correct explanations were 
from the high and low reliability groups. That is, they had already heard the 
explanation when asked to generate an explanation for an outcome that directly 
contravened their prior beliefs. Furthermore, their explanations frequently involved 
“it doesn’t make a difference…”, which directly reflected the language used in 
providing the relevant information. This supports the idea that the information 
provided facilitated their explanation. Philips and Tolmie (2007) found that 
participants provided better explanations with parental support, when learning 
about a science problem. Fang and Wei (2010) found an improvement in scientific 
reasoning for participants who received a home science reading program, as well as 
in school instruction. Whilst it was not possible to identify the direct impact of the 
home science reading intervention, the authors concluded it also benefitted 
scientific reasoning (see also Gerber et al., 2001; Leichtman et al., 2017). Some 
evidence to support the theory that many of the weight explanations involved 
participants simply repeating the source information is that only older participants 
provided correct explanations at baseline. Furthermore, the majority of participants 
who provided higher scoring explanations came from secondary school. Although 
there were too few correct explanations to do in-depth analyses, this suggests that 
there may be age-related differences in the quality of explanations provided, as has 
been found in earlier literature (Lombrozo, 2006).  
In summary, there were no age-related differences in explanations. This was 
unexpected given that generally language ability improves with age. However, 
similarly to the findings regarding prediction, the small number of participants 
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providing correct explanations, coupled with a relatively small sample, made it 
difficult to draw strong conclusions in this case.  
4.2.2 LANGUAGE 
Contrary to expectation, no significant relationship was found between receptive 
vocabulary and the correctness of explanations. This was the case even though 
generating explanations relies on fundamental language skills (Norris & Phillips, 
2002), in a way that generating predictions does not. Support for this has been 
provided in previous research, where children are first observed providing 
predictions regarding causal relations at a younger age, compared with providing 
explanations. Children as young as two years of age have been observed predicting 
outcomes regarding unfamiliar causal systems (Gopnik et al., 2001), whereas similar 
research looking at the role of explanation begins with children aged five years old.  
However, as discussed previously (section 4.1.2), there may be an issue with the 
assessment used to collect information regarding participants’ receptive 
vocabularies in this study. That is, compared to the primary schools, the secondary 
schools involved in the study had a higher percentage of students who came from 
lower SES environments, and a higher percentage of students with English as a 
second language. Both these factors can have a negative effect on participants’ 
scores on measures of receptive vocabulary (Bryant et al., 2017; Melby-Lervåg & 
Lervåg, 2014). This may then impact on any relationship there might be between 
language ability and provision of a correct explanation, whereby younger 
participants had higher receptive vocabulary scores and older participants had 
lower receptive vocabulary scores on average, resulting in no relationship between 
receptive vocabulary score and correctness of explanation 
Another potential issue is that there were too few correct explanations provided by 
participants of any age for any relationship to be observed. This led to the 
development of a binary outcome measure, where participants were deemed to 
have made either a ‘correct’ or an ‘incorrect’ explanation. However, the degree of 
variation in responses was lost by coding the data in this way. If the relationship 
between language and explanation performance was small, it may not be observable 
when using a binary outcome measure. Any small advantage provided by superior 
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language ability offered to explanation provision is likely to have been lost when all 
correct responses were grouped together. 
In summary, although language ability, as measured by receptive vocabulary, was 
not related to performance providing correct explanations, it is possible that this is 
explained by differences in the sample, and/or type of language measure used. 
4.2.3 DEGREE OF CONVICTION 
As predicted, after they had heard relevant information regarding the familiar causal 
system, participants reporting a higher degree of conviction in their predictions 
were more likely to have made a correct explanation compared with participants 
who had a lower degree of conviction. Contrary to what was found with the 
prediction data, this was not the case after they had observed that weight does not 
affect distance travelled. However, as discussed previously, this result cannot be 
regarded as a true representation of the participants’ abilities to generate correct 
explanations, as many gave a ‘because I just saw it’ type of explanation. As such, 
many participants included in the incorrect explanation group may have been 
confident in their prediction, thereby providing a higher degree of conviction 
ratings. This could result in a smaller difference between degree of conviction for 
those who provided correct and incorrect explanations. 
However, contrary to what was predicted, there was no effect of source reliability 
on the degree of conviction data, in contrast to what was found with the data on 
prediction. Participants in the high reliability group did not provide higher ratings 
of degree of conviction if they provided a correct explanation, compared with if they 
provided an incorrect explanation. It should be noted that the rating was provided 
regarding participants’ predictions, not their explanations. This corresponds with 
the literature on source reliability understanding, where participants are usually 
asked to show preferences rather than provide explanations (e.g. Birch et al., 2008; 
Koenig et al., 2004; Jaswal & Neely, 2006). However, in contrast to this, studies 
looking at source reliability understanding in adults frequently asked adults to 
evaluate the strength of explanation type arguments (e.g. Hahn et al., 2005; Hahn et 
al., 2009). It may have been that the factors involved in evaluating the accuracy of a 
prediction may be less complicated than those involved in evaluating the 
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appropriateness of an explanation. For example, for prediction it is necessary to 
decide where the car will land, based on prior beliefs, and any new relevant 
information that has been provided (in this case from differentially reliable sources) 
that the participant has to decide whether to believe. For the explanation, there are 
other factors involved, such as language ability (Norris & Phillips, 2002), specifically 
as it relates to generating explanations. It is possible that some participants were 
capable of generating correct predictions in concordance with evidence from high 
reliability sources, but not correct explanations. As such their high degree of 
conviction ratings would be included in the incorrect explanation group, thereby 
decreasing the difference between participants who made a correct and incorrect 
explanation in the high reliability source group. There is only a small difference 
between number of participants who provided correct predictions versus 
explanations in the high reliability source group, but it may be enough to remove 
the effect given the small sample size. 
In summary, although participants who provided a correct explanation had higher 
degree of conviction ratings, contrary to the literature there was no effect of source 
reliability by degree of conviction on correct explanations. However, given 
providing correct explanations appears to be more difficult than providing correct 
predictions, it is possible that degree of conviction ratings does not map directly 
onto correct versus incorrect explanations. 
4.3 GENDER 
As expected, there was an effect of gender with boys more likely to provide both 
correct predictions and explanations regarding weight after receiving information 
from differentially reliable sources. This concurs with the previous literature which 
finds that males are more likely to perform more highly in science at school (Curran 
& Kellogg, 2016; Nunes et al., 2017; Quinn & Cooc, 2015). The current study was, 
however, unbalanced in terms of gender, which may have affected the outcome. 
There were more females (62%) than males overall, but this difference was 
complicated by the fact that the gender imbalance differed by age; the primary 
school sample had a slightly higher proportion of males while the secondary school 
sample had a substantially higher proportion of females. So it is possible that the 
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gender differences observed here could be explained by age-related differences in 
attitudes toward source reliability in males versus females. That is, the oldest 
participants, more of whom were female, were more likely to disregard information 
that does not concur with their prior beliefs. However, younger participants were 
less likely to disregard information that did not concur with their prior beliefs. This 
could result in the finding that males showed better performance with regards to 
prediction compared with females overall. Another alternative is that the older 
participants, more of whom were female, were also more likely to come from lower 
SES environments, found in previous research to be associated with lower 
attainment in science at school (Nunes et al., 2017). The fact that the males also had 
higher average BPVS scores may provide some additional support for this as 
language ability is related to SES (Nunes et al., 2017).  As such it is difficult to 
conclude that the gender differences observed here represent typical gender 
differences observed in the literature.  More research would be necessary, ensuring 
a sample of different ages that included the same proportion of males and females 
at each age. 
In summary, although gender differences were observed, is not clear that they are 
actual gender differences, or have been influenced by systemic differences 
contained within the sample. 
4.4 UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSAL SYSTEM  
As expected, the majority of the participants made correct predictions regarding the 
causal variables at baseline, suggesting that they understood how the causal system 
worked. They appeared to understand the effect of height better, compared with 
starting point on the incline, and surface friction of the incline. Very few participants 
made incorrect predictions, in the wrong direction, and there were no age-related 
differences. Overall this suggests that the causal system was generally well 
understood.  
However, observing that weight did not affect the distance that the car travelled was 
related to participants’ understanding of the causal variables. Although there was 
little difference between participants’ causal variable predictions at baseline and 
after hearing relevant information regarding the effect of weight, there was a 
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difference after observing that weight did not affect the distance travelled. In 
essence, many participants shifted from making correct predictions to incorrect 
predictions, by predicting that one or more of the causal variables had no effect on 
distance travelled (similarly to what they had just observed for weight). They were 
most likely to do this for friction, which makes the most sense, as surface friction 
has the least impact on distance travelled of all three variables.  
 Some participants may have held onto their beliefs that weight does, in principle 
have an effect on distance travelled, but not for this equipment. They may have 
reasoned that, if it was the case in this instance, then it was possible that it was the 
case for other variables as well, and adjusted their predictions accordingly. If this 
was true then one might expect to see an effect of source reliability, whereby hearing 
unexpected information regarding the causal system from a high reliability source 
indicated to the participant that what they had observed related only to weight, and 
not the other variables. The numbers are too small to conduct appropriate analyses 
in this case. However, this does suggest that revising beliefs can be very difficult 
when they are counter to prior beliefs. At least some participants are likely to revise 
their entire causal understanding of a particular system, rather than separating out 
variables that play a causal role and variables that do not. This suggests that those 
participants have not yet gained effective strategies for understanding causal 
relations. It is possible that their control of variable strategies would be poorer than 
participants who did not readjust all their beliefs regarding the causal system.  
In summary, participants seemed to understand the causal system, with height 
being the best understood variable. However, for many participants, observing 
counterintuitive evidence regarding one variable in the causal system, impacted on 
their understanding of the whole causal system, rather than just that variable. 
4.5 PRACTICE TRIALS 
Prior to testing, participants had the opportunity to play with the causal system. 
Some exploratory analyses were done on the data relating to the choices of trials 
they made. Younger participants were more likely to repeat trials compared with 
older participants. This contributes towards the suggestion that younger 
participants have less well developed executive function skills (Diamond, 2013), and 
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as a result may be less likely to remember which trials they have already done. They 
may also want reassurance by repeating a trial rather than trying a different 
strategy. 
Use of extreme set up trials, where participants sought to discover the furthest and 
least distance a car could travel, could give information regarding how the causal 
system worked. Many participants tried to gain this type of information, with 
differences based on both gender and receptive vocabulary score. However, as the 
males in this sample had higher receptive vocabulary scores on average, it is difficult 
to speculate which of these variables might have been influencing their use of 
extreme set up trials. It is possible that males have more experience using toy cars 
on inclines in play from a young age (Todd, Barry, & Thommessen, 2017), during 
which finding how far a car can travel is a common pastime, and so they engaged in 
similar activities here. This is in contrast to females who are likely to have played 
fewer such games, and therefore may have fewer preconceived ideas regarding 
‘play’. Alternatively, if the BPVS score is seen as a marker for intelligence (Robertson 
& Eisenberg, 1981), then one might interpret the difference as engaging in 
information finding regarding the causal system, where intelligence is a predictor of 
better scientific reasoning.  
Although some participants engaged in spontaneous control of variable type trials, 
there did not appear to be a relationship between this and age, receptive vocabulary 
or gender. Cook et al. (2011) found that, while four-year-olds did engage in 
spontaneous testing of variables, they did so only when faced with ambiguous 
evidence. When faced with unambiguous evidence, they played indiscriminately. In 
this case, it is possible that, for some participants, prior beliefs were functioning as 
unambiguous evidence regarding how the causal system works, and so did not feel 
the need to test the system. The lack of age differences could reflect the 
strengthening of prior beliefs over time (Gopnik et al., 2017). 
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4.6 LIMITATIONS  
4.6.1 SAMPLE 
4.6.1.1 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
Receptive vocabulary was the only measure of individual difference collected in this 
study. One reason why this particular measure was chosen was it could be delivered 
relatively quickly compared with other measures of language ability, since 
constraining the length of time testing took was an issue. However, individual 
differences such as IQ, reading comprehension, and scientific reasoning ability are 
known to be related to science attainment; it has been reported that around 40% of 
the variance in scientific attainment can be explained by IQ, reading comprehension, 
and scientific reasoning ability (Nunes et al., 2017). Nunes et al. (2017) concluded 
that the relevance of SES for students’ science attainment was largely dependent on 
differences in reading comprehension and scientific reasoning. They also pointed 
out that much of the research looking at the role of language ability and success in 
learning science does not take into account IQ, making it difficult to draw 
conclusions relating to cause and effect. As such, it is likely that some of the variance 
between participants who did or did not change their predictions and explanations 
in light of the new information might be further explained by these factors. Also, as 
the study did not have access to measures of attainment in science, it was not 
possible to compare our participants’ performance in our task with their science 
attainment. One would predict that there would be a relationship between the two, 
and it would be important to look for relationships between the two variables in any 
future study. 
Furthermore, information regarding individual SES was not available so could not 
be included in the analyses. Given the extensive evidence that there is a relationship 
between SES and science attainment, it is likely that there would be one here also. 
Having this information would have strengthened the study since the students came 
from schools with pupils from a range of SES backgrounds. As such, any future 
research should seek to provide a measure of individual SES. 
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4.6.1.2 SCHOOL DIFFERENCES 
There were a number of differences between the schools that participated in this 
study which are important to highlight. This is because these differences may 
indicate that the results related to age in particular, and possibly also gender, need 
to be treated with caution.  Firstly, there were differences in the student population 
relating to SES. The primary schools were both popular oversubscribed church 
schools, although school A (providing around two thirds of the primary school 
participants) fully prioritised church applicants, whereas school B accepted 40% of 
children based on distance from the school. Furthermore, School A served a well-off 
middle-class area of London, whereas school B served a much more SES mixed area 
of London. This was indicated by the comparatively higher percentage of children 
on free school meals in school B compared with school A, a common indicator of 
lower SES. School B also had fewer children reaching the expected standard in 
English and maths compared with school A, which may not be surprising if SES is 
associated with cognitive achievement throughout life, where cognitive 
achievement includes IQ, language and school performance (see section 2.1.1.1and 
2.1.1.2; Nunes et al., 2017).   
However, even more students from both the secondary schools were likely to have 
come from lower SES environments compared with the primary schools. Secondary 
school C is a girl’s school (providing around three quarters of the secondary school 
participants), which accepts 75% of its students on distance and 25% on ability. It 
serves a highly multicultural area of London, indicated by the large number of 
students with English as second language. The student population is also mixed in 
terms of SES, and almost half of the children are entitled to free school dinners (see 
section 2.1.2.1). School D is a boy’s school, with girls in the sixth form and Students 
are accepted largely on distance. It has also a large number of students with English 
as a second language, and an even larger number of children entitled to free school 
dinners (see section 2.1.2.2 Table 2-4).  
Given the school catchment areas cover such a broad range of SES backgrounds, with 
a tendency towards younger children having higher SES and older children lower 
SES backgrounds, it was difficult to draw strong conclusions relating to the absence 
of age differences. This is because SES is known to affect performance in science 
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attainment (Nunes et al., 2017). For example, it is possible that there is a difference 
between how teachers are regarded as sources in higher and lower SES schools, 
where one might expect more conflict between students and teachers in a lower SES 
school. For example, SES is one of the predictors of out-of-school suspension and 
expulsion at the individual and school level (Skiba, Chung, Trachok, Baker, Sheya, & 
Hughes, 2014). If this is the case, then age-related differences might be more 
apparent if the older participants had come from higher SES backgrounds, similar 
to the majority of the younger participants.  
These issues highlight the importance of taking SES into account when investigating 
aspects of cognition that are known to be influenced by SES.  It also indicates that a 
larger sample of schools, relatively matched in terms of their intake, would have 
made the research more robust. Much of the academic literature that uses fairly 
constrained experimental design, such as the research on causal understanding, and 
scientific reasoning in younger children, avoids this problem by mainly using 
participants from middle-class or upper middle-class environments. However, this 
research only tells us how children from higher SES backgrounds, who attend 
nurseries and schools that have time and space to participate in the studies, 
perform. As the literature on the impact of SES tells us, it is often not the case for all 
children. 
Other factors that may have had an influence on the way that the participants 
thought about scientific issues include variables such as the style of science teaching, 
the general school ethos, and the school environment in terms of behaviour 
management. There were differences in teaching focus between the two primary 
schools. School A had a strong focus on science, clearly stated on the school website 
at the time of testing. In contrast, school B had a strong arts and music focus, seeking 
to embed arts-based teaching methods throughout their curriculum. This primary 
focus on the Arts might suggest less emphasis on science (for example, there was no 
mention of science on their website at the time of testing, where, in contrast, school 
A included a science curriculum). It is also possible that school B teachers come from 
an arts or music background, and feasibly may have less exposure to explicit 
scientific reasoning strategies and scientific concepts. Not all primary school 
teachers have accurate conceptions of forces and motion (e.g. Kruger, Summers, & 
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Palacio 1990; Narjaikaew, 2013), which may impede the teaching of these concepts 
in primary school science class. Furthermore, the early verbal environment children 
are exposed to at school is known to be related to literacy (Connor, Morrison, & 
Slominski, 2006). Similarly, teachers’ use of sophisticated vocabulary at five to six 
years old predicted children’s literacy performance at nine to 10 years old 
(Dickinson & Porsche, 2011).  
Although this research did not focus explicitly on scientific literacy, is possible that 
sophisticated use of scientific thinking concepts from an early age impact on the 
development of children’s scientific reasoning and understanding. Furthermore, 
informal learning environments (both in school and out) have been shown to be 
related to scientific reasoning (Gerber et al., 2001). A school that has a strong arts 
and music focus may be less inclined to generate scientific language or provide extra 
informal learning environments known to benefit children’s scientific reasoning 
skills, when compared with a school that has a strong science focus.  
Any future research would need to either seek to minimise school differences in 
relation to the question at hand, or include school as a potential explanatory variable 
by including a number of schools with different approaches to the teaching of 
science.  
4.6.2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
4.6.2.1 THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT 
One methodological issue was the variability in the space that was allocated for the 
research. Both primary schools and secondary school D had a problem with finding 
a space to set up the relatively large apparatus (school C had recently had new 
premises built, so space was not an issue for them). Secondly, schools differed in the 
extent to which they promoted the study with families.  Communication with 
parents via the children, to obtain informed consent was challenging, particularly in 
school B and D (who promoted the study less).  The consequence of this was that it 
limited the number of participants, which meant that strong conclusions regarding 
any statistical effects were less likely to be identified.  The small number of schools 
who agreed to take part precluded using school as a potential explanatory variable. 
  
155 
Although some of the schools had students from lower SES families, it was not 
possible to determine whether any particular child participating in the research had 
a lower or higher SES family background. Higher SES is known to predict greater 
parental involvement in school activities (Hoover–Dempsey, Bassler, & Brissie, 
1987), so it is possible that a greater proportion of children from higher SES families 
were volunteered by their parents. This was particularly likely in primary schools, 
where participation was potentially more parent-driven, where students were given 
information on the study to take home to their parents. The decision to participate 
would be made once the parent had received the information, and the parent could 
have played a role in their child’s decision to participate. In secondary schools, 
participation was more student driven. Teachers introduced the study to students, 
who then volunteered to participate (the younger two age groups in secondary 
school then had to get parents’ consent). This process meant that parents did not 
play such a strong a role in their child deciding to participate in secondary school, 
where that decision was student-driven (it was possible that the parent could 
dissuade their child from participating, however). Nevertheless, is was not possible 
to determine whether SES affected participation in secondary school. Parental 
involvement has been found to predict children’s participation in extra-curricular 
activities (Anderson, Funk, Elliott, & Hull Smith, 2003), and SES has been related to 
parental involvement in school activities (Hoover–Dempsey et al., 1987).  So SES 
may also have had an effect in the nature of the sample in the current study. These 
issues highlight the importance of being able to collect information about individual 
level SES in any future research.  
4.6.2.2 TEST QUESTION PHRASING 
Another methodological issue concerns the phrasing of the question regarding 
participants’ explanation for what they have observed. During this study, 
participants were asked “why do you think that?”  The goal was to get them to 
provide an explanation for what they believed regarding the effect of weight. This 
resulted in participants mostly providing explanations as expected. However, some 
participants, after having observed weight did not affect distance travelled, 
provided only a perceptually based explanation. This is not incorrect as a response 
to the question “why do you think that?” However, it does not reveal their beliefs 
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regarding the effect of weight. One potential solution to this problem would be to 
reframe the question, in order that it focuses participants’ attention more closely on 
the causal relations in the system. For example, instead of asking participants “why 
do you think that?”, with regards to their different predictions regarding weight in 
the causal variables, one could ask them “what do you think the effect of weight is?” 
This is more likely to lead them to frame their reasons based on the implications of 
the evidence they have just observed, rather than the evidence they had just 
observed. 
4.6.2.3 CORRECT VERSUS AMBIGUOUS EXPLANATIONS 
A second and related methodological issue  was that, for the purposes of conducting 
analyses and given the small number  who provided correct explanations, they were 
combined with responses from participants who provided ambiguous explanations 
(see section 2.6.4). Whilst there was some evidence to suggest that ambiguous 
explanations were attempts to provide correct explanations regarding the effect of 
weight, it was not an ideal solution. Any future research would need to make sure 
that the sample was large enough for appropriate analyses, even in the case that 
relatively few participants provided correct explanations.  
4.6.2.4 SOURCE RELIABILITY MANIPULATION 
Another potential issue was whether the source reliability manipulation was 
pertinent enough. A lack of pertinence may have been why only around a third of 
participants in the high reliability group paid attention the new information 
regarding the effect of weight, as well as minimal age-related effects. It could be that 
if the expertise of the source had been made more pertinent, then a stronger effect 
of source reliability might have been identified, particularly with older participants. 
The child research literature using the selective trust paradigm, and the adult 
research literature using the argument strength paradigm, both make the source 
reliability manipulation fairly obvious. In selective trust tasks, participants were 
required to gather information on the reliability of the sources during testing, before 
being asked to make judgements based on information provided by the sources (e.g. 
Koenig & Harris, 2005). This gave them some time to reflect on the reliability of the 
sources before being asked to participate in the test phase of the experiment. 
Furthermore, adults were often provided with booklets containing a number of 
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arguments which they are expected to rate, where source reliability, for example, is 
manipulated. There was usually not a time limit. However, in the current study 
participants were given information from differentially reliable sources and then 
almost immediately asked for a prediction and explanation regarding weight. It is 
possible that some participants might have needed time to incorporate the new 
information, adjust their beliefs, and generate new predictions or explanations. 
Howe et al. (1992) found that learning and integrating counterintuitive information 
learned in science benefits from discussion and can continue long after the learning 
event has concluded (in eight- to 12-year-olds).  
Another potential issue was that it was not always clear how much attention the 
child was paying at the time the information was delivered by the source. The 
experimenter sought to make sure the child was paying attention, asking them what 
they thought about the information afterwards, but many children responded to that 
question with “I don’t know”. This made the degree to which they had processed the 
information unclear. “I don’t know” could indicate confusion regarding the new 
information as it relates to the causal system, or indicating that they have not 
engaged with the information at all.  
One possible way forward would be to generate a visible manipulation to 
accompany the verbal one. Presenting information both visually and orally is known 
to support learning (Mayer & Anderson, 1992), and may function to make source 
reliability manipulation more pertinent, and attention-grabbing. One could for 
example have a video of a teacher in a lab coat, and a young child, both generating 
the relevant information (in a classroom context). If the failure to adjust predictions 
and explanations to reflect source reliability was related to the source, not being 
pertinent enough, then seeing such a video may emphasise the difference between 
sources much more. 
It was not possible to assess whether or how source reliability interacts with 
observational evidence regarding understanding of causal relations. This was 
because there were so few incorrect predictions following observation that weight 
did not affect distance travelled (at the third time point), that any differences 
between sources would not be observable. Addressing this question would require 
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a more complex design, making it harder to implement (and children to 
understand). In the future, one could manipulate the frequency with which the 
physical evidence concurred (e.g. always, often, sometimes, never) with the verbal 
information provided by the source. The implications of observational evidence for 
causal understanding is not always clear, and verbal information can facilitate 
learning (Philips & Tolmie, 2007). Given this, one might expect to find that source 
reliability supplements observational evidence, such that a difference is observed 
with intermediate frequencies (often, sometimes, never), where more errors are 
likely to be made. 
4.7 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In order to eliminate some of the limitations outlined in the previous section, future 
research would be more robust if conducted in direct collaboration with schools.  
The experimental procedures could be designed in collaboration with teachers so 
that the experimental paradigm would be shifted into the classroom. This would 
entail working directly with the school, and teachers, to investigate the impact of 
source reliability in classroom environments. As there was an interest in developing 
an understanding of source reliability to inform teaching and learning, the 
experimental environment should be as close as possible to the environment of 
interest.  
For example, in primary schools, students might be asked to work out the relevant 
causal variables in the causal system used in the current study (motion on an 
incline). They would be able to play with the system, and then generate a baseline 
set of predictions, by filling in a typical class worksheet. Children might then see one 
of two short videos that explained how weight does not affect how far the car travels, 
one by a younger peer, and the other a teacher (both from school). Children would 
then fill in further worksheet stating what they predict, and an explanation and, after 
that, they would be asked to assess the veracity of the statement made by either the 
teacher or the peer. Some guidance would be given as to how to do a fair test, which 
they would then be asked to do on weight, followed by further prediction and 
explanation. Such a design more closely mimics activities that normally occur in the 
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classroom, so would give us a better idea of how children reason about source 
reliability in situ. 
In secondary schools, one could take this further, as both teachers and students 
could be used as sources. A physics teacher, a non-physics teacher, student peers of 
the same age or younger/older could all be used. Students can potentially learn from 
many different sources in the school environment and it would be useful to know 
how students utilise information from these sources.  
Other variables that could be investigated include doing the procedure singularly, 
or in groups, which are known to benefit learning (Howe et al., 1992). One could 
examine the impact of cognitive abilities and academic attainment, the impact of 
teaching methods, and different schools on the relevance of source reliability. Doing 
this in direct collaboration with schools would help to solve the number of problems. 
Schools would hopefully encourage participation, which would increase the sample 
size per school. Designing the experimental procedure with teachers will increase 
the validity of the design, in that the procedure would be closer to a typical lesson. 
This is important, as if one wants to know what students do in their real-life 
environments, then the experimental procedure should mimic that as much as 
possible.  
With the collaboration of schools, it may be more likely to be able to collect 
individual demographic information, along with academic achievement and 
possibly other measures of individual difference (as long as parental consent is 
given). Ideally, one would want to use demographic information that was readily 
available to the school, though data protection issues would still need to be 
addressed. This could decrease the amount of time devoted to each student, which 
was an issue, especially in secondary school where teachers do not like students to 
miss class time. Furthermore, if one identified subcategories of students, who 
appeared not to be paying attention to appropriate sources, then one could 
implement interventions to counteract that. However, one would want to be able to 
identify these students using currently available demographic information, rather 
than using specially designed cognitive ability tests which are usually not used or 
available in schools. With school collaboration, it is likely to be easier to repeatedly 
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assess performance over multiple sessions, to assess changes in strategy and 
understanding. Given peer learning frequently occurs after time has elapsed (Howe 
et al., 1992; Howe, McWilliam, & Cross, 2010), assessment after time has passed 
would also be very important. 
Another crucial area for further investigation is to incorporate factors such as SES 
into research looking at the development of scientific reasoning. Given that the SES 
attainment gap in science is so persistent, understanding how to boost the 
attainment of poor performing students should be of the utmost importance. It is 
possible that participants from lower SES environments interact with source 
reliability differently from those in higher SES environments. For example, levels of 
expert commentary in news stories reinforce SES-based differences in political 
knowledge in adults, where a knowledge gap has been observed in this arena (Jerit, 
2009), similar to that observed in scientific attainment. Jerit (2009) found evidence 
that suggested the manner in which the media cover political issues could affect 
disparities in knowledge across SES groups. Disparity appeared to increase when 
expert commentators were employed to cover political issues. In contrast to this, 
presenting more contextual information, such as providing more information on the 
historical, social or political context of important events, decreased the political 
knowledge gap. Jerit (2009) argued that the disparity could be related to differences 
in educational opportunity. For example, those who grew up in a higher SES 
background, would be more likely to have had access to better education, and may 
find it easier to understand news articles with abstract concepts, technical subjects, 
and infrequently used words. Feelings of alienation towards reputed experts may 
pervade source reliability evaluation in lower SES adults’ everyday lives, and affect 
their judgements regarding experts and other high reliability sources, in general. 
Furthermore, if Jerit (2009) correctly ascribes the disparity to differences in 
educational opportunity, then these beliefs are likely to begin during the years of 
education, and may in part contribute towards the science attainment gap. 
One goal of science education should be to produce good scientific reasoners. 
Ideally, school leavers should have an evaluativist epistemological understanding, 
which would enable them to engage in educated decision-making. However, a recent 
report from the Confederation of British Industry (2015), suggested that science 
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education is lacking in the UK, especially in primary school.  The survey suggested 
that many primary school teachers believe that science is becoming less important, 
and give it less time in the curriculum. This is problematic, as a decrease in interest 
in teaching science effectively could lead to poorer scientific thinking-skills going 
into secondary school. There is a big jump in cognitive and academic language 
proficiency (separate from interpersonal communication skills) that is required to 
function effectively in secondary schools (Cummins, 1980). Less attention paid to 
science in primary school would increase the gap, particularly for children from 
lower SES environments, and/or homes where English is a second language.  
Furthermore, another factor that may affect the development of scientific thinking, 
is the methods of assessment. Currently in the UK, based on annual nationally 
standardised tests at specific ages, both primary and secondary schools are ranked, 
and this information is made available to the general public. This has led to the 
practice of “teaching to the test” where teachers teach their students how to pass 
the test. As pointed out by Stanovich (2011), this is particularly problematic when 
it raises test performance without affecting the underlying construct being assessed. 
This is in contrast to teaching to the test where the underlying skills taught to 
improve test scores also improve the ability under question. Consider reading - if 
teachers taught the reading skills that were measured in the ‘test’, but these reading 
skills also underpinned reading ability, then teaching to the test in this instance 
would also be improving reading ability. In the same vein, if in physics children are 
taught the appropriate answers to particular questions (children are often given 
homework that comes from GCSE exam papers), but knowing the answers to these 
questions does not underpin scientific reasoning skills, then many children might 
leave school with less than adequate scientific reasoning skills.  
It is important to gain a good understanding of the development of the required 
scientific reasoning skills and how they develop in the classroom in order that 
assessments are designed to measure the skills that students take with them when 
they leave school. Understanding source reliability is one of those crucial scientific 
reasoning skills.  
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4.8 CONCLUSION 
Even though individuals generally have an excellent intuitive understanding of the 
physical world around them, this does not always transfer itself to explicit 
knowledge. It is hoped that good science education will provide the foundation for 
good scientific reasoning skills, that should facilitate decision-making in the 
everyday world. One of the very important skills in scientific reasoning is the 
evaluation of source reliability. Both children and adults have been shown to pay 
attention to source reliability and even very young children have been shown to 
have epistemic awareness regarding what sources might know.  
The aims of this study were to establish at what age children begin discriminate 
between differentially reliable sources in more naturalistic environments, showing 
epistemic awareness; to enable a more direct comparison between the adult and 
child literature on source reliability; to make a direct comparison between the 
implicit and explicit understanding of a specific causal systems; and to examine the 
role that language ability and gender might play. To do that, participants from 
primary and secondary school (aged six to 17 years) were asked to provide 
information regarding their beliefs about a specific causal system, before and after 
being given new information from differentially reliable sources, and after carrying 
out an intervention, whereby they observed the truth of the new information.  
Participants did pay attention to source reliability in that participants in the high 
reliability source group were more likely to make a correct prediction and 
explanation regarding the causal system. However, there was not an effect of age, 
although the younger children may have struggled to incorporate the new 
information. It is possible that this relates to the older participants struggling to 
inhibit their prior beliefs. However, it may also indicate that the source reliability 
manipulation was less effective with older participants. SES factors, which could not 
be taken into account in the analyses, may also have been at play.  
There was a relationship between degree of conviction, and source reliability; 
participants providing a correct response in the high source reliability group were 
more likely to report a higher conviction in their response compared with incorrect 
participants. This allowed comparison with the adult literature on source reliability, 
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which frequently utilises ratings for argument strength to assess participants’ 
understanding of source reliability, and find differences in argument ratings, 
dependant on source reliability. 
Whilst the lack of age-related differences made it difficult to compare the 
developmental trajectory of implicit and explicit causal understanding, there was 
one major difference that could be observed. Participants were much more capable 
of providing correct predictions, drawing on their implicit causal understanding, 
than they were of providing correct explanations, drawing on their explicit causal 
understanding. 
Finally, gender may have played a role in performance. However, there are 
confounding factors that made it difficult to draw conclusions in this study, which 
may also explain the lack of a relationship between language ability and 
performance. SES is likely to have influenced performance as well, but was not 
examined here. 
Both children and adults are faced with the never-ending stream of information in 
the 21st-century that is unprecedented in this world of ‘fake news’. It is crucially 
important in this day and age to be able to evaluate sources, and incorporate the 
information into reasoning about the world dependent on the reliability of the 
sources.  
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Appendix A LETTERS FOR SCHOOLS 
SCHOOL RECRUITMENT EMAIL FOR SCHOOL A & B 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
I would be really grateful if you could pass my request to your head teacher, Ms. XXX.  
Thank you very much for your help, 
Germaine Symons 
 
Dear Ms XXX, 
I am doing some research looking at how children reason about causal systems, and was 
wondering if I could work with the children at XXX? 
I am CRB checked, and my study has the appropriate ethical approval. In fact, the 
children with whom I have already done this study all participated happily, and seemed to 
enjoy what they were doing.  
 
I have attached an information sheet with more details regarding the study.  
 I would be very happy to visit you to discuss this further if you wish. Alternatively, my 
phone number is XXX XXXX. 
Thank you for your time, 
 
Germaine 
Germaine Symons, 
Department of Psychological Sciences, 
Birkbeck University of London, 
Malet St, London WC1E 7HX 
  
TEL: 020 7079 0868 
MOB: XXX XXXX 
EMAIL: g.symons@bbk.ac.uk 
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INFORMATION FOR HEAD TEACHER ATTACHED TO RECRUITMENT EMAIL. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES 
BIRKBECK UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
 
Title of Study:   Understanding causal systems in children  
 
Name of researcher:   Germaine Symons,  
Department of Psychological Sciences,  
Birkbeck University of London,  
Malet St,  
London WC1E 7HX  
TEL: 020 7079 0868  
MOB: XXX XXXX  
EMAIL: g.symons@bbk.ac.uk  
 
We are interested in how children learn about causal systems in everyday life, and 
through the teaching of science. In particular, we are interested in how children 
incorporate information about the causal system into their understanding, when the 
information comes from different sources (e.g. parents, teachers, other children, and so 
on); and how this changes as children get older and become more verbally competent. An 
understanding of the interaction between the utilization of different sources of 
information and age can contribute towards developing more effective methods of 
teaching of science in school.  
We would like to test all Year 2, Year 4, and Year 6 children who consent, and whose 
parents have consented, to their participation.  
The apparatus will be a game with slopes of different surface friction, angle, and starting 
position. A car is run down the slopes and, depending on the particular set up (type of 
surface, angle of slope, starting position on the slope), will travel a certain predictable 
distance. This apparatus represents the causal system we will use to assess children 
understanding.  
We would ask children to ‘play’ with the game, and then ask them questions relating to 
how far they think a car will travel. The children would do this in three sessions. The first 
session would familiarise them with the apparatus, and establish what they already know 
about how the system works. The second introduces new information, and then looks at 
how this information might change their understanding. These first two sessions will be 
only a few days apart. The third session will occur a few weeks later and allows us to 
measure the effect of consolidation of knowledge on understanding.  
Should you be interested, I will provide you with a summary of my findings that can be 
distributed once the study is complete, and/or do a presentation of the findings for anyone 
who wishes to attend.  
The study is supervised by Professor Mike Oaksford. If you wish to contact my supervisor, 
contact details are: Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck University of London, 
Malet St, London WC1E 7HX. TEL: 020 7079 0868 
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Appendix B LETTERS FOR PARENTS 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL PARENTS 
Dept. of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street,  
London, WC1E 7HX 
www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc  
 
Researchers Email Telephone 
Germaine Symons g.symons@bbk.ac.uk XXX XXXX or 020 
7079 8008   
Prof. Mike Oaksford m.oaksford@bbk.ac.uk 020 7079 0868 
Prof. Andy Tolmie a.tolmie@ioe.ac.uk 020 7612 6888 
 
 
Dear Parent / Caregiver, 
 
I am doing a PhD based at Birkbeck, University of London, and work as a developmental 
psychologist. We are starting a project which looks at how children learn about causal 
systems in everyday life, and through the teaching of science. In particular, we want to know 
how information children have received from different people (teachers, parents, other 
children) affects how they understand how the world works. This will both help us 
understand children’s reasoning about the world, and allow us to develop more varied and 
effective ways of teaching science in schools. XXX School, has very kindly agreed for us to be 
involved in this project, and I am writing to ask for your permission for your child to be 
included as a participant in this project. 
 
Firstly, your child would play a language game, where they match spoken words to pictures. 
After that they get to play a game, where they run cars down different types of slopes. We 
then ask them questions about how far they think the car will travel. Your child would do 
this once where they get to play with the game under the guidance of the experimenter, and 
twice under their own guidance. Each session takes approximately 15 minutes. Children 
generally find the games fun and enjoy discussing the different things that might affect how 
far the car travels. We would collect our data by videoing your child’s responses. These 
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video files will be kept in password-protected files, and only accessed by the researcher. All 
information collected will be kept confidential. 
 
For your reassurance, all researchers involved in this investigation have been through the 
formal CRB Disclosure procedure and have been approved by the Birkbeck, University of 
London, to work with children. They also have previous experience working with children, 
both as a researcher and in a school. The project has been reviewed and approved by 
Birkbeck, University of London, Ethics and Research Committee. We would also like to 
emphasise that participation is entirely voluntary and children are free to withdraw from 
the study at any time. All parents will be provided with a summary of our findings (through 
the school) once the study is complete. 
 
We very much hope that you and your child will offer to help us with our research. If you 
have any questions, please contact Germaine Symons by phone or email (see above). If 
your child and you are happy to take part, please sign the attached consent form and return 
it to your class teacher.  
 
Many thanks, 
 
Germaine Symons 
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CONSENT FORM FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL PARENTS 
Dept. of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street,  
London, WC1E 7HX 
www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc  
 
Researchers Email Telephone 
Germaine Symons g.symons@bbk.ac.uk XXX XXXX or 020 
7079 8008   
Prof. Mike Oaksford m.oaksford@bbk.ac.uk 020 7079 0868 
Prof. Andy Tolmie a.tolmie@ioe.ac.uk 020 7612 6888 
 
Consent Form  
 I consent to my son/daughter’s involvement in this study 
 I understand that my son/daughter’s participation in this study is voluntary 
and that I may withdraw them at any point. 
 I understand that all personal information will remain confidential to the 
Investigators.  
 I have received a copy of the information sheet about this study. 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions that I may have about 
the study and have had these answered to my satisfaction. 
 
Name of Child:_______________________________________________________ 
Date of birth of Child:__________________________________________________ 
Parent/ Guardian’s signature:____________________________________________ 
Researcher’s signature:_________________________________________________ 
Date: _____________________________________________________________ 
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INFORMATION SHEET FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL PARENTS 
Dept. of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street,  
London, WC1E 7HX 
www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc  
 
Researchers Email Telephone 
Germaine Symons g.symons@bbk.ac.uk XXX XXXX or 020 
7079 8008   
Prof. Mike Oaksford m.oaksford@bbk.ac.uk 020 7079 0868 
Prof. Andy Tolmie a.tolmie@ioe.ac.uk 020 7612 6888 
 
Dear Parent / Caregiver, 
 
We are doing research based at Birkbeck, University of London, and work as developmental 
psychologists. We are doing a project which looks at how children learn about causal 
systems in everyday life, and through the teaching of science. In particular, we want to know 
how information children have received from different people (teachers, parents, other 
children) affects how they understand how the world works. This will both help us 
understand children’s reasoning about the world, and allow us to develop more varied and 
effective ways of teaching science in schools. We have done this in primary schools, and now 
want to do it in secondary schools. XXX School has very kindly agreed for us to be involved 
in this project, and we are writing to ask for your permission for your child to be included 
as a participant. 
 
Firstly, your child would do a language game, where they match spoken words to pictures. 
After that they get to play a game, and we ask them questions about how the game works. 
Your child would do this twice where they get to play with the game under their own 
guidance, and once under the guidance of the experimenter. Each session takes 
approximately 10-15 minutes, and would take place during lunch or after school.  
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Both children and adults generally find the games fun and enjoy discussing the different 
things that might affect how far the car travels. In return for participating, your child would 
be given a £5 gift voucher.  
 
We would collect our data by videoing your child’s responses. These video files will be kept 
in password-protected files, and only accessed by the researcher. All information collected 
will be kept confidential. 
 
For your reassurance, all researchers involved in this investigation have been through the 
formal DBS Disclosure procedure and have been approved by the Birkbeck, University of 
London, to work with children. They also have previous experience working with children, 
both as a researcher and in a school. The project has been reviewed and approved by 
Birkbeck, University of London, Ethics and Research Committee. We would also like to 
emphasise that participation is entirely voluntary and children are free to withdraw from 
the study at any time. All parents will be provided with a summary of our findings (through 
the school) once the study is complete. 
 
We very much hope that you and your child will offer to help us with our research. If you 
have any questions, please contact Germaine Symons by phone or email (see above). If 
your child and you are happy to take part, please sign the attached consent form and return 
it to Ms Budd (Psychology and Biology teacher).  
 
Many thanks, 
Germaine Symons 
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CONSENT FORM FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL PARENTS 
Dept. of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street,  
London, WC1E 7HX 
www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc  
 
Researchers Email Telephone 
Germaine 
Symons 
g.symons@bbk.ac.uk XXX XXXX 
or 020 
7079 
8008   
Prof. Mike 
Oaksford 
m.oaksford@bbk.ac.uk 020 7079 
0868 
Prof. Andy 
Tolmie 
a.tolmie@ioe.ac.uk 020 7612 
6888 
 
Consent Form for Parents/Caregivers  
 I consent to my son/daughter’s involvement in this study 
 I understand that my son/daughter’s participation in this study is voluntary 
and that I may withdraw them at any point. 
 I understand that all personal information will remain confidential to the 
Investigators.  
 I have received a copy of the information sheet about this study. 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions that I may have about 
the study and have had these answered to my satisfaction. 
 
Name of Child:_______________________________________________________________ 
Date of birth of child: _______________  Yr Group & Class _____________________ 
Parent/ Guardian’s signature:___________________________________________________ 
Researcher’s signature:________________________________________________________ 
Date: ___________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C INFORMATION FOR STUDENTS OVER 16 
CONSENT FORM FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL CHILDREN UNDER 16 
Dept. of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street,  
London, WC1E 7HX 
www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc  
 
Researchers Email Telephone 
Germaine 
Symons 
g.symons@bbk.ac.uk XXX XXXX 
or 020 
7079 
8008   
Prof. Mike 
Oaksford 
m.oaksford@bbk.ac.uk 020 7079 
0868 
Prof. Andy 
Tolmie 
a.tolmie@ioe.ac.uk 020 7612 
6888 
 
 
Consent Form (for students less than 16 years old – Yr 8 & 10) 
 I consent to participating in this study 
 I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I may 
withdraw at any point. 
 I understand that all personal information will remain confidential to the 
Investigators.  
 I have received a copy of the information sheet about this study. 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions that I may have about 
the study and have had these answered to my satisfaction. 
Name: ______________________________________________________________ 
Date of birth: _________________________  Yr Group & Class _________________ 
Signature: ____________________________________________________________ 
Researcher’s signature: _________________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________________________________________________________ 
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INFORMATION SHEET FOR STUDENTS 16 YEARS AND OVER 
Dept. of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street,  
London, WC1E 7HX 
www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc  
 
Researchers Email Telephone 
Germaine 
Symons 
g.symons@bbk.ac.uk XXX XXXX 
or 020 
7079 
8008   
Prof. Mike 
Oaksford 
m.oaksford@bbk.ac.uk 020 7079 
0868 
Prof. Andy 
Tolmie 
a.tolmie@ioe.ac.uk 020 7612 
6888 
 
 
Dear Student, 
 
We are doing research based at Birkbeck, University of London, and work as 
developmental psychologists. We are doing a project which looks at how children 
learn about causal systems in everyday life, and through the teaching of science. In 
particular, we want to know how information children have received from different 
people (teachers, parents, other children) affects how they understand how the 
world works. This will both help us understand children’s reasoning about the 
world, and allow us to develop more varied and effective ways of teaching science 
in schools. We have done this in primary schools, and now want to do it in secondary 
schools. XXX School has very kindly agreed for us to be involved in this project, and 
we are hoping you would like to be included as a participant. 
 
Firstly, you would do a language game, where you match spoken words to pictures. 
After that you get to play a game, and we will ask you questions about how the game 
works. You would do this twice once when you would play with the game under your 
own guidance; and once under the guidance of the experimenter. Each session takes 
approximately 10-15 minutes, and would take place during lunch or after school.  
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Both children and adults generally find the games fun and enjoy discussing the 
different things that might affect how far the car travels. In return for participating, 
you would be given a £5 gift voucher.  
 
We would collect our data by videoing your responses. These video files will be kept 
in password-protected files, and only accessed by the researcher. All information 
collected will be kept confidential. 
 
For your reassurance, all researchers involved in this investigation have been 
through the formal DBS Disclosure procedure and have been approved by the 
Birkbeck, University of London, to work with children. They also have previous 
experience working with children, both as a researcher and in a school. The project 
has been reviewed and approved by Birkbeck, University of London, Ethics and 
Research Committee. We would also like to emphasise that participation is entirely 
voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. You will be 
provided with a summary of our findings (through the school) once the study is 
complete. 
 
We very much hope that you will offer to help us with our research. If you have any 
questions, please contact Germaine Symons by phone or email (see above). If you 
are happy to take part, please sign the attached consent form and return it to XXX 
Many thanks, 
Germaine Symons 
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CONSENT FORM FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL CHILDREN OVER 16 
Dept. of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street,  
London, WC1E 7HX 
www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc  
 
Researchers Email Telephone 
Germaine 
Symons 
g.symons@bbk.ac.uk XXX XXXX 
or 020 
7079 
8008   
Prof. Mike 
Oaksford 
m.oaksford@bbk.ac.uk 020 7079 
0868 
Prof. Andy 
Tolmie 
a.tolmie@ioe.ac.uk 020 7612 
6888 
 
 
Consent Form (for students over 16 years old – Yr 12) 
 I consent to participating in this study 
 I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I may 
withdraw at any point. 
 I understand that all personal information will remain confidential to the 
Investigators.  
 I have received a copy of the information sheet about this study. 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions that I may have about 
the study and have had these answered to my satisfaction. 
Name: ______________________________________________________________ 
Date of birth: _________________________  Yr Group & Class _________________ 
Signature: ____________________________________________________________ 
Researcher’s signature: _________________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
